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A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COAL TRADE: 1850 - 1913 
 
Abstract 
 
Coal was of great importance to the continuing dominance of Great Britain in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. From 1815 to 1914, the Pax Britannica was built on a 
steady exploitation of Britain’s coal resources. The factories that built the country’s many 
manufactures ran on steam turbines powered by the ‘black diamonds’ dug up from across the 
nation, South Wales to Scotland. The nation’s homes were heated and its electricity generated 
by burning great mountains of it. The ships that protected the shores and projected  power 
across the waves ran, during this period, almost exclusively on coal, as did the ships bringing 
the raw materials of the planet to ‘the workshop of the world’. Yet in this last regard, the 
crucial role played by coaling stations set about the planet’s coastlines has never yet been truly 
appreciated. In order to do this, it is necessary to discuss coal more generally and its 
importance to the British transport economy. This must be done both domestically (in terms 
of London’s dominant role in the British coal market, particularly for coal from the North 
East) and internationally (based around the South Wales coalfield and its use as a ballast to 
enable Britain’s imports), not to mention the dominance of steamships in international trade 
before the First World War – the latter a topic riven by debate. Furthermore, given the absence 
of scholarly work on coaling stations themselves, once their importance is established it is vital 
to undertake a study of their structure and variety, the firms and alliances behind their creation 
and to see if these were in fact a great British success story in a period traditionally associated 
with British entrepreneurial failure.  
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Preface 
This project has had many guises, many drafts and discussed many things. It has been a work 
of great joy and great frustration. Starting from an imperial basis in my undergraduate 
dissertation many years ago, building into a Masters where I undertook some preliminary 
primary research and then further into the thesis with much more, (not to mention 
significant additional secondary reading) I have struggled to create the thesis that I know is 
out there. The struggle is simultaneously the size of the topic to be tackled, and the 
surprising absence of relevant primary sources. Nobody thought to keep the contracts and 
the correspondence, the stuff of day-to-day business. The temptation is to take the topic and 
return to it its original, imperial roots by assessing the impact of coal and the strategy for 
coaling the Royal Navy. However, this is not only a part of the story, rather than an over-
arching narrative, but it has also been done. When I started on this project many years ago, 
whilst many scholars wrote about coal exports from the UK and Germany and mentioned 
Canadian or South African or Chinese imports of the same, there seemed little interest in 
how that functioned or, indeed, how the ships that carried that cargo were fuelled on their 
voyages. Now there seems to have been a revival of interest. In particular, Gray’s thesis on 
coaling stations and the Royal Navy from 2014 has explored the military angle more or less 
as completely as the sources allow. Professor Boyns has been writing new articles, and 
indeed it seems a new little circle of interested academics is exploring this little-known bit of 
history. Therefore I present this as my contribution to that field of study; but accept its 
limitations and its omissions. I have scoured the archives and present an attempt to 
demonstrate just what the Coal Trade meant to Britain.   
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“The process of extracting and refining the historical data of the coal industry 
exhibits some of the characteristics of the industry itself: it is labour-intensive, 
technically complex and not always rewarding.”1 
 
 
                                                 
1 B. Dietz, ‘The North East Coal Trade, 1550 – 1750: Measures, Markets and the Metropolis’, Northern History, 
22 (1986), pp.280 – 294. 
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 “Our foreign coal trade has been, is, and will be an integral and essential part of our system. It 
is the alpha and omega of our trade.”2 
 
Introduction 
Coal is a well-studied field, with the black diamonds having provided for an 
extensive historiography regarding miners, capitalists, communism, working conditions, 
technological change and social upheaval. Coal has fascinated historians since the Victorian 
period as Britain’s prosperity rested squarely upon its coal reserves. However, if one focuses 
in upon the coal export trade itself, then the historiography is distinctly more Victorian in 
nature and book-ended by the tomes of Jevons and Jevons, albeit with a few honourable 
modern exceptions. The first Jevons’ somewhat doom-laden account of the British coal 
industry perhaps puts it most succinctly: “Our foreign coal trade has been, is, and will be an 
integral and essential part of our system. It is the alpha and omega of our trade.”3 Written 
originally in 1865, these words were to prove true until the outbreak of the First World War 
some fifty years later, when his own son wrote a book on the same topic similarly 
expounding the importance of the coal trade. Whilst the younger Jevons’ work may have 
proved somewhat inaccurate (including as it does, a prediction that coal output would peak 
at 902 million tons by the year 2101), the continuing interest in the coal trade does reflect an 
appreciation of its contemporary importance to the nation.4 
The developments in historiography of the British coal industry are demonstrated by 
the introductory note to the 1969 edition of Jevons’ work. “Jevons may not always fully satisfy 
                                                 
2 W.S. Jevons, The Coal Question (London, 1906; first edition 1865); p.315 
3 Ibid., p.315. 
4 H,S, Jevons, The British Coal Trade (London, 1969; first edition 1915); p.752. 
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us with his analysis of the economic and social problems of the mines and their workmen, but 
he is stimulating and free from narrow preconceptions.”5 This is somewhat of a reference to 
the continued domination of the subject by histories of the miner and his social condition.6 
This is where a lot of historiographical time has been spent, and rightly so. The developments 
of industry, mechanical cutting, safety lamps and working conditions, the impact on 
community, society and the environment have all been weighed, sifted and measured by a 
range of metrics. Indeed, even the issues of measurement itself, and how standardisation and 
industry-led change resulted in a more efficient trade have been studied and demonstrated by 
Velkar.7 
Yet between these two poles, that of the wide-ranging social study of coal’s impacts 
and the detailed examination of its key elements, there remains a neglected mid-ground relating 
to the coal export trade during the pre-war period. Palmer is somewhat of a lone recent voice, 
agreeing with the Royal Commission of 1918, which stated that “in many ways this trade is 
the key to an understanding of the carrying trade” as British (or more accurately Welsh) steam 
coal came to be vital in the shipping trade of nearly all nations.8 This, of course, echoes the 
earlier quote of Jevons, emphasising the continuity that has characterised discussion of the 
coal export trade in this period. However, whilst this continuity may have lasted from 1865 to 
the present day, it is perhaps also a symptom of the topic’s languishing at the bottom of the 
register for historical investigation. Coal exports are most frequently viewed, rather than as a 
topic in their own right, as a tangent off the more general topics of either coal production, a 
subject which has attracted many a pen, or merely as an indistinguishable part of the mechanics 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p.ix. 
6 See, for example, R. Church, (ed.), The History of the British Coal Industry: Volume III (Oxford, 1986). 
7 Chapter 4 of A. Velkar, Measurements and Markets in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge, 2012). 
8 S. Palmer, ‘The British Coal Export Trade, 1850 – 1913’ in D. Alexander & R. Omner (eds.); Volumes not 
Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trades (Newfoundland, 1979); p.334. 
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of Britain’s imports and exports. An exception to this rule can be made for Gray, who has 
been working on how the shift to steam from wind power affected the Royal Navy, which by 
necessity also looks into some elements of coaling stations abroad.9 However, Thomas’ work 
from 1903 remains the best source at isolating and demonstrating the importance of coal 
export trade in this period, its in-depth discussion of its many facets making it rather essential 
reading for any historian of the British coal industry.10  
The Victorian nature of much of this historiography perhaps reflects the paucity of 
sources surviving into the present day. Between the switch to oil fuel, the nationalisation of 
many of the coal firms into the National Coal Board and the dry and universal nature of ship 
coaling, very little business minutiae has survived to the present day. Contracts between 
shipping firms that no longer exist, with coaling agents that are no longer, alongside orders 
for coal from now-defunct firms, were not, it seems, deemed worthy of archiving to any 
great extent. Even the records from the Cardiff Coal Exchange offer, upon investigation, 
little in the way of detailed practice – instead more often being a box of mortgage papers. 
The National Archives offer some little material from a Royal Naval perspective, which I 
have looked at (and which has also provided Gray with some of his insights) whilst the 
National Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers in Newcastle offers a frustrating 
silence to many coal export related questions about what happens once the coal leaves the 
pit.  
Nevertheless, some historians are returning to this period and topic of study, 
noticing the lacuna of analysis as I have done, but in many cases progressing significantly 
                                                 
9 This work has been carried out, it seems, simultaneously with my own, albeit it at a faster pace. See S. Gray, 
Black Diamonds: coal, the Royal Navy and British Imperial Coaling Stations, circa 1870 – 1914 (Warwick, 2014) 
Unpublished PhD Thesis accessed online: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/63697/ 
10 D.A. Thomas, ‘The Growth and Direction of Our Foreign Trade in Coal During the Last Half Century’, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Vol. 66, No. 3 (Sep, 1903), pp.439 – 533. 
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faster. Gray, as mentioned, as already looked at how the Royal Navy switched from wind to 
coal and thence to oil for its fuel, and in doing so has touched upon the role of coaling 
stations in fuelling that particular fleet.11 Looking at the role of Welsh coal in protecting the 
trade between Britain and South America, Gray and Boyns have sought to state that Welsh 
coal has been overlooked as a significant element of ‘informal empire’ in the period 1850 – 
1913.12 However, whilst many works reference coaling stations in passing, as the end point 
for much of British output, for example, analysis of how they functioned in the period is 
limited. Harley has undertaken some work that sought to play down the role of coaling 
stations in enabling trade and lowering freight rates, arguing that they were simply sellers of 
fuel to ships based on the cost of coal plus distance.13 This traditional viewpoint is assessed 
in Chapter 5, which seeks to demonstrate that it crucially negates three important elements 
of how coaling stations worked, briefly that coal itself had a somewhat special freight rate of 
its own. that not all shipping legs were to/from the United Kingdom and not all coal was 
from the United Kingdom. Wegerich has looked into the provision of bunker coal from 
domestic sources and its impact on the supply of coal to steamers at ports in South Africa 
and India and provided some key examples for the last point, which can be expanded to 
look at non-domestic coal provision elsewhere.14 
However, through looking at the records of firms that do survive, those of the Aden 
Coal Company, Wilson Co & Sons, Lambert Brothers and some from the various Cory 
                                                 
11 See S. Gray, Black Diamonds, passim. 
12 T. Boyns & S. Gray, ‘Welsh Coal and the Informal Empire in South America, 1850 - 1913’, Atlantic Studies: 
Global Currents, Volume 13, Issue 1, (2016), pp.53-77. 
13 Harley, C. K., ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740 – 1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention 
Reaffirmed’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec. 1988) for example. However it should be noted 
that a fuller exploration of this theory is provided in Chapter 5. 
14 A. Wegerich, A Second Force in Coal Price Convergence: the spread of coal mining and competition in the world bunker coal 
market, 1883 - 1938, [accessed via: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/] (Oxford University, 2015), 
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firms, this thesis seeks to demonstrate what it can about how these businesses were run as 
well as the scale and mechanics of their operation. It is through looking at these business 
records that much of the understanding developed in the latter half of the thesis is 
developed, to determine the nature and shape of the coal export and coaling station trade. In 
addition to the companies named previously and based in South Wales, Pyman, Bell & Co. 
and the papers of Witherington and Everett provide a contrasting image from the North 
East allowing the two key exporting areas to be contrasted not just in terms of output but 
also in terms of their approach. 
In doing this, the thesis seeks to add fresh evidence to an area of historiography that 
is well-populated, but where case studies of individual sectors and industries remain useful.  
Whilst the debate about whether or not entrepreneurialism in Britain before the First World 
War has been well-played out (and, indeed, relates heavily to the coal mining industry, as 
shown in Chapter 1), further evidence is always welcome, and so the historiography is lightly 
touched upon throughout this thesis. However, more recent thought in the field has sought 
to explore what, indeed, is meant by entrepreneurialism, and whether rather than 
disappearing from the UK before the First World War, it instead moved in new and 
different directions. Rather than a traditional rise before the mid-century and then a steady 
decline in the latter half, Crafts argued that a steadier and less dramatic pattern of more 
consistent growth was appropriate and Broadberry indicated that entrepreneurialism moved 
from manufacturing to transport infrastructure and service provision.15 Casson has suggested 
that this growth, without America’s vast land resources, instead was focused elsewhere 
                                                 
15 N. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution, (New York, 1985). Crafts worked alongside 
Harley in helping to re-align viewpoints of economic growth in the 18th and 19th centuries, and it is therefore 
interesting that this thesis therefore seeks to support one of the pair, whilst suggesting revisions to the other. 
For Broadberry, see S.N. Broadberry, Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850 – 2000: British Performance in 
International Perspective (Cambridge, 2006). 
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including the provision of imperial infrastructure.16 This thesis, in seeking to move the focus 
towards the export coal trade and the provision of coal abroad to help support the imperial 
and global trade networks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries certainly fits 
into those moulds, being another case study to add more weight to their 
arguments.  Therefore the importance of these coaling stations and the dynamic services 
they provided will also be considered.    
Finally, there are also questions about the nature of entrepreneurship and how this 
can be determined in a field. If, as Chandler has argued through business histories, the slow 
move into professional management and marketing by British firms demonstrates a lack of 
entrepreneurship, then the dynamic nature of the coaling station industry and its chasing of 
business from shippers would potentially provide an alternative (see Chapter 6).17 However, 
if it is instead through innovative approaches away from a traditional hierarchical view such 
as this, then coaling stations may also offer something to the debate, with examples of 
corporate composition (such as constellations of free-standing firms managed out of a small 
head-office in Cardiff or London like Lambert Brothers) as well as larger firms such as Cory 
Brothers (also covered in Chapter 6).18 
Whilst the firms may have differed in size, in terms of scale more broadly it is 
undeniable that in 1913 the world ran on coal. The League of Nations, in the inter-war 
period, sought to measure this and estimated that over 71% of the world’s energy came from 
                                                 
16 M. Casson & A. Godley, ‘Entrepreneurship in Britain, 1830 – 1900’ in D Landes, J. Mokyr & W. Baumol 
(eds.) The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times (Princeton, 2010) p.220-
221 
17 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge,1990). 
18 M. Wilkins, ‘The Free-Standing Company, 1870–1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment’, Economic History Review, 41, (1986) pp.259–282 and further developed in M. Wilkins & H. Schroter, 
The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy, 1830–1996, (Oxford, 1998). 
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coal, compared to only 4.5% from oil, 1.4% from natural gas and 2.4% from water power.19 
Britain’s power supply was even more concentrated, with 92.9% of Britain’s energy coming 
from coal, and only 6.1% coming from oil. Whilst coal was consumed all over the world, 
production was focused in a number of countries which had been endowed with accessible 
coal deposits.  
Table 0.1: Production and Consumption of Coal (1913) – Selected Countries20 
Production Consumption 
Country Total  
(m 
tons) 
% of Total 
Production 
Country Total 
(m 
tons) 
Per 
Capita 
% of Total 
Consumption 
United 
States 
517.1 41.2% United 
States 
489.0 5.1 39.0% 
Great 
Britain 
292.0 23.3% Great 
Britain 
192.0 4.2 15.3% 
Germany 209.5 16.7% Germany 179.0 2.7 14.3% 
France 40.3 3.2% France 62.0 1.6 4.9% 
Austria-
Hungary 
36.5 2.9% 
Austria-
Hungary 
48.0 1.0 3.8% 
Russia 36.0 2.9% Canada 29.0 4.0 2.3% 
Belgium 22.8 1.8% Belgium 27.0 3.5 2.2% 
 
As can be seen from Table 0.1, the three leading producers of coal were the United 
States of America, Great Britain and Germany, by quite some margin. However, there was a 
sizeable gap between the amount of coal produced and the amount of coal consumed. 
France, for example, consumed over 20 million tons more than it produced, Austria-
Hungary some 12 million tons.21 Similarly, the United States produced 28 million tons more 
                                                 
19 Unless stated otherwise, figures in this passage come from International Labour Office, League of Nations, 
The World Coal-Mining Industry (Geneva, 1938), p.32. The remainder of the world energy supply, incidentally, was 
made up of 2.7% from Lignite and 17.4% from firewood. 
20 Sourced from the League of Nations, World Coal-Mining. World Coal Production can be found on pp. 62-3, 
whilst World Coal Consumption is on p.70. 
21 A note on terminology: in any text relating to the coal industry, there are of course, the three types of tonne: 
the metric tonne, the British or “long ton” (1,016.047 kg) and the American or “short ton” (907.1847 kg). 
Generally speaking, I have used British tons throughout, unless demonstrated in the spelling as being a metric 
tonne (see, for example, the table above). If I have had to use short tons I have marked this adequately. 
However, there may have been a few errors where the wrong spelling has been applied. As we are dealing with 
high-level assessment rather than actually entering into a transaction ourselves, I hope this is forgivable. 
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than it consumed, Germany some 30.5 million tons more and Britain an astounding 100 
million tons more. As a result, approximately 16.5% of the world’s coal production was 
entered into the foreign trade, moving the coal between countries with a surplus and those 
with a deficit in general, although there are, as ever, some exceptions.22  Indeed, it is 
noticeable that countries aside from the United Kingdom often appear to be both importers 
and exporters of coal (see Table 0.2)23: 
Table 0.2: Selected Countries’ Contribution to Total amount of Coal Exported or Imported 
Globally (1913)24 
 
Exports Imports 
Britain 48.3% 
Austria-
Hungary 
2.7% France 15.1% Italy 6.8% 
Germany 22.1% Japan 1.8% Holland 14.4% Belgium 6.8% 
USA 14.4% Australia 1.0% Canada 10.9% Russia 6.3% 
Belgium 3.4% France 0.9% Germany 9.8% Argentina 2.6% 
Holland 3.1% China 0.7% 
Austria-
Hungary 
9.6% Japan 2.5% 
 
 The import and export of coal, therefore, was not some homogeneous entity being 
moved to meet supply, but instead this hints at the complex nature of the international coal 
trade, with different grades and types of coal moving across borders, each for different 
purposes. For example, differing coals from the North East could be used for various 
purposes (ranging from gas works to domestic consumption via railway fuel), all of which 
affected how they were bought, shipped and sold. These distinctions are often smoothed 
over when looking at high-level numbers, and this thesis seeks to dig down and explore the 
                                                 
22 This includes coal shipped as bunker fuel on foreign journeys; excluding these figures makes it 12.6%. 
23 As a result of having read far too many documents written before the First World War, in which the United 
Kingdom, Britain and Great Britain were used interchangeably, there is a chance this may have occurred in this 
text too. Generally this needn’t cause a problem in ensuring full understanding of the coal movements, as 
Ireland produced no coal of her own, and so all shipments were coming from Great Britain and the present day 
UK. This means that shipments to Ireland are not counted as exports, instead these are coastal, domestic 
journeys. 
24 This includes coal shipped as bunker fuel on foreign journeys. 
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differences and how they shaped the export of coal from Britain and the nation’s role at the 
centre of the 19th century coal export trade, in particular regarding the provision of fuel for 
steamships within the wider context of the coal industry more broadly.  
Therefore, this thesis concisely lay outs, the context in which the coal trade was to 
happen before assessing it in more detail. Chapter One therefore briefly considers the state 
of mining in the country in 1850, and how this changed through to 1914, as it was down the 
mine that the coal trade story begins. Having established that the technology used down the 
mines remained broadly static during this period, despite the increase in output, it continues 
to explore the changes that occurred as a result of the coal industry in the nineteenth century 
to the methods of transportation available. In particular, it briefly considers the spread of the 
railways across the United Kingdom and how this enabled and consumed Britain’s coal 
output. It then proceeds to assess how big a role steam shipping had in the world economy 
before the First World War, and how this progressed whilst being fuelled, of course, by coal. 
This provides a crucial framework to demonstrate how the shipment of coal was enabled 
and shaped by technological and geographical considerations. It also considers a number of 
long-standing historical debates about the coal and shipping industry, in order to further set 
the historical scene within which the coal trade sits. 
Therefore, having established the context in which the coal trade could occur, both in 
terms of the extraction of the key product but also its shipment to (and in some cases its 
consumption by) the end user, Chapter Two looks into the trade in coal from the north east 
of the country. This centres on the rivers of the Tyne and Wear and the direction of the exports 
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from this coal centre.25 This chapter also includes a diversion to assess the coastal trade down 
to London, which was the oldest part of the coal trade, and it will look into how the shipping 
industry adjusted and adapted to the coming of the railways as competitors in this trade. In 
trying to understand the trade it will use the company records of Witherington and Everett, a 
coal exporter which ran ships to both the continent and London. This is a necessary diversion 
as the London trade was such a large part of the coal trade from the north east, as well as often 
being integrated into wider European movements.  
Chapter Three assesses the other half of the British coal trade, namely the shipment 
of coal from South Wales. A trade which had only started in the early nineteenth century but 
which would come to completely dominate the South Wales economy, the export of coal was 
a defining feature of South Wales in this period. Developing the work of Thomas (Viscount 
Rhondda himself) it will seek to understand the role that these exports had in enabling the 
British (and, indeed, the European and world) economies to function in the way it did in the 
late nineteenth century through its enabling of large-scale imports of food and raw materials.   
Of this coal, the Admiralty were a key purchaser, and Chapter Four takes a brief look 
at the role of the Admiralty and, by extension, the impact of wider government on the British 
Coal Trade. In particular the imposition of the coal export tax as a result of the Boer War and 
the reaction of the coal merchants, and the impact of the tax are assessed.  
The coal from South Wales that was not bought by the Admiralty was often exported 
for further navigation purposes, be it for steam railways in foreign lands or to provide fuel for 
steam-ships in locations where there was no suitable local supply. Indeed, providing coal for 
                                                 
25 Pleasingly, of course, those from Newcastle-upon-Tyne are called Geordies after the coal mining safety lamp, 
whilst those from the Sunderland on the Wear are named Mackems as a legacy of their mack-ing [building] of 
the ships. 
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steamships around the world took perhaps the majority of this export.26 Chapter Five therefore 
seeks to drill down and explore this further, setting out the role that these coaling stations had 
in enabling world trade to be undertaken by steam power, and explain how a historical 
approach which has downplayed their importance should be re-assessed, falling more in line 
with contemporary viewpoints on the role of coaling stations. In particular, this chapter will 
look at the orthodoxy that coaling stations were of minimal importance in expanding and 
enabling trade in any way beyond the provision of fuel (at a premium) in locations where it 
was scarce. Instead Chapter Five shall demonstrate how coaling stations had a far more 
significant impact upon the shape of world trade, whilst also showing that fuel costs were not 
simply a function of “cost at Cardiff, plus shipping” but instead determined by a range of 
different factors. 
Having established that coaling stations played an important role in the world 
economy between 1850 and 1914, Chapter Six therefore lays out what is known about the 
business aspect of these stations. Using both primary and secondary material, it demonstrates 
how firms in the industry varied in size, from single station minnows, through regional 
corporations and up to globe-striding networks, as well as seeking to understand how best 
they operated. Using the records of various companies that have survived, and from both the 
North East and South Wales trades, it lays out some information on how business was 
conducted, including attempts at collusion and how the industry dealt with external factors 
such as freight-rate depressions to provide a more detailed look at this unique area. 
Therefore this thesis has essentially four aims. Firstly it will seek to place the coal 
export trade of the period in context through analysing how the changes that surrounded it 
                                                 
26 The Economist at the time certainly reckoned so, estimating that of the 57,860,327 million tons of coal Britain 
exported in 1900, around 30,000,000 were destined for steamer consumption around the world. Issue 3039, 
23/11/1901 
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enabled it to be. Secondly, it will explore the coal export trade in its own right, disentangled 
from these wider changes (as much as is possible). Thirdly it will seek to look at one particular 
element of the coal trade which has, to date, not been studied in any great depth – that of 
coaling stations abroad and how these were serviced and managed and the impact this had. 
Finally, throughout the thesis, relevant secondary debates will be brought in to assess whether 
coaling stations (or the broader coal export trade) can bring new contributions to either 
confirm or confound existing historical consensus; in essence using this new lens to re-
examine long-running historiographical concerns. In 2019, for example, we are still 
considering the extent and depth of pre-war productivity changes, building on the long-
running discussion relating to whether pre-war Britain was complacent and lagging behind its 
peers, or instead proceeding as best and efficiently as it could in new directions away from 
traditional manufacturing.27 
The coal export trade may have staggered on into the second half of the twentieth 
century, however after the First World War and the rise of oil fuel, it was a long, drawn-out 
decline, hastened by the sinking of tonnage in both World Wars.28 The period of 1850 – 1913 
therefore saw the birth and maturity of a distinct industry and trade upon which 
contemporaries fully believed the prosperity of the country was resoundingly based. It is 
perhaps due to this early decline from 1913 onwards that the business of coaling stations has 
been somewhat neglected, resulting in it being under-studied and poorly understood; this 
thesis seeks to remind us of what the Victorians already knew.  
  
                                                 
27  See, for example, N. Crafts, & T.C. Mills, ‘The Pre-1914 UK Productivity Slowdown: A Reappraisal’, 
Warwick Working Papers Series (Aug., 2019). 
28 The Merchant Navy lost around 7,759,090 tons of shipping to U-Boats in the First World War, and 11.7 
million tons in the Second, out of an Allied total of 14.7 million tons. This latter number was over half (54%) 
of the Merchant Navy extant at the start of World War II. Friel, I., Maritime History of Britain and Ireland, 
(London, 2003), pp.245 - 250. 
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Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel 
A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COAL TRADE: 1850 - 1913 
 
 “The extraordinary success and activity of the coal industry in the period 1880 - 1913, the 
high profits, the overflowing royalties, implanted standards of what was normal and natural in the minds 
of many collier owners, managements and royalty owners which were carried over into the post war 
period.”29 
 
Chapter One: Coal in Context 
 
The coal trade begins with the coal itself, and so it is necessary to look into how the 
coal industry functioned and developed alongside the period of the coal trade being considered 
as part of this thesis. Therefore this chapter seeks to explore a high-level exploration of the 
mining and transport of coal in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so that the trade 
and movment of that coal beyond the UK’s shores can be better understood. This is 
particularly of use given that the transport of coal to the docks for onward travel was an 
important contributory factor to the shape and size of the trade, whilst some of the 
historiographical concerns laid out about the coal industry more broadly will also be explored 
so that they can later be assessed through the lens of the coal trade itself.  
In the nineteenth century, coal consumption increased dramatically. Between 1885 and 
1913, for example, consumption per head of the population increased from 3.63 tonnes per 
head in the UK to 4.17 tonnes. However, Britain’s growth was slow due to its nature as an 
increasingly mature, industrialised economy. Other countries experienced more dramatic 
increases: from 2.25 to 3.41 tonnes per head in Belgium,  1.09 to 2.34 tonnes per head in 
Germany, 0.68 to 3.81 tonnes per head in Canada and 1.79 to 5.10 tonnes per head in the 
United State of America as industrialisation spread across the globe.30 However, unlike the 
                                                 
29 W.H.B. Court, ‘Problems of the British Coal Industry Between the Wars’, Economic History Review, Vol. XV 
(1945), p.3. 
30 The figures in this paragraph come from J.H. Jones, G. Cartwright & P.H. Guenault, The Coal-Mining Industry: 
An International Study in Planning (London, 1939), p.16. 
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industrialisation that coal powered world-wide, there was not a step-change in the technology 
utilised in mining. In a UK context, the great change in working patterns, from bank work or 
“pit and stall” working to longwall working had mostly been completed by 1850.31 This 
enabled more of the coal to be worked and less to be left behind, supporting the roofs, as well 
as improving safety. Griffin has suggested that until this shift, the small size of the colliery 
workings and the methods employed had limited most pits to producing fewer than 50 tonnes 
per day in the 1840s.32 
Whilst improving ventilation (the gradual replacement of a furnace at the bottom of 
the shaft using convection to move air around the mine with mechanically powered fans - a 
process that was generally complete by 1900) carried on throughout the period, there was 
generally little improvement in the technology used at the coalface itself.33 Coal-winning in 
Britain before the First World War remained pick and shovel work, with the coal-miner 
dependent largely on his own muscle, conducting his intensely skilled and cooperative 
handicraft using the same techniques as they had 70 years earlier.34 The only exception to this 
rule was the growing use of gunpowder, which lightened the burden of breaking down the 
coal, albeit at the somewhat increased risk of explosions.35 
Similarly, the use of steam power combined with the development of cages (often 
multi-layered) travelling up and down the shaft on guiding rails increased capacity. In the 
                                                 
31 The discussion of the different approaches to working a coal mine is not necessarily relevant for more than 
this passing mention here. However nearly any text covering coal mines in the nineteenth century will have a 
chapter dedicated to this transition, the culture of the men and traditional practices and regional variation in its 
implementation. Similarly the developments in mine safety are not discussed in this section; an interesting but 
tangential narrative on Davy lamps, Stephenson, whether or not they were effective and their gradual 
development and adoption was not deemed necessary. For fuller accounts of these developments, see J. Nef, 
The Rise of the British Coal Industry (Oxford, 1966) and R. Church, History of the British Coal Industry Volume III. 
32 A.R. Griffin, The British Coal-Mining Industry (Buxton, 1977), p.109. 
33 B.R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800 - 1914 (Cambridge, 1984), p.80. Although 
the last ventilation furnace (Walsall Wood, Staffordshire) was not extinguished until 1950. 
34 W.H.B. Court, ‘Problems of the British Coal Industry’, p.5. 
35 A.R. Griffin, The British Coal-Mining Industry, p.108. 
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North East, this doubled the winding capacity of the mine from 300 to between 600 to 800 
tonnes a day. The use of better winding engines meant that capacity could increase quite 
quickly. Cinderhill Colliery, Nottinghamshire, installed an engine with a winding capacity of 
500 - 600 tonnes a shift in 1849, and by 1854 a second shaft was sunk where the engine had a 
capacity of over 1,000 tonnes a shift.36 Indeed, the mid-century was a period that saw the 
creation of a recognisable coal-mining industry: 
They had efficient furnace ventilation, massive pumping and winding equipment, safe, 
well-constructed shafts, with wheeled tubs, cages and guide rails, mechanical haulage with rails 
above and below ground, coal screening plant and all the other features of a late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century colliery. Within the space of twenty years (1840 - 1860) almost all the old 
inefficient collieries had been either reconstructed and re-equipped on similar lines or had closed; 
and other new and efficient collieries had been opened.37 
 
This did not change significantly in the period up until the First World War, aside from 
gradually, evolutionary improvement in individual facets. A large part of this was due to the 
lifespan of the collieries themselves. In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war (during 
which coal prices had risen significantly) 1,401 new pits were sunk by 1875. As a result of this, 
‘certainly more than half and possibly as much as two-thirds’ of the coal produced in 1913 
came from collieries which had been planned before 1875.38 Whilst on each upswing of the 
trade cycle new collieries showcasing the latest techniques were sunk, and those old collieries 
that were suitable were re-equipped so as to enable work on deeper, more difficult seams, this 
meant that to a certain extent technological innovation was limited to newer mines or those 
that could be re-cast suitably. What this resulted in was a situation where in order to boost 
output to meet the increasing demand after 1880, it was necessary to employ more men for 
more hours at more pits. Employment in British coal mining increased from 492,000 in 1883 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p.109. 
37 Ibid., p.109. 
38 A.J. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’ in D.H. Aldcroft, The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 
1875 – 1914 (London,1968), p.67. 
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to 1,107,000 in 1913 – an increase of 125%.39 Output per head sank; the average for the five 
year period of 1879/83 was 319 tonnes, for 1889/93 it was 282 tonnes and by 1909/13, it was 
only 257 tonnes.40 However, it should be noted that this output remained high when compared 
with other major coal-producing nations, with only the United States being more productive.41 
Comparison with the United States is often undertaken, highlighting the difference in the way 
that coal was cut. Whilst in the United Kingdom the number of mechanised coal cutters in 
use rose from 311 in 1900 to 2,897 in 1913, with the proportion of output cut mechanically 
rising from 1.49% to 8.72% over the same period.42 By way of contrast, on the other side of 
the Atlantic the numbers rose from 3,907 in 1900 to 16,381 in 1913, increasing the proportion 
of coal won mechanically from 25.1% in 1900 to 50.7% in 1913.43 That increased 
mechanisation would have helped to improve labour productivity is a standard argument 
levelled as evidence of the lack of enterprise on behalf of the late Victorian entrepreneur.44 Yet 
there is some evidence that mechanisation did take place where conditions merited it: 
  
                                                 
39 A.J. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry: 1850 – 1914’, 
Economic History Review, 2nd Series, Vol. SIV, (August, 1968), p.62. 
40 M.W. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry, 1870 - 1846 (London, 1977), p.7. 
41 W.H.B. Court, ‘Problems of the British Coal Industry’, p.4. 
42 C.A. Paull, Mechanisation in British and American Bituminous Coal Mines, 1890 - 1939 (London University M. Phil 
Thesis, 1965)  p.112 (number of coal cutters) and p.136 (proportions lifted). 
43 Ibid. p.136. 
44 A.J. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’, p.69. For an excellent summary of both the attacks and their steady rebuttal, 
see D.N. McCloskey, & L.G. Sandberg, ‘From Damnation to Redemption: Judgements on the Late Victorian 
Entrepreneur’, Explorations in Economic History, Volume 9, 1971 – 1972, pp.89-108. 
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Table 1.1: Mechanisation in British Coalfields, (1907 & 1913) – Percentage of Output cut by 
Machine by Coalfield45 
 
Coalfield 1907 1913 
Scotland 10.9 21.7 
Yorkshire & East Midlands A 6.5 0.2 
North East and Cumberland 3.6 6.0 
Lancashire & North Wales 3.8 7.7 
South Wales …. 1.1 
North Staffordshire 4.5 n/a 
South Staffordshire 1.1 n/a 
Midland & Southern B ... 4.3 
A - includes Leicestershire and Warwickshire in 1907 
B - comprises West Midlands, Leicestershire, Warwickshire, Somerset and 
Gloucestershire 
 
As can be seen, the difference between regions is noticeable, which would suggest that 
there is some scope to accept that colliery owners invested in machinery only when to do so 
would be effective. Furthermore, whilst comparisons with the United States show the United 
Kingdom as a country significantly behind, Taylor has noted that the mechanical harvesting 
of coal made greater progress in Great Britain than in any of the continental European 
countries.46 Similarly, despite having access to the world’s most well-established and liquid 
stock exchange, that only limited recourse was had to it implies that there was not a great 
demand for funds to re-fit mines for the age of mechanisation that was beginning. As late as 
1925 almost half of British coal was being mined by private companies.47 Whilst hardly 
concrete evidence, this would suggest that there is some scope for consideration that 
                                                 
45 B.R. Mitchell, Development of the British Coal Industry, p.82. 
46 A.J. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’, p.56. 
47 M.W. Kirby, British Coalmining, p.8. 
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mechanisation was not inhibited by a lack of available capital and nor was it neglected entirely. 
It would seem to have been an option that was available to those who felt that their 
undertaking would profit from it. However given the different nature of British seams (which 
tended to be narrower and more broken up) compared to the large, dense deposit basins of 
the USA where mechanised coal-cutting was far more widespread, a knee-jerk reaction to 
castigate British mine owners for lacing entrepreneurial drive seems a touch hasty. It is unclear 
that the traditional view of the British businessman in the period as having “an attitude to new 
techniques which combined ignorance, indifference, hostility, prejudice and complacency in a 
dosage which ranged from the damaging to the lethal” is therefore necessarily accurate, if 
mechanical coal cutting was being put into place where it was most effective.48  Indeed, as 
Mitchell has suggested: 
The pre-1914 British coal industry, with its numerous independent entrepreneurial units, 
must have been one of the closest approximations to the model of pure competition that it is 
possible to get. And this should surely make us pause, and wonder how, if the many that failed 
to adopt mechanical cutting were as unenterprising as all that in failing to pursue cost-reduction 
(and profit maximisation), they managed to get away with it.49 
 
 ‘Get away with it’ they certainly managed, with output increasingly steadily during the 
period studied. Although that is not to deny that the industry was cyclical in nature, with 
troughs (1879, 1886, 1895-6, 1905 and 1909) and peaks (1872, 1883, 1890, 1900, 1907 and 
1913). 50 Broadly speaking, however there is a narrative of growing output, even if it was to be 
surpassed by that of America. As Clapham noted: ‘Half a continent is likely in the course of 
time to raise more coal and make more steel than a small island, although this fact still surprised 
people between 1890 and 1910.’51 Britain, having been a pioneer in the large, industrialised 
                                                 
48 D.C. Coleman & C. Macleod, ‘Attitudes to New Techniques: British Businessmen, 1800 – 1950’, Economic 
History Review, 2nd ser. XXXIX, 4 (1986), pp.588-611. 
49 B.R. Mitchell, Development of the British Coal Industry, p.84. 
50 A.J. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity’, p.51. 
51 J.H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. III (Cambridge, 1938), p.122. 
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extraction of coal, was also the first to suffer from the tendency for diminishing returns. The 
earliest miners had worked the easily accessible and most productive seams, meaning that the 
coal increasingly mined in the later nineteenth century was at greater depth or in thinner seams 
(or both), especially in the longest exploited fields such as those in Northumberland and 
Durham. By 1913, 44.3% of British coal was from seams of less than 4 feet in thickness, and 
almost one fifth was being hauled to the surface from depths of 1,500 feet or more.52 However, 
getting it to the surface was definitely worthwhile, despite the cycles noted, the trend of 
wholesale coal prices was consistently upwards, as demand outstripped the growth in supply.53 
This optimism helps to explain how some collieries made losses for up to five years in a row 
during the troughs that the industry experienced and yet remained open. Given the low value 
of a coal mine in terms of scrap, and the deterioration of the roadways and water damage that 
would occur if the mine was mothballed, the loss-minimising approach was to simply keep 
operating until the next upswing.54 
 Therefore with buoyant demand, an available and growing workforce, well-established 
technology, assets that needed to be used and an essential monopoly on the provision of power 
to the Western world, there was certainly grounds for optimism amongst British coalowners 
in the pre-War period. Regardless of the debate on the efficacy of their entrepreneurship, the 
period saw a growth in the production of coal in all of the fields across the country. However, 
once this coal had been brought to the surface, there was a need to move it to where it could 
be used. As Marshall wrote, regarding the industry: “Coalmining, after all, is as much a 
‘transport’ as a ‘productive’ industry.”55 
                                                 
52 A.J. Taylor, ‘Labour Productivity’, p.50. 
53 A.J. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’, p.55. 
54 M.W. Kirby, British Coalmining, p.8. 
55 A. Marshall, Industry and Trade (London, 1923), p.784. 
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Generations of students have written essay questions on “evolution or revolution” of 
transport in the industrial revolution, however, here it is appropriate only to focus on the 
impact of coal power on the two forms of transport most associated with the distribution of 
coal: railways and steam shipping. It may be that the changes which enabled the massive 
expansion in output were, rather than being a technological change in the mining process, a 
revolution in the distribution of coal; the coal trade as it were. This chapter therefore briefly 
charts some of the key links between coal and the railways before turning to steam-shipping. 
The former is much more of a linear progression, as the railways were so disruptive to land 
transport that their spread was steady and their reach grew throughout the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, their only real competition in this period was the coastal steam ship on some key 
routes). Steam-shipping, on the other hand, had a direct competitor in the well-established and 
nationally important act of sailing. It therefore required several different technologies, such as 
iron hulls, screw propulsion and the compound engine, to develop and come together before 
it could provide effective competition. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on the coal fields in 
the North East and South Wales, which were closely related to steam-shipping; far more than 
the inland fields of Derby, despite the best efforts of the canal revolution in the eighteenth 
century. For this reason, somewhat more space is given to the discussion on steam-shipping 
than that devoted to the railways, although both would prove vital in the distribution of coal 
between 1850 and 1914. 
The railways, of course, have a long and established association with the mining of 
coal. Coal was not only the principle freight that they were developed to move, but was also 
to become their source of motive power. Wooden wagonways in the seventeenth century were 
used in both the North East and South Wales to take coal from the pits to the docks for 
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transport, either along the coast to London or to the continent for sale.56 The first steam 
powered railways were also in this mould, with the Stockton and Darlington railway carrying 
coal from Durham to the Tees for export.57 Indeed, aside from the Liverpool and Manchester, 
all of the railways approved before 1830 were of short length and for this express purpose, 
with two exceptions.58 The Llanelly Railway in South Wales provided a steam-powered 
solution of getting coal to the ships, as did the Duffryn Llynvi & Porthcawl and Bridgend 
railways by horse, all being authorised in 1828. The Stockton and Darlington itself was to face 
competition from the Clarence Railway (1828) in transporting goods to the Tees, whilst a 
network of lines (both horse and locomotive) were authorised in the Lanarkshire coalfield. 
Even the inland Leicester & Swannington Railway (1830) was designed to allow coal from 
Leicestershire to compete with coals from Nottingham and Derby in Leicester, which were 
brought in upon the canal.59 
Similarly, much (although less overwhelmingly so) Parliamentary rail activity was based 
around Durham up until 1835, with lines connecting the Durham coalfields with the rival 
ports on the Tyne, Wear and Hartlepool and the onward connection to London as a market 
(see Chapter 2).60 Despite this focus on the movement of coal, however, due to the success of 
the Liverpool and Manchester Railway’s passenger operations, and the subsequent growth in 
                                                 
56 J. Simmons & G. Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History (Oxford, 1997), p.92. There is 
not the space for a study on the development of these wagonways, their surface changing from wood to iron or 
indeed the interesting people who owned and managed them. For a rather in-depth discussion of their 
development in the north east see: G. Bennett, E. Clavering & A. Rounding, A Fighting Trade: Rail Transport in 
Tyne Coal 1600 - 1800 Volume 1: History (Gateshead, 1990). 
57 Of course the Stockton and Darlington relied partially on horses too, but it is generally accepted as being the 
first railway principally drawn by steam traction, let alone the first authorised as a public railway by an Act of 
Parliament. 
58 The exceptions, incidentally, were the Limerick and Waterford (1826) which was never built and the 
Newcastle and Carlisle, authorised in 1829. 
59 M.C. Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820 - 1844: A Study in the Development of the Capital Market (Oxford, 
1975), p.5. 
60 Ibid. p.7. 
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passenger rail travel across the nation, British railways actually earned more money on 
passenger transport than on freight traffic until 1852.61 However, after this period, freight re-
asserted its pre-eminent role in the railway hierarchy, with coal an important component of 
this. Whilst the full details of the development of the railway industry are a fascinating 
diversion, what with assorted ‘Railway Mania’ of the late ‘30s and the ‘40s, the twists and turns 
of George Hudson’s personal empire on the east coast and much else besides, regrettably it is 
important to focus on the role of coal in providing both fuel and a freight for this mode of 
transport.62 
With the railways built, by hook or by crook as it may have been, it is interesting that 
much of the continued expansion was related to the creation of mileage or improvement of 
facilities to support the coal-mining industry, with a particular focus on the steam coal of South 
Wales.63 Indeed, whilst on the topic of steam coal, it is worth briefly diverting to assess the 
railways in terms of fuel consumption and their role in the consumption of coal. It is worth 
noting that the early public railways did not run on coal but coke. Before 1830, coal could only 
be sold in lump form, measured by volume, which made slack and such into unsaleable waste 
product - which was therefore used to fuel all colliery steam plant (including the early 
locomotives).64  
                                                 
61 G.R. Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840 - 1870 (London, 1970), p55. 
62 For a rather colourful and detailed approach to the development of the railways, one could do far worse than 
C.H. Ellis, British Railway History: 1830 - 1876 (London, 1954) and the second volume C.H. Ellis, British Railway 
History: 1877 - 1947 (London, 1960) which manages (rather wonderfully, it must be said) to simultaneously 
meander and power through a relatively comprehensive (if somewhat personal) view of railway development. 
In terms of George Hudson, a good tale is told in B. Bailey, George Hudson: The Rise and Fall of the Railway King 
(Stroud, 1995) whilst Lewin’s 1936 work on Railway Mania is also recommended: H.G. Lewin, The Railway 
Mania and its Aftermath (London, 1936).  
63 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870 - 1914: the maturity of the private system’ in M.J. Freemen & D.H. Aldcroft (eds.), 
Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), p.93 
64 J. Simmons & G. Biddle, British Railway History, p.92. 
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However, locomotives on public railways were required by legislation to consume their 
own smoke, meaning that from 1829 until the 1860s (when modifications to fireboxes made 
coal useable by steam engines) they burned coke rather coal; with many companies having 
‘batteries’ of coke ovens - being static these did not need to consume their own smoke and 
thus avoided the strictures of the legislation.65 It is worth noting that even with these 
modifications, as in steam-shipping the quality of the coal mattered. Ellis notes how the Great 
Northern was less pleasant to travel upon then some of its rival companies: 
South Yorkshire coal was of that sort which transferred a remarkable quantity of soft, 
unburnt particles to the insides of the carriages, to the passengers and to their clothes. In this 
respect the cleanest railways were the Great Western and the South Western running their traffic 
on the best hard Welsh coal.”66 
 
It was to this end that some large railway operators from overseas (such as Italian State 
Railways) kept a permanent office in Cardiff for the purchasing of the best coal, and as 
mentioned above, the Great Western Railway drew approximately 70% of its supplies from 
South Wales.67 However, in terms of actual consumption, railways were a relatively small 
consumer of coal. In 1844 - 1851, operational requirements were 1.4m tons per year (3 - 4.5% 
of total coal output) and by 1862 - 1866, whilst the amount required had grown to 4m tons 
per year, the percentage of total output required remained at 4.5%.68 Indeed, by 1903 at its 
peak, the railway consumption of coal was only 5.5% of total output, despite the fact that as 
speeds increased, the coal consumption per locomotive was increasing.69 
Whilst significant, therefore, the railway sector was not a major user of coal, despite 
contemporary perceptions. Instead the railways interaction with the black diamonds was in 
                                                 
65 Ibid., p.92. 
66 C.H. Ellis, British Railway History: 1877 - 1947, p.22. 
67 D.S.M. Barrie, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain: Volume XII: South Wales (London, 1980), p.129 
for Italian State Railways and p.61 regarding the GWR. 
68 T.R. Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy: 1830 - 1914 (Hong Kong, 1980), pp.30-31. 
69 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870 – 1914’, p.97 
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shuttling them from mine to destination. However, this flow does not lend itself to easy 
categorisation. There were essentially two types of movement; the long haul of coal from the 
laden north to the barren south and then intra-area flows between coal mines and industrial 
sites. The latter grouping had distances that could be shorter than a mile on the public rail 
network, whilst the former often had hauls of over 200 miles. The average figure (not, given 
the above, that it means much) is an average distance of 34 miles.70 Such a figure demonstrates 
that the heavier flows were the shorter flows, rather than on the long distance routes to the 
metropolitan south.  
A case to demonstrate this is that of the North Eastern Railway (NER), including the 
original Stockton & Darlington that had started it all. The North Eastern ran from Doncaster 
in the south (where it joined the Great Northern line to London) to Berwick in the north 
(joining the North British Railway). Coal for landsale, defined as that used for ironmaking, 
manufacturing and household purposes within the area covered by the North Eastern’s line 
made up over 50% of the coal moved in 1870-1874. A further 34.7% was moved by the NER 
for shipment via the ports, with only 11.6% of coal handled by the NER was sent onwards to 
other areas of the British rail network - such as south to London or west to Manchester (see 
Table 1.2): 
  
                                                 
70 G.R. Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth, p.166. 
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Table 1.2: Structure of NER Coal Traffic, 1870-971 
 
 1870-4 Annual 
average tonnage 
% 1875-9 Annual 
average tonnage 
% 
Shipment 5,782,869 34.7% 8,502,004 43.4% 
Landsale 8,368,390 50.2% 8,449,717 43.1% 
Foreign-forwarded 1,940,691 11.6% 2,016,356 10.3% 
Free Hauled 571,325 3.5% 622,385 3.2% 
     
 
As can be seen, by the late 1870s coal for export via the port was of growing 
importance, taking over as the largest of the railway’s flows, whilst foreign-forwarded 
continued to decline. This was doubtless a result of the problems which were affecting the 
North East’s economy. In the 1870s, the decline in manufactured iron output in the region 
had had knock-on impacts across allied trades such as railways and shipping, as 20 out of 44 
iron puddling firms (owning 821 of the 2,159 furnaces in the region) were bankrupt and a 
further 499 of the furnaces were idle.72 However, the increasing absolute tonnage (rather than 
merely the relative percentage) demonstrates that this growing flow helped to mitigate against 
some of this decline. Contemporaries, however, did not take this view. J. W. Pease, a man of 
many business interests (including the Stockton and Darlington Railway amongst others, such 
as banking, coal, ironstone and limestone quarrying, iron manufacturing, locomotive 
engineering and woollen manufacturing) stated that his practice, which he projected on the 
                                                 
71 Table reprinted from R.J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company 1870 - 1914 (Leicester, 1976), pp.27. 
“Free-hauled” is that which was not subject to further charges based on distance carried. 
72 D.L. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867 - 1939 (Cambridge, 1940), pp.23-28. 
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industry as a whole, was to supply distant markets in bad times but to focus on the local 
industry in good times.73 
That this trend was more a structural shift in flows than simply the result of the 
declining iron industry is confirmed through looking at figures from the following decade 
(Table 1.3): 
Table 1.3: Structure of NER Coal Traffic, 1880-974 
 
 1880-4 Annual 
average tonnage 
% 1887-9 Annual 
average tonnage 
% 
Shipment 10,011,163 43.6% 12,639,284 50.6% 
Landsale 9,896,989 43.1% 10,776,075 43.2% 
Foreign-forwarded 2,409,043 10.4% 842,020 3.4% 
Free Hauled 659,255 2.9% 680,096 2.8% 
     
 
Indeed, the shipment of coal from the North East ports now took up over half of the 
coal moved by the North Eastern, trends which continued into the twentieth century (Table 
1.4): 
  
                                                 
73 Parliamentary Papers, Special Committee on the Present Dearness and Scarcity of Coal (London, 1873), X, QQ.4321-
5.  
74 Table contains data selected from R.J. Irving, North Eastern Railway Company, pp.28-29 and pp.34-35. 
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Table 1.4: Structure of NER Coal Traffic, 1890 - 1904.75 
 
 1890-4 Annual 
Average Tonnage 
% 1895-9 Annual 
Average Tonnage 
% 1900-4 Annual 
Average Tonnage 
% 
Landsale 10,433,690 38.9 11,720,872 37.9 12,060,808 34.3 
Shipment 14,461,654 54.2 17,437,601 56.3 21,173,870 60.3 
Foreign 
Forwarded 
1,094,385 4.0 925,310 3.0 867,085 2.5 
Free Hauled 775,299 2.9 866,608 2.8 1,010,797 2.9 
       
 
Despite the growth in landsale coal, it is clear that coal moved for shipment at the 
region’s ports was becoming the main movement of mineral traffic in which the railway was 
engaged. Sending coal onwards and out of the region (to generate those flows of up to 200 
miles, as noted earlier) was declining ever further, from over two million tons in the early 
1880s to only c.650,000 tons by 1913: 
Table 1.5: Structure of NER Coal Traffic, 1905-976 
 
 1905-9 Annual 
Average Tonnage 
% 1910 - 13 Annual 
Average Tonnage 
% 
Landsale 13,096,058 32.5 13,499,426 31.5 
Shipment 25,490,759 63.2 27,613,425 64.5 
Foreign Forwarded 692,175 1.7 649,262 1.5 
Free Hauled 1,033,320 2.6 1,076,055 2.5 
     
  
                                                 
75 Ibid., p.44. 
76 Ibid., p.49 
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By the outbreak of the war, the North Eastern was shifting almost two-thirds of its 
coal tonnage to the North Eastern ports, much as its forebear, the Stockton and Darlington, 
had originally been designed to do. The amount of coal being transported and distributed had 
dramatically increased, yet whilst the land movement of coal was significant in opening up 
more collieries further from the banks of the Wear and Tyne, it was mostly over short distances 
to the ports where it could be shipped by sea, much as it had been before.  
This was even more the case with regard to the railways of South Wales, for between 
the years of 1885 and 1914, the South Wales coalfield increased its production from 24.75 
million tonnes to over 50 million tonnes. The Taff Vale Railway, which was connected to a 
total of eighty collieries (including some private line connections) increased its coal and coke 
haulage from around 9 million tonnes to over nineteen million.77 Indeed, Cain has stated that 
the defining feature of railway expansion after 1870 was connecting and extending the network 
to reflect the growing coal trade of South Wales.78 The vast majority of the Taff Vale’s tonnage 
ran down to the ports of Cardiff and, after 1878, Barry. In one week of November 1893 the 
railway moved 281,416 tons (through 70,000 wagon movements).79 Indeed, after 1922, when 
almost all of the South Wales railway network was brought under the control of Great Western 
Railway, that company could rightly claim to own and operate the largest dock system in the 
world.80  
Coal therefore not only fuelled the railways, but provided a significant amount of its 
tonnage. In 1913, coal and coke provided 60% of all freight carried, with other minerals 
making up a further 20% and the rest being made up by general merchandise - a composition 
                                                 
77 D.S.M. Barrie, A Regional History of the Railways, pp.128-129. 
78 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870 – 1914’, p.93 
79 Ibid., p.129. 
80 T. Taylor, ‘Capital Formation by Railways in South Wales, 1836 - 1914’, in C. Baber & L.J. Williams (eds.) 
Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History (Cardiff, 1986). p.98. 
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of traffic which is not thought to have changed significantly over the preceding fifty years.81  
Without coal, the railway revolution would have had a very different shape. However, without 
the railways, the coal industry would have been significantly different also. Hawke made some 
initial steps in this direction in 1970, estimating that railways reduced the cost of moving coal 
by over 70%.82 Whilst there was not a revolution in getting the coal out of the ground, as the 
technology for this had been nearly all in place by 1850, with only incremental improvements 
to come in the period to 1913, the collection and onward movement of that coal was 
transformed enabling a dramatic increase in capacity (which, admittedly, had to be filled by 
employing more men at more pits for more hours). However, once the coal had reached the 
docks, be it Cardiff, Blyth or Sunderland, it is important to assess how the changes in 
technology affected the next stage of the distribution chain. 
In terms of steam-shipping, coal was, similarly, a large and important source of cargo 
(see the following chapters).  The regularity and reliability of the railway on land provided a 
stark contrast with the still unpredictable nature of wind-powered sea transport. As such, the 
transition of the world’s merchant marine from sail to steam power over the 1850 – 1913 
period is an interesting tale in and of its own right, and one that has caused a significant amount 
of controversy amongst historians. This next section therefore seeks to lay out the chronology 
of the switch from sail to steam. 
The birth of steam-shipping can be attributed to various different nations in the late 
eighteenth century. Marquis de Jouffrey d’Abans attempted to propel a boat by steam along 
                                                 
81 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870 – 1914’, p.97. 
82 G.R. Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth, p.173. It should be noted that this figure was developed in connexion 
with a broader attempt to determine the ‘social saving’ that the railways brought to the UK by 1865 (£12 million, 
or 1.46 per cent of national income, is the answer, also on p.173). These figures (and the methodology which was 
used to reach them) have since been called into question given the nature of the source data. See: D.H. Aldcroft,  
‘Railways and Economic Growth: A Review Article’ in T.R. Gourvish, (ed.), Railways, Volume 1 (Aldershot, 1996) 
pp.1–12 and also T.R. Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, pp.33-40.  
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the Rhone in 1783; John Fitch tried similarly on the Delaware in 1786 and William Symington 
and Patrick Miller also ran a similar trial in 1788 on the Clyde.83 However, marine steam 
propulsion history starts properly in 1802 when the first successful steamer (capable of doing 
either passenger or goods service) was built on the Forth and Clyde Canal.84 Indeed, the first 
steamer permanently registered in the UK was the Industry in 1814 at the port of Glasgow.85 
Yet it was a not a straight line of development from there to the merchant marine one century 
later at the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, Britain’s dominance of the world’s 
merchant traffic was by no means assured. As Europe recovered from the Napoleonic Wars, 
the ships built by the Americans to transport grain and food to Europe due to the artificial 
shortages created by war, were put to new uses and trades, with American fast sailing ships 
becoming a significant force in the world’s merchant marine. By 1850 the USA was only 
around 750,000 tons shy of the total British tonnage.86 The introduction of Free Trade, in the 
abolition of the Navigation Laws in 1849 had opened up new opportunities.87 American-built 
clippers carried much of the world’s valuable cargo, in particular tea from China to London, 
wherefrom it was re-distributed across the rest of the continent. In the bulkier trades, 
America’s abundance of cheap wood from which to build ships weighed heavily against the 
British shipbuilder and the trade was suitably despondent about the future.88 
                                                 
83 D.R. Headrick ‘The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in 
the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Modern History, 51, (June, 1979), p.235. 
84 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, (London, 1914), pp.43–45. 
85 J.R.T. Hughes, & S. Reiter, ‘The First 1,945 British Steamships’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 
53, No. 282 (Jun., 1958), pp.360-381 
86 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, p.26. 
87 The Navigation Laws were mostly abolished in June 1849, with the last vestiges (those restrictions on the 
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Thus by mid-century there was little sign of the power of steam on the world stage. 
No one particular technology threatened the dominance of the world’s shipping by sail and, 
in particular, the American clipper. In Britain, if steam was used at all it was in the form of 
wooden paddle steamers such as those of the Cunard line, preferred both by merchants and 
the Admiralty.89 Merchant steamers made up only two per cent of all vessels listed in Lloyd’s 
Register for 1853.90 Although it is worth pointing out the significant impact that these few ships 
made. In 1852, the collier John Bowes had delivered to London in 140 hours what would have 
taken two sailing colliers one month.91 By 1855, the conclusion was that ‘screw-colliers carried 
about double the average cargoes of sailing-colliers, and were capable of making three times 
the number of voyages per annum; one screw-collier being, therefore, equal in capability to 
six sailing-colliers.’92 Such mathematical gain was insurmountable, and so by 1868, steam brigs 
already delivered 58% of London’s sea-borne coal.93 This switch to steam propulsion was even 
more dramatic in trade consisting of more valuable commodities. Glover Brothers’ Annual 
for 1863 states that ‘in the shorter trades all valuable goods are now carried by steam’, mainly 
due to the savings in insurance and the better reliability and punctuality offered by coal-fuelled 
vessels. However, these observations ‘apply only to short voyages…in the long voyage trades 
steamers cannot compete with sailing vessels.’94 It was axiomatic amongst British sailing ship-
owners that ‘steamer may occupy the Mediterranean, may tentatively go to Brazil … but China 
at least is safe for sailing ships’ – echoing the predictions of the early nineteenth century that 
                                                 
89 C. Smith, ‘ “The ‘Crinoline’ of Our Steam Engineers”: Reinventing the Marine Compound Engine, 1850 – 
1885’ in D.N. Livingstone, & C.W.J. Withers (eds.), Geographies of Nineteenth-Century Science (Chicago, 2011), 
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90 B. Greenhill & A. Gifford, Steam, Politics and Patronage (London, 1994), p.48. 
91 R. Smith, Sea-Coal for London, (Edinburgh, 1961), p.285, 
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the practical limit of a steam voyage was about twenty-one days.95 Indeed, latterly Harley has 
placed a dividing line between steam and sail voyages at approximately 3,000 miles by the 
1860s, which roughly corresponds, although this would shortly be overcome.96  
 This dramatic shift, from the situation in 1850 towards steam propulsion rising to truly 
challenge sail by the 1870s, would happen due to a number of reasons. In the 1850s and 60s, 
shipping technology was in a period of rapid flux. Firstly, during the mid-nineteenth century, 
iron had come to be used significantly in the construction of ships, being forced to overcome 
significant prejudice in the conservative shipping world about making ships out of something 
which did not float. However, the success of the composite clippers had disproven such 
superstitions, although few saw the future in terms of all-iron steamers.97 
Yet, whilst Lloyds might have started classifying iron ships as early as 1837, there were 
noticeable problems which had to be overcome before their widespread diffusion. The two 
biggest were the issues of fouling and magnetic deviation. The first was undeniably 
problematic. Although immune to the marine life that drilled into the hulls of the wooden 
sailing ships, the accretion of seaweed and shellfish growth provided significant drag instead:98   
Some gentlemen make light of the question of fouling. I took up the Shipping Gazette the 
other day, and looked at all the ships overdue from China, the longest average voyage we 
have. They were all of them over six months on a voyage, which is from two to three months 
more than they ought to be. Out of seven so overdue six are iron. Will any gentleman tell me 
that an iron ship can be cheap, can be profitable, if she runs the risk of being from two to 
three months overdue? 99 
 
 Yet traditional solutions to the problem of fouling were of little use on the iron hull. 
After significant experimentation throughout the eighteenth century, copper sheathing had 
                                                 
95 R. Woodman, The History of the Ship (London, 2005), p. 219. 
96 C.K. Harley, ‘The Shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850 – 1890: a study in technological change and its 
diffusion’ in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 (Princeton, 1971), p.222. 
97 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, pp. 35-36. 
98 B. Greenhill & A. Gifford, Steam, Politics and Patronage, p.127. 
99 C.F.T. Young, The Fouling and Corrosion of Iron Ships, (London, 1867), p.51. 
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been used to protect wooden hulls from such drag, yet copper plates could not be applied to 
an iron hull as the galvanising electrolytic process resulting in rapid corrosion of the iron.100 
The cost of keeping iron hulls clean was considerable, with the P. & O. Steamship Company 
spending an estimated £70,000 annually on cleaning its bottoms.101 Eventually this problem 
would be overcome by the application of chemicals to limit the amount of fouling, although 
these would take many years to be widely used throughout the merchant fleet. 
 The second major problem which limited the use of mostly metal ships before the 
1840s was that of magnetic deviation. The accuracy of a compass was significantly reduced 
when surrounded by so much iron. A solution was found by the iron-ship builders Lairds, 
through a series of trials carried out between 1835 and 1838 with the Astronomer Royal, 
involving magnets and iron connectors. 102 
Yet, despite these problems outline above, iron possessed many advantages over 
wood. The shortage of wood in Great Britain from which large ships could be made meant 
that by the late 1830s it was cheaper to build in iron than in wood.103 Iron ships were also 
lighter than their wooden equivalents and could offer more cargo space within the same 
tonnage and dimensions, whilst equally not being subject to the common problem of leakage 
which plagued all wooden ships, ensuring that this greater amount of cargo could arrive in 
better condition. This was particularly the case given that, as of the beginning, iron ships were 
built with double bottoms and watertight bulkheads for compartmentalisation, making them 
significantly better insurance risks.104 In addition, iron ships also offered the advantage of sheer 
                                                 
100 For a brief overview of the progress of sheathing throughout the eighteenth century see J.R. Harris, ‘Copper 
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size: in 1858 the Great Eastern at nearly 700 feet was over twice the general limit of wooden 
construction (300 feet), proving that a new era in ship construction was dawning.105  
A further change was the emergence of screw steamers as dominant over the paddle 
variety, although this was not as easy as one might have initially thought. As contemporary 
Robert Lamont wrote:   
…intending investors in screw steamers had not only to overcome prejudice by testing and 
proving the superiority of the screw over the paddle or side-wheel, but, in many cases, when 
themselves satisfied, had to convince their co-owners; and had, before adopting the “screw” 
to sacrifice large sums of money in selling their stock of paddle steamers, which could not, 
either in engines or hull (then mostly wooden), be converted into use for screw steamers; 
and, not only that, but intending investors were called to face the very formidable fact that 
they would have to pay an enormous tax, in the shape of a royalty of £2 per horse-power, 
on every vessel owned in Great Britain and Ireland, or built in any part of the United 
Kingdom, for the privilege of using the screw propeller… 106 
 
 The barriers to the iron screw steamer were not just psychological or technical. Patents 
had been taken out upon many variations of “the screw”, and these were amalgamated through 
their purchasing by a single group of investors who then demanded the above-mentioned 
payment. They succeeded in securing £40,000 form the Government for the Admiralty’s use 
of screw technology, and it was not until the prolongation of the patent was refused by the 
Privy Council in 1851 that all royalty payments stopped and the significantly better technology 
became more widely dispersed.107 
 There was also the matter of incorporation and limited liability. Until the Companies 
Act of 1862, limited liability was restricted to only a few firms in the trade, a matter which 
likewise caused Mr Lamont some significant agitation.108 Although the contemporary view has 
been validated as Boyce found that limited liability was important both in the setting up of 
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Britain’s shipping firms and in enabling them to support the costly transitions of either sail to 
steam, tramp to liner firm or, in some cases, both.109 This finding was echoed by the work of 
Valdaliso in assessing the developing structures of the Spanish shipping industry in this period. 
Although not linked to limited liability, Valdaliso found that specialised shipping firms were 
first to emerge in trades linked with the early introduction of steam.110 
 Whilst undoubtedly an expensive decision, the switch towards steam continued, aided 
by continuing improvements in technology. The compound engine was one of the most 
important developments in helping steam overcome the dominance of sail due to the rapid 
improvements in economy it offered the steamship. Contrary to steam’s dominance of the 
mine and factory, and the rapid growth of the British rail network, The Engineer of 5 November 
1858 reported that whilst a marine steam engine burnt around 6lbs per horsepower per hour, 
a locomotive on the South Western Railway required 3lbs and a stationary engine in a Cornish 
mine no more than 1.57lbs. Clearly, therefore ‘no other application of steam is yet so 
unsatisfactory as that to ocean steam navigation’.111  Such inefficiency would be overcome by 
numerous discoveries: the improved scientific knowledge of steam engines (such as 
condensation, the expansive working of steam, etc.), the development of better lubricants and 
engine parts could be machined to closer tolerances.112 Improvement in metal manufacture 
also enabled higher pressure engines than the 10 – 15lb per square inch of the 1840s. 113 These, 
amongst others, enabled Elder and Randolph to create the compound marine engine. An in-
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depth assessment of the mechanical changes is outside the scope of this study, but by the mid-
1860s pressures of forty to fifty pounds per square inch were common.114 Alfred Holt, 
somewhat ahead of the curve, building on the Elder design, managed boiler pressure of as 
much as 70lbs per square inch.115 This powered his ships Ajax, Achilles and Agamemnon to 
China in 1867, steaming at a steady ten knots whilst burning no more than 20.3 tons of coal a 
day – enabling them to travel the 8,500 miles from Mersey to Mauritius without coaling whilst 
still having room for 3,000 – 3,500 tons of cargo.116   
At the same time as technological changes started to favour the steamship, the clippers 
faced changing circumstances of their own. Although adaptive to new technology (the 
composite clipper, with an iron frame and a wooden hull having become the standard over 
the all-wooden variety) their very livelihood was under attack.117 The best years of the 
American clipper era were the first half of the 1850s. The California Gold Rush created a 
perfect journey cycle for the clippers, taking gold-diggers from the Atlantic coast of the United 
States around the Cape to the Golden Gate Bridge, before setting sail for China and the tea 
race to Europe and finally taking emigrants from there to the burgeoning USA.118 Yet the 
profits that could be earned on such journeys rapidly encouraged competition, so that there 
was a glut in the market for clippers around Cape Horn by the middle of the decade.119 Indeed, 
in that same year not only did the Gold Rush end but the Panama Railroad opened, offering 
an alternative and faster way to the Pacific than by the Cape and sail.120  
                                                 
114 M. Fletcher, ‘The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869 - 1914', The Journal of Economic History, (1958), p.557. 
115 F.E. Hyde, ‘ Liverpool’s Carrying Trade’, p.141. 
116 R. Woodman, History of the Ship, p.219. 
117 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, pp.30 – 31. 
118 R.A. Rydell, ‘The California Clippers’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb. 1949), p.74. 
119 Ibid., p.76. The profits were indeed impressive: the Samuel Russell made over $70,000 between New York and 
San Francisco, thus covering her own construction costs and leaving substantial profit on just one leg of the 
three-leg journey.  
120 See J.H. Kemble, The Panama Route, 1848 – 1869 (Berkeley, 1943) p.194 for the disastrous effect this had upon 
the clippers’ most lucrative freight accounts. 
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Simultaneously, the British shipbuilder had decided to fight back against the 
dominance of the American clipper. In 1856 a British clipper beat two of the fastest American 
clippers from China to London – not only was it faster, but with its hard wood construction 
(as opposed to American soft woods) its cargo arrived in finer fettle.121 The competition 
between British and American clippers was, however, cut short by the American Civil War in 
1861 and from thereon out, British ships were pre-eminent in the trade.122 However, the 
leading role of the British clipper was short-lived. The breakneck pace of technological 
evolution continued, and not only were Holt’s liners offering a competitive steam-driven 
service around the Cape of Good Hope by the late 1860s, but the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869 was the beginning of the end for sail on the routes to the East.  
The Suez Canal, by cutting 5,777 miles off the journey to Bombay, whilst conferring 
no similar advantage on the sailing ship due to the hazards of navigation in both the canal 
itself and the Red Sea, dramatically altered the geography of the world trade network.123 Whilst 
the impact on distances to other countries was less (only 3,000 miles were taken off the 
distance to China for example) the effect on the distribution of trade between steam and sailing 
ships was no less palpable.124 In the case of China, not only did Holt’s steamers now offer a 
reliable and safer option for the transport of high-value goods such as tea, but they could also 
bring it back to London more speedily than the clippers: 65 days rather than the 90 or so it 
had taken the fastest clippers.125 Indeed, Rathbones of Liverpool, who were heavily involved 
in the Eastern tea trade, reported problems due to the speed of steamship delivery resulting in 
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a glut of tea arriving onto the market at once.126 The change was dramatic. From 14% of 
tonnage from China being steam in 1869 it rapidly grew to be 70% in 1873 and over 90% by 
the end of the decade.127 Other high value trades were similar. During the first four months of 
1871, 90% of unprinted calicoes, 77% of the unprinted yarn (both to Calcutta) and 96% of all 
plain cotton goods to Bombay went via Suez.128 Fletcher also notes the high proportion of 
other return goods carried by steam: cotton, cowhides, ginger, indigo, rapeseed and tea were 
(in over 90% of cases) carried by steam, and in the example of teelseed, 100% was. Yet it was 
also making inroads on the low-value, bulky goods market: 20% of jute, 40% of jute cuttings 
and 33% of rice. 129 Steam was, therefore, definitely starting to win the battle of the Eastern 
trade. An indication of the future could be seen in the orders placed at British shipyards. 
Compared to figures in the late 1860s (when two thirds of tonnage built had been sailing 
ships), construction of new sailing ships collapsed after the Canal opened, being around 15% 
of all new tonnage in 1871 and 1872.130 Ship-owners, as seen above, a traditionally conservative 
constituency, were investing heavily into steam-shipping. 
It is, however, important not to use the cutting of the canal as a turning point in the 
story of sail and steam. Whilst the Suez Canal did dramatically change the odds in favour of 
steam-shipping, it is doubtful that it much more than bring forward the date of the switch. 
The main reasons behind the shift to steam were a result of accrued benefits from technology, 
which enabled the use of the Canal. It is commonly maintained that if the Canal had opened 
merely 10 years earlier, then barely any steamers would have been able to take advantage of it 
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due to their inefficiency in burning coal.131 By contrast, the triple and quadruple expansion 
condensers of 1898 could offer around 200lbs of pressure per square inch. This was achieved 
despite a reduction in coal consumption per indicated horsepower per hour from 3.6lbs in 
1868 to a mere 1.3lbs in the latter year.132 By 1903 annual coal consumption per net registered 
ton of shipping was down to 1.5 tons (in comparison to 6.7 tons in 1830 and 3.5 tons in 
1869).133 However, by shortening the distance so dramatically it did short-circuit the gradual 
displacement and catalyse the growth in steam-shipping.  
Thus a number of circumstances had come together in order to promote the growth 
of the steam-ship. The reliability and regularity of the steam ship had enabled the steamship 
to take over first the coastal trade and then trade with Europe in the 1850s. Then the long-
term benefits of industrialisation had enabled the compound engine to broaden the 
competition with sail across a range of theatres. Cunard (amongst others) brought steam to 
dominance in the Atlantic in the 1860s and 1870s whilst Holt demonstrated the feasibility of 
the steam trade with the Orient in that same decade. With the Suez Canal offering another 
advantage to steam in the Eastern trade from 1869, steam rose to dominance in trade with 
India and China by the 1880s and would push on to take over the Australian trade by the end 
of the following decade.  
However, this traditional narrative has been challenged by a number of authors.  In 
particular, the criticism can be divided into two different approaches: one which seeks to 
emphasise the important role played by iron steamer earlier in the nineteenth century, and the 
second arguing for sail’s demise to be pushed back to the turn of the twentieth century.   
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 Hughes and Reiter are the main proponents of highlighting steam’s earlier role, 
particularly drawing attention to the early adoption of the iron-screw steamer: 
As early as 1844 the gross tonnage of iron steamers exceeded that of wood and by 1851 the 
tonnage of iron-screw steamers alone exceeded total wood steamers (both paddle and screw). 
Hence the well-known view that “iron had not been generally adopted for steamers before 
the decade 1855-65” is rather far from the mark. From 1851 onwards, the additions of iron-
screw steamers to the fleer led all other types and by 1853 iron-screw steamers clearly 
dominated all others combined in the growth of the steam merchant marine. 134 
 
When combined with the rapid obsolescence of these early iron ships (as with any pioneering 
transport development) a sound argument can be made that by 1860s the British steam 
merchant fleet was both ‘iron screw’ and less than a decade old.135 It is important to note, 
however, that whilst the wooden and paddle steamers might have had a significantly shorter 
reign than the traditional narrative would suggest, and that iron screw was dominant in 
additions to the steam-powered fleet, it was still only a small amount of Britain’s total merchant 
tonnage. By 1865 it accounted for one fifth of the total register tonnage; although this small 
percentage may have done more work than the wind-powered fleet.136 
Equally, others have sought to emphasise the role of the sailing vessel after 1850, in 
particular Graham has sought to demonstrate their continuing importance: 
Actually, the transition from the sailing ship to the iron and steel cargo steamer was not 
completed for another three decades after 1850; the great days of sail lie not before but after 
the middle of the century. As long as the routes to the Far East lay round the Cape of Good 
Hope, the commercial steamer could not hope to compete; and even after the opening of 
the Suez Canal, much of the traffic to the Bay of Bengal, the East Indies and Australia was 
still carried by the sailing ship. The cutting of the Suez did not mark a turning-point in the 
life of sail.137 
 
Indeed, the figures do demonstrate that sailing tonnage under the British flag did not 
peak until 1870 before starting a steady decline towards the twentieth century, whilst steam 
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rapidly became pre-dominant (see Figure 1.1), although it is important to note that the peak 
of sailing tonnage was only one year after the Suez Canal opened: 
Figure 1.1: Registered Net Tons of British Shipping in Selected Years138 
 
 
However, a graph measuring the registered tonnage does hide a number of important 
distinctions within the fleet. For a start, the average size of a steamer was significantly bigger 
than that of a sailing vessel. Glover assessed the average size of the sailing and steam ship in 
his series of articles regarding the tonnage of the United Kingdom.139 The average size of a 
steam ship rose from 140 net registered tones in 1850 to 785 net registered tons by 1900. 
Sailing ships, by comparison, rose from 130 net registered tons to 196 net registered tons over 
the same period (although they had peaked in 1890 at 210 net registered tons):140 
 
                                                 
138 Data taken from Parliamentary Papers, Merchant Shipping, 1881 – 1911 (with some particulars for 1912). Tables 
showing the progress of merchant shipping in the United Kingdom and the principal maritime countries Cd.7033 (London, 
1913), pp.58-61. 
139 J. Glover, 'Tonnage Statistics of the Decade 1891 - 1900', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 65, No. 1, 
(Mar. 1902), p.17. The numbers differ marginally from those in the Official Returns, but are close enough for it 
not to matter in such a broad overview as this, being always within a few thousand tons of each other.  
140 Ibid., p.17. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 49 
Figure 1.2: Average Size of Steamers and Sailing Vessels Registered in Britain in Selected 
Years (Net Registered Tons)141 
 
 
 Thus the figures for 1900 showing that steamers made 7,202,509 net registered tons 
as opposed to 2,077,655 for sailing vessels are not quite as simple as they appear. For in sheer 
numbers, sail still outnumbered steam: 10,573 registered sailing ships as opposed to 9,178 
steamers. Although this is in remarkable contrast to the figures for 1850, which were 24,797 
as opposed to 1,187 respectively. 142 Indeed, this size difference was only further enhanced as 
the nineteenth century wore on and the costs of ship construction continued to decline (see 
Figure 1.3):  
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Figure 1.3: Construction Costs of Hulls and Complete Steamers, 1850 – 1913  
(Real Prices £ per Gross Ton)143 
 
Thus as the average size of ships increased, the cost of building them declined. But 
not only were the steam ships significantly bigger than the sailing ships that they were 
replacing, they were also significantly more efficient. This helped to recoup the significantly 
higher capital investment of the steamer (Kaukiainen has estimated that the average cost of a 
completed sailing vessel was some 30 – 40% lower than Maywald’s ‘Hulls Only’ series). 144 The 
common adage is that steam was capable of carrying three times as much as sail, due to its 
higher speed and regularity. Thus whilst the total number of ships in the British merchant 
marine was falling, the total effective carrying capacity of the fleet was rising at an incredible 
rate: 
 
                                                 
143 Graph taken from the data in K. Maywald, ‘The Construction Costs and the Value of the British Merchant 
Fleet, 1850 – 1938’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, III (1956), p.50.  See the article for a full discussion of 
how the amounts were reached.  
144 Y. Kaukiainen, ‘Coal and Canvas: Aspects of the Competition between Steam and Sail, c. 1870 – 1914’, 
International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. IV No. 2, (Dec.1992), pp.185-186. 
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Figure 1.4: Total Number of Ships Registered in Britain and Total Effective Carrying 
Capacity: 1860 - 1900145 
 
This combination of falling absolute numbers but a growing ability to shift cargo has 
been emphasised by a number of authors. In particularly Clapham has stated that the rise of 
steam over sail is even more dramatic than the figures would suggest: 
Movement became swift, and steam took over the heavy carrying on route after route. It is 
possible that even the 901,000 steamship tons on the British register in 1865 did more 
transport work that the 4,937,000 sailing tons of the same year; certain that the 1,900,000 
steamer tons of 1875 did more than the 4,200,000 sailing tons of 1875. In 1882 the mounting 
curve of the steamer tonnage crossed the descending curve of the sailing ships. By 1885, the 
nearly 4,000,000 steamer tons with their 108,000 men may have done from six to seven times 
the work of the 3,400,000 tons of sailers and their 91,000 men. 146 
 
As could be expected, this dramatic enlargement of the carrying capacity available to 
shift the world’s growing trade coincides with a dramatic fall in the cost of shipping. There is, 
however, significant debate about whether or not this is a direct cause of the steam revolution. 
Traditionally this had been taken as the case, with the falling freight rates of the late nineteenth 
                                                 
145 J. Glover, 'Tonnage Statistics of the Decade’, pp.17-18. Glover further expresses the opinion that the 
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power of steam over sail.  
146 J.H. Clapham, Economic History of Modern Britain Volume II, p.72. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 52 
century being attributed by a number of contemporaries to the large numbers of regular, 
reliable steamships plying the seas. Isserlis set out to chart this decline: 
Figure 1.5: Isserlis’ General Freights Index, 1880 – 1905 (1880 = 100)147 
 
 
As can be seen, freight rates between 1880 and 1905 fell by forty per cent, and the 
Victorian consensus was upheld. Indeed, this view held until the late 1950s when North’s 
seminal article was published which substantially revised this assessment in two different 
ways.148 Firstly, he re-assessed the period of freight rate decline, extending the trend back to 
1815 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars, with the two periods of dramatic decline being 
1815 – 1851 and 1870/3 – 1908/9 (depending on the route being investigated).149 Secondly, 
North attributed this longer-term fall to a variety of factors other than steam propulsion. He 
                                                 
147 The figures of L. Isserlis, ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 
101, No. 1 (1938), pp.53-146 were re-cast into a non-chained index by Mitchell and Deane. See B.R. Mitchell & 
P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), p.224. These figures have since been revised 
by many historians, due to the bias in the weighting of the freights used, but as the starting point for the 
following discussion they still remain important.  
148 D. North, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750 – 1913’, The Journal of Economic History, 
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credits a better utilisation of ships (with less time idling in port and in ballast as a result of the 
expansion of trade, improved port facilities and the ending of navigation laws), improved 
knowledge of winds and currents (that which had previously taken years of accumulation for 
individual sailors was now widespread knowledge) and technological changes in shipping (in 
addition to those in terms of steam power) were all of greater importance than the shift from 
sail to steam.150 In particular, North noted that steam could not have contributed substantially 
to the earlier decline due to the chronology of its development (except perhaps, on a few of 
the short distance intra-European routes) and that the decline in the latter period were 
focussed in 1873 – 1884 and were on the longer routes which were still the preserve of the 
sailing ship.151 
Since North’s article, his findings have been echoed by numerous other historians. 
Lew and Cater pointed out that improvements in communication technology, most notably 
the telegraph, allowed information to be transported ‘nearly instantaneously’. This information 
could be used to better make use of the increased capacity of the steamships, through allowing 
them to pick up more cargo or be directed to transport it to a more profitable market than 
had hitherto been the case – information enabled a more efficient use of the ships, resulting 
in fewer ‘feast or famine’ scenarios of glutted or under-supplied markets.152 This must have 
been responsible for some portion of the decline in freight rates during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, it is hard to isolate any one cause of the decline in freight rates. 
Stemmer re-iterated the importance of broader economic cycles and world events in setting 
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152 B. Lew & B. Cater, ‘The Telegraph, Co-ordination of Tramp Shipping, and Growth in World Trade, 1870 – 
1910’, European Review of Economic History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Aug. 2006), pp.147–173. In this they are echoing the 
earlier works of S.P. Ville, Transport and the Development of the European Economy 1750 – 1918 (Basingstoke, 1990),  
p.94 & L. Scholl, ‘The Global Communications Industry and its Impact on International Shipping before 1914’ 
in D. Starkey,& G. Harlaftis (eds.), Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850 
(Newfoundland, 1998), p.200. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 54 
freight rates (the Crimean and Boer Wars for example) whilst not denying the overall 
downward trend.153 Indeed, whilst there is undoubtedly a downward trend throughout the 
period, it is significantly more pronounced on certain routes than others (such as those 
Stemmer was assessing between Europe and South America); Mohammed and Williamson 
further developed this analysis, noting how many journeys were not just bilateral but involved 
many different component ‘legs’ in the tramp shipping industry.154 
However, whilst the Victorian viewpoint may have been substantially revised, there is 
still significant evidence of the importance of steam power in bringing down the cost of 
transporting goods across the oceans. Harley found substantial evidence to suggest that there 
was an important role for steam in having a large impact on British freight rates, alongside 
improving productivity on board both sail and steamships and the improvements in metallurgy 
that resulted in lower ship construction costs.155  Klovland, writing about the 1850s, further 
found that whilst steam did not have a substantial impact on freight rates in that decade, it 
may well have had a significant impact once it was no longer such a novel technology.156 
The preceding combination of factors, of technological developments enabling better 
utilisation of the faster, larger, steam-driven ships enabled freight rates to fall despite the large 
increase in the amount of trade using them. Whilst the size of the world’s shipping fleets rose 
from an indexed 61.8 in 1850 to 185 in 1910 (1870 = 100), the demand for shipping from the 
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UK alone rose from 14.3 to 483 over the same period (again with 1870 = 100).157  
Indeed, in a recent paper, Jacks and Pendakur struggled to find any evidence that the lowering 
of freight rates was anything other than a result of the increase in the volume of the flow of 
freight around the world during the latter half of the nineteenth century.158 Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the decline in freight rates were not universally beneficial, with certain 
countries not receiving any significant benefits from their fall. Hanson notes that the growth 
rate of exports for many countries outside of Europe actually slowed down, despite the falling 
costs of transport.159 
The use of freight rates to assess the impact of steam on the world economy is 
therefore an undoubtedly complex task with, as yet, no clear outcome. Fischer and Nordvik’s 
summary still remains by far the most concise: ‘beyond general agreement that freight rates 
fell in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there is little consensus among maritime 
historians about the subject.’160  
But whilst it may not be clear how steam affected freight rates, (and indeed, a firm 
conclusion may never be found) it is perhaps prudent to assess how the growth of steam 
propulsion affected the merchant navies of the various maritime nations. Whilst Britain may 
have had the world’s largest merchant marine in the pre-war period (see Table 1.6) it was by 
no means the only large naval power: 
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Table 1.6: The World’s Merchant Marine (Selected Countries) in Net Registered Tons and 
the Proportion of which was Steam-powered (1880 and 1910)161 
 
  1880 % Steam 1910 % Steam 
United Kingdom: 6,754,513 40.3 11,555,663 90.4 
British Possessions: 1,872,658 12.0 1,806,325 51.3 
Empire Total: 8,447,171 34.9 13,361,988 85.1 
Russia: 467,884 19.0 723,562 64.1 
Finland: 288,308 4.0 392,883 18.2 
Norway: 1,518,658 3.8 1,526,156 58.7 
Sweden: 542,642 14.9 769,985 77.0 
Denmark: 249,466 20.8 546,838 76.0 
German Empire: 1,181,525 18.3 2,903,570 82.5 
Netherlands: 328,281 19.6 534,275 91.4 
Belgium: 75,666 83.6 191,132 98.2 
France: 919,298 30.2 1,451,648 56.2 
Spain: 560,133 41.7 789,457 94.3 
Italy: 999,196 7.7 1,107,187 60.9 
United States*: 1,352,810 10.8 791,825 67.8 
Japan**: 89,309 46.1 1,647,629 74.9 
     
 
As noted above, it is not merely size that matters; it is also worthwhile to note the 
varying percentages of sail and steam tonnage in the varying countries, and what this can tell 
us about the varying usages of these craft. 
Finland stands out as a remarkably slow laggard in the conversion to steam power. 
Kaukiainen combines Finland into the same category as Canada, and argues that this is not 
necessarily an indication of backwardness, instead that there was still plenty of profitable 
employment for sailing vessels right up until the First World War in bulky, non-time-sensitive 
goods such as timber and coal, particularly with the large, iron-hulled windjammers of the 
                                                 
161 Figures taken from Parliamentary Papers, Merchant Shipping, 1881 – 1911 (with some particulars for 1912). Tables 
showing the progress of merchant shipping in the United Kingdom and the principal maritime countries Cd.7033 (London, 
1913), pp.58-61.*: USA figures are of ships registered for Overseas Trade only. **: Japanese figures are in 
Gross Tons.  Ships were only counted after a certain size, which varied country to country; however this 
usually discounts only small coasting vessels and river boats, and so needn’t overly affect the accuracy of the 
table for the particular purpose of indicate the general weighting of the international merchant marine.  
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1880s and 1890s.162 These were of particular value on the long journeys from Western Europe 
to the Pacific coast of South and North America.163 
India, which had been a relatively large shipping nation before 1850, did not continue 
to play a role in worldwide shipping, and was to fade significantly with the advent of the 
steamship, as the shipbuilding trade moved towards the developed Western nations (and 
Britain in particular).164 The tonnage registered in India fell to a nadir of only 65,564 tons by 
1895, of which only 45.7% was steam.165 Indeed, the figures for ships entering Indian ports 
show an even starker picture of decline: 
Table 1.7: Shipping Entering Indian Ports (1857 and 1898/99)166 
 1857 1898/99 
 # of Ships Tonnage Average 
Tonnage 
# of Ships Tonnage Average 
Tonnage 
Indian 34,286 1,219,958 35.6 2,302 133,033 57.8 
British 59,441 2,475,472 41.6 6,219 7,685,009 1,235.7 
Other N/A N/A  1,165 1,297,604 1,113.8 
       
 
Whilst Indian ships may have increased in size slightly, quite clearly the major gains in 
the period covered by the table have been made by other countries and their newer, larger 
steamships. India had thrived during the age of wooden sailing ships, being a sizeable regional 
                                                 
162 Y. Kaukiainen, Sailing into Twilight: Finnish Shipping in an Age of Transport Revolution: 1860 – 1914 (Helsinki, 
1991). 
163 Y. Kaukiainen, ‘Coal and Canvas’, pp.176-177. 
164 “India” here stands not only for the East India Company, which charted large numbers of European-style 
craft, built by Indian shipwrights (in particular at Chittagong, Rangoon, Damaun, Cochin, Beypore and the 
West Coast of India) but also for indigenous ships which continued to be built and ply the coastal trades and 
those which were deemed as being of less importance by the Europeans. See Broeze, F., 'From Imperialism to 
Independence: The Decline and Re-Emergence of Asian Shipping', The Great Circle, Vol. 9 No. 2, (1987), pp. 73 
- 95. 
165 Figures taken from Parliamentary Papers, Merchant Shipping, 1881 – 1911 (with some particulars for 1912). Tables 
showing the progress of merchant shipping in the United Kingdom and the principal maritime countries Cd.7033 (London, 
1913), pp.58-61. 
166 Table originally appears in F.J.A. Broeze, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependency: Maritime India during the 
Raj’, Modern Asian Studies Vol. 18, No. 3 (1984), p.442.  
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supplier of shipping and dominant in its own coastal trade, but the age of steam (and, more 
accurately, argues Broeze, the arrival of subsidised shipping lines such as the British India 
Steam Navigation Company and the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company) resulted in 
the stagnation and under-development of the Indian maritime industry.167 
By way of contrast, Germany experienced a similar transition to Great Britain; not only 
a dramatic increase in tonnage (it more than doubled over the period covered in Table 1.5) 
but also a decisive shift in emphasis towards steam.  Between 1871 and 1887, steamship 
capacity rose by around 454 per cent, whilst sailing ship capacity fell by nearly 8 per cent over 
the same period.168 Much as has been outlined above for Britain, from the 1860s onwards, 
steamers took over increasingly long-distance routes, pushing the sailing vessel into more and 
more marginal routes, so that ‘on the basis of the German data…the change from sail to steam 
occurred between 1875 and 1880.’169 
Japan, meanwhile combined something from both schools of experience. The tonnage 
of sailing ships built continued to expand right up until the end of the First World War, whilst 
simultaneously the use of steamers grew even more rapidly; the vast majority of the Japanese 
fleet was steam-powered.170 The sailing ships were used for trade with other Asian countries, 
where the port facilities were often less well-developed resulting in longer turn-around times 
–given that a day spent in port was a day of cost rather than profit, this was undesirable for 
steamers due to their higher initial capital costs.171 
                                                 
167 Ibid., pp. 443-444. 
168 R. Knauerhase, ‘The Compound Marine Engine’, p.392. 
169 Ibid., p.400. It is worth noting that this article caused some controversy, most notably by Walton (G.M. 
Walton, ‘Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping after 1870: A Comment’, Journal of Economic History (1980). 
However this is regarding Knauerhase’s conclusions regarding productivity of sailing ships versus steamers). 
170 Y. Yashuba, ‘Freight Rates and Productivity in Ocean Transportation for Japan, 1875 – 1943’, Explorations in 
Economic History, Vol. 15., (1978), p.17. 
171 Y. Kaukiainen, ‘Coal and Canvas’, pp.178. 
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However, whilst undoubtedly an improvement on looking at the world’s merchant 
marine in general, even looking at how national fleets experienced the revolution is not, 
perhaps, detailed enough. As has been established, the distribution of steam ships was affected 
significantly by the routes being plied from any given port. Thus different ports within the 
same country would experience the steam revolution at different times, as steam propulsion 
gradually became competitive upon the main routes run out of that port: 
Figure 1.6: Proportion of Tonnage Registered at various UK Ports of Steam Propulsion (1860 
– 1910) 172 
 
 
 The above graph would certainly support such an assertion. Newcastle, the port with 
the largest proportion of short-run shipping routes (coal to London, Baltic and the 
Mediterranean) has the highest percentage of steam tonnage, reaching 95% by 1890. Yet the 
switch to steam in the North East does seem to have been notably slow off the mark, before 
experiencing a dramatic shift in the 1870s. Thus whilst not as early as might be expected, it 
can be explained through the fact that the slow increase in coal shipped from Newcastle 
                                                 
172 Data taken from G.J. Milne, North East England 1850 - 1914: The Dynamics of a Maritime-Industrial Region 
(Woodbridge, 2006), p.141. “North East” refers to Newcastle, North Shields, South Shields, Sunderland, The 
Hartlepools, Middlesbrough & Stockton, although Stockton became a Customs port only in 1861. 
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(mainly due to the growing use of rail freight instead) could be easily managed by the greater 
working capacity of the steamships without an increase in absolute tonnage:173 
Figure 1.7: Tonnage of Steam and Sail Registered in North East Ports (1860 – 1910) 174 
 
 
Equally, London, with its strong links to the Eastern trade, and acting as the entrepot 
for Europe with trade from around the world, experienced the shift both first, due its 
pioneering role at the centre of the British shipping industry, and also later than Newcastle, 
due to its longer routes, the majority only just being reached in 1880 (51.7%). Liverpool, with 
its strong links to routes from the western coast of the Americas, was the slowest to move 
over to steam, only hitting 52.3% by 1890. As such, the figure for that year does reflect what 
has been set out at some length above: Newcastle, being mostly short routes, had 95.8% of its 
                                                 
173 See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of the London trade and the North East Coal Export Trade. Other 
factors such as loading and unloading times, and the decrease in turnaround times this afforded will have 
affected the need to increase capacity through better asset utilisation. 
174 Data taken from G.J. Milne, North East England, p.141. “North East” is the same as Figure 5.6.  
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registered tonnage powered by steam, London, with longer routes had 76.2%, whilst Liverpool 
lagged on 73.6%.175 
However it is necessary to look at more than the number of tons registered at any 
given port. Liverpool was used by ships from a great number of other ports and countries,  
not merely those registered there, and so is a plausible candidate to see if figures about its use 
back up any other conclusions that have been drawn above. Firstly, if we look at steam arrivals, 
they were still sizeable. By 1870, tonnage from the Mediterranean was 80% steam, whilst from 
the northern Atlantic USA, steam outnumbered sail five to one. Furthermore, the 
overwhelming majority of this tonnage was British: 86% of arriving steam tonnage (from all 
routes) was registered in either Liverpool or Glasgow.176 Thus Britain had a large steam 
tonnage, and it was operating on the shorter routes run out of Liverpool, whilst sail remained 
dominant on the longer routes to the western coast of the Americas. Furthermore, from 1855 
to 1870, Norway played a significantly larger part in the sail economy. Total Norwegian sailing 
tonnage visiting the port increased from 3,020 to 15,568 tons, rising from 1% to 4% of the 
total arriving sailing tonnage.177 Furthermore, these Norwegian ships were playing a wider role 
in the world economy, only 30% of Norwegian sailing ships came from Norway. The others 
carried timber from Canada (14%), animal hides from South America (11%) and 24% came 
from the southern USA.178 
From this tangled web of geography, historiography, and technological change it is 
therefore somewhat difficult to draw much more than tentative conclusions.  The transition 
                                                 
175 For a fuller discussion of Liverpool’s switch to steam, see P.K. Cottrell, ‘The steamship on the Mersey, 1815 
– 80: investment and ownership’ in P.K. Cottrell & D.H. Aldcroft (eds.), Shipping, Trade and Commerce (Leicester, 
1981), pp.141–142. 
176 G.J. Milne, Trade and Traders in mid-Victorian Liverpool: Mercantile Business and the Making of a World Port 
(Liverpool, 2000), p.42. 
177 Ibid., p.37. 
178 Ibid., p.38. 
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from sail to steam was not a smooth, steady journey from one state to the other. Steam moved 
forward in fits and starts, like all novel technology. Brunel’s SS Great Britain, vanguard of the 
new steam era, had its engines removed and replaced with sails as this was a more efficient use 
of space than the machinery and fuel required, before ending its days as a coal hulk - providing 
storage for the fuel for the more modern steam ships until these were themselves replaced 
with oil. Iron-working would have to be improved, paddles had to give way to screw 
propulsion and the compound engine would have to be invented to see off the challenge of 
the fast sailing clipper ships. Steam took over routes depending on the value of cargo, the 
distance involved and the volume of trade to be made. Indeed, sailing ships remained a 
valuable proposition on many routes throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
exploiting the strengths of sail to play an important role in the world’s maritime transport 
economy. Whilst it was no longer the prime mover on several routes, sail tonnage provided 
cheap transport for bulky commodities, including coal – the necessary fuel source of the 
steamer. Furthermore, the transition towards steam was not driven by technological change 
alone. Legislative changes, improvements in communication technology and the growth of 
world trade all helped to make shipping a larger and more profitable industry, albeit one that 
was still beholden to the world economic cycle.  
Furthermore, each country experienced the maritime steam revolution in different 
ways. Fleets (such as India’s) which had been regionally important ceased to be so as 
international giants moved in with reliable steamship services. Other fleets, such as the Finnish 
and the Norwegian, retrenched and took advantage of iron and steel technology, and the 
declining cost of shipbuilding throughout the nineteenth century to continue sailing up until 
the end of the period under study. The large steel windjammers were still a profitable 
investment for these countries, particularly on the long-distance trades to the Australia and 
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the western coasts of South and North America. Britain and Germany saw a large shift towards 
steam propulsion, with the sailing ship relegated to long-distance roles, whilst Japan saw 
something similar, despite the increasing amount of sail tonnage built for regional and intra-
Asian trade. However, whilst each country’s role in the world economy was important, Britain 
by far had the largest merchant marine, and as such there were large differences between ports 
depending on the key routes and cargoes travelled and handled there.  
As will be shown in the following chapters, in the key ports of the north east and south 
Wales, these routes and cargoes are related to a large extent to the coal industry. Coal provided 
an integration of domestic and international infrastructure in terms of fuel and freight, the 
improvements at home enabling a greater linking to the world economy. Therefore as can be 
seen, coal played an important role in the development of both the railways and shipping. The 
steam-driven transport developments of the nineteenth century provided a fundamental shift 
in the way that transport was viewed. Tortuous land journeys (by road or canal) of relatively 
small loads were replaced by regular, reliable services travelling at speeds hitherto unimagined 
and carrying tonnages that would have been impossible at the start of the century. British 
economic development without the railway would have been different indeed. Coal was not 
only the fuel of the railways but also their lifeblood in terms of freight, travelling both within 
and between coal mining districts, to metropolitan areas but also, importantly, to docks and 
ports throughout the country to fuel the merchant marine and provide a substantial amount 
of our export cargo. 
In the world of shipping, steam power was less transformative, but nonetheless had 
resulted in a significant impact by the outbreak of the First World War.  Iron-hulls, anti-fouling 
paint, the compound steam engine and engineering solutions such as the Suez Canal had recast 
the geography of world trade. Coal provided the raw fuel which powered this revolution, much 
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like it did for the railways, and as coal was an important commodity for the railway trade, so it 
was for steam-ships. Chapters Two and Three will explore this is in more detail. In particular, 
Chapter Five will demonstrate how the move to steam-shipping and the use of coal as a fuel 
may have adjusted the nature of world trade routes. Coaling stations may well have had an 
integral role to play in spreading the steam revolution around the world. Not only was coal an 
important cargo for many of the ships leaving northern Europe, but it was also the fuel source, 
which was needed to be found all around the world if steam was to become truly the dominant. 
Coaling stations were a necessary aspect of the steam revolution, further expanding the range 
of the steamer and bringing more and more of the world within the reach of Western Europe’s 
industrial economies. 
 However it is important to draw out the conclusion that whilst the techniques used 
in coal-mining had not changed substantially over the period under study - steam power 
enabled more coal to be hauled to the surface and improved draining - the technology used in 
distributing it had done so in leaps and bounds. Improved distribution in the coal trade would 
open up London and other urban centres to inland fields which had previously only been able 
to supply those in the immediate vicinity. The improved links encouraged the sinking of more 
shafts as the market grew, whilst the seemingly bottomless demand of overseas provided a 
home for a growing amount of the coal won in the country, coal that could only be mined 
because the distribution network for it had changed so dramatically.  
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Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel 
A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COAL TRADE: 1850 - 1913 
 
 “The coal-trade must be allowed to stand very high in the scale of national importance, as the 
best nursery of able-bodied seamen; furnishing many thousands of excellent sailors, for the momentous 
purpose of carrying on every branch of British navigation, and greatly contributing to the wealth and 
security of the empire.” 179 
 
Chapter Two: The North East Coal Trade 
 
The domestic trade of coal in Britain was mainly based around the shipment of coal 
from the pits of the Tyne and Wear down to the burgeoning metropolis of London. Indeed, 
“The Coal Trade” as a phrase applied almost exclusively to that movement of coal until well 
into the nineteenth century (as above).180 The trade had existed since Roman times, but during 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in the sixteenth century it became a fundamental part of the 
country’s economy as deforestation threatened what could now be termed the first “energy 
crisis”.181 Whilst coal was well-known as a fuel, its sheer bulk made for it being dismissed as 
relatively useless without an easy way of transporting it to population centres or where the 
energy is required. However, whilst much of the coal in the UK was not easily accessible prior 
to the railways, the exception of the Tyne and the Wear valleys was that coal could be mined 
within sight of the rivers, even on their very banks, enabling for easy loading into ships and 
thence transport to London.182 Indeed, it is well-known that it is in the wooden ‘waggonways’ 
of the north east, carrying the coal to the riverbank, that the original idea of the modern railway 
was formed and where Stephenson trained and built his first locomotives. The years until 1771 
saw the creation and collapse of a series of monopolies, culminating in the “Limitation of the 
                                                 
179 R. Edington, A Treatise on the Coal Trade, (London, 1813), p.221. 
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Vend” which ran from 1771 – 1845.183 However, despite seven collapses before 1816 (due to 
companies breaking the agreement and the Napoleonic Wars), the Limitation ran without 
break from then until 1845, successfully colluding to keep high coal prices reigning in 
London.184 Underneath the terms of this agreement, a total of amount of coal to be raised and 
the price it would be sold at was set every year, and the different collieries were allocated shares 
based on their total potential production.185 This price-fixing was ascertained by 
contemporaries in 1828 to cost London’s coal merchants an estimated £800,000 a year.186 
Indeed, the Royal Commission on Coal in 1870 heard that during the time of the Limitation, 
the same English coal could often be found at half the Thames price in St. Petersburg.187 Not 
all agree with such dramatic figures though. Hausman, for example states that, whilst present, 
the effect of the cartel on prices in London was insignificant when compared to coal tax in 
the period (which he calculates as having a real effect of five to nine shillings per chauldron 
between 1770 and 1831).188 Indeed, Mokyr, in reviewing Hausman’s article further suggests 
that as the Vend was unable to have much of an effect on prices, it was perhaps not as 
successful a monopolist as traditionally assumed.189 
Tan agrees that the powers of the Vend were severely limited in regard to setting prices, 
but that the price impact was higher than that for which Hausman gives it credit.190 Whereas 
                                                 
183 Whilst undeniably fascinating, here there is not the space for a full discussion of the hostmen, “Grand Allies” 
and various other aspects of this intervening period. For full details see either R. Smith’s Sea-Coal or P.M. Sweezy, 
Monopoly and Competition.  
184 E.S. Tan, ‘Market Structure and the Coal Cartel in Early nineteenth-century England’, Economic History Review, 
62, 2 (2009), p.351. 
185 Of course, this is a gross over-simplification. For a better, brief discussion of the Limitation, see H.S. Jevons, 
British Coal Trade, pp.315 – 317, or for yet fuller details, again P.M. Sweezy’s Monopoly and Competition. 
186 A.R. Griffin, The British Coal-Mining Industry, p.144. 
187 Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Royal Commission on Coal, Volume III (London, 1870), p. 2; cited in H.S. 
Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.316.  
188 W.J. Hausman, ‘Cheap Coals or Limitation of the Vend? The London Coal Trade, 1770 – 1845’, The Journal 
of Economic History, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Jun., 1984), pp.321–328. 
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Hausman argued that the Vend’s effect on prices was at most ten percent, Tan instead 
supports a higher figure of thirteen to seventeen percent.191 This was limited at the upper end 
by the need to keep prices below that at which coal mines outside of the Vend (that is, those 
in Yorkshire and elsewhere) were able to compete. Thus Tan concludes that rather than the 
traditional view, that is of railways being responsible for the decline of the cartel’s grip on the 
London market, instead canals were the factor most responsible for the opening up of the 
metropolis to other suppliers.192 This in turn echoes Turnbull’s comments on canals’ role in 
the coal market: ‘they did not open up new coalfields nor materially alter the national market 
structure for coal… [they did]… widen the market areas supplied from inland pits…”193 It is 
worth noting that there are two reasons to doubt the impact of canals on the liberation of the 
coal market however. Firstly Griffin notes that in several scenarios, such as the East Midlands 
and the Glaswegian coalfields, this liberation was not forthcoming. Here, as in the Erewash 
Valley in 1798, institutions closely modelled on the Vend were set up in 1798 to control the 
price of coal shipped on the canal.194 Secondly, there is also the issue of their importance in 
the London coal trade. Canals, whilst doubtless important for the coal industry as a whole, 
were not significant in the supply of coal to London. For example, the Grand Junction Canal 
(opened in 1800) was not permitted to carry coal nearer to London than Grove Park until 
1805, and even then its trade was limited to 50,000 tonnes.195 This threshold was later 
abandoned, but it did not especially matter for coal imports by canal were to peak in 1844 at 
                                                 
191 Ibid., p.350. 
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Review, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Nov., 1987), p.552. Although there is an interesting discussion of the impact of the 
Limitation on the spatial geography of the collieries themselves: see P. Cromar, ‘The Coal Industry on Tyneside 
1771 – 1800: Oligopoly and Spatial Change’, Economic Geography, Vol. 53. No 1 (Jan, 1977), pp.79–94. 
194 A.R. Griffin, The British Coal-Mining Industry, p.145. 
195 Ibid., p.137. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 68 
72,000 tons.196 Thereafter canal coal declined in importance, making up, on average, under 
0.1% of London’s coal imports in the latter half of the century (indeed, in 1880 it accounted 
for only 0.04%).197 
However, Tan notes that it is less the actual use of the canals as the potential for their 
utilisation that is important. Whenever prices rose above the level at which coal shipped by 
canal could compete with the Limitation’s coal, it did so, providing an upper limit to the 
Limitation’s ability to raise prices Thus if more money was to be made without breaching this 
price ceiling, then the solution would need to be found in lowering costs.  
The context, therefore, of the London coal trade preceding the liberalisation of 1845 
has been laid out. However, 1845 was not merely a turning point due to the collapse of the 
cartel. Although the historical spotlight shines less brightly on this than on the preceding 
period, it is of equal importance, for the coal trade did not stop in 1845. Indeed, it is from this 
date, as London burgeoned into the Imperial metropolis, technology revolutionised transport, 
and without the Limitation’s restrictive supply practices, that the coal trade becomes vibrant 
and fascinating. As mentioned above, railways brought coal to London for the first time in 
that auspicious year and unlike the canals, they truly offered an alternative, not only to the 
coasting trade of the North East, but also to the North East as a whole, given that they opened 
up significant new areas of mining to London’s reach. In 1845, 3,472,000 tons of coal were 
imported into London, of which 3,403,320 tons came by ship. Indeed, Newcastle, Newcastle 
Wallsend and Sunderland Wallsend together with Stockton and Hartlepool provided 3,077,499 
tons alone. By way of comparison only 8,377 tons were brought by railway.198 Yet by 1868, the 
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last year of the coal duties wherein meticulous records were kept and published, only 2,981,230 
tons were brought by ship, with 2,661,286 tons coming from Newcastle and Sunderland 
together with Hartlepool and West Hartlepool. This figure is met by a total of 2,979,333 tons 
coming into London by rail, 938,403 tons being transported on the Great Northern Railway 
from Newcastle, but also with 1,059,177 tons travelling on the North Western; demonstrating 
a significant shift away from the North East as the monopoly supplier of London’s coal. Thus 
over this initial twenty-three year period there was a clear trend towards rail transport and away 
from sea-borne coal, as railways had emerged from nothing to parity with the coasting trade 
as a form of transport. Indeed, by 1879 only 3,509,000 tons were transported by sea, compared 
to 6,547,000 tons on the railways.199 In the 1870s over fifty per cent of the coal railed into 
London was borne by the East Midland, whilst a further twenty per cent came from Yorkshire 
and less than ten per cent came from the North East.200 Clearly rail transport was opening the 
London market to producers who didn’t benefit from the natural benefits of the Tyne, Wear 
and Tees. 
Such an increase in competition would be expected to have a dramatic effect on prices, 
as various producers and transport companies bid for the task, ensuring low prices for 
London’s end consumers. A comparison, however, of pre-Railway (and therefore ‘Vend’ 
prices) with those of the early twentieth century, is cautionary in this regard. In 1839 a Tyneside 
colliery owner and MP gave witness to a Parliamentary Enquiry stating the make-up of the 
final selling price in London: 
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200 R. Church, History of the British Coal Industry Volume III, p.45. 
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Table 2.1: Analysis of the Retail Price of Coal in London, 1839201 
 
 £ s d 
Cost of Coals (F.O.B.) at Newcastle 
London Coal Market Charges 
Ship Owners’ Freight Charges 
London Coal Merchants’ Margin 
 
 
 
 
10 
2 
9 
10 
6 
8 
4 
0 
Retail Price 1 12 6 
 
Although quite broad, the categories indicate that approximately one third of the price 
was added on at the London end of the transaction. By way of contrast, the far more detailed 
1914 figures indicate that over three quarters of the price is taken care of by the coal purchase 
and railways fees: 
Table 2.2: Analysis of the Retail Price of Coal in London, August 1914202 
 
 s d s d 
Cost at pit 11 6   
Railway Rate 6 4   
Wagon Hire 1 0 18 10 
Loaders’ wages  9   
Other wages at Coal Wharf (e.g. foremen, picking out slate)  2.5  11.5 
Carmen, delivery in big sacks  8   
Driving money and attendance at stables  2.5  10.5 
Railway siding rent, demurrage, weighbridge charges, etc.  1    1 
Sacks  1.5    1.5 
Vans, trollies and weigh machines  1.75   
Horse depreciation  1   
Forage and bedding  5.5   
Shoeing, stable expenses, vet, etc.  2.5   
Stable rent, rates, heating and lighting  1.5 1   0.25 
Loss on smalls and weights  4    4 
Salaries 1 3   
Establishment Charges 1 1.5 2   4.5 
Total Cost: 24   7.25 
Profit:  10.75 
Retail Price: 25   6 
                                                 
201 Figures taken from Griffin, A. R., The British Coalmining Industry, (Buxton, 1977), p.144. 
202 Ibid., p.154. Figures are for one ton of Derby Best Coal.   
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Thus, at £1 5s 6d it is apparent that prices fell by 7s despite the greater price of the 
Derbyshire coal at the pit head in 1914. Railway freight costs in the early twentieth century 
being lower than the coastal shipping costs of 1839 also make a noticeable impact on the end 
price. 
The implicit assumption in Mitchell’s article about the effect of the railways on the 
London coal trade and Brown’s book on the Port of London is that, having dramatically 
increased their share of the coal transport market from their inception, and having successfully 
demolished the canal as effective competition, the railways were destined to repeat the same 
trick against coastal shipping and thus dominate London’s coal supply.203 Indeed, with railways 
opening up new areas of the country, becoming faster, safer and more reliable, and with the 
speed advantage that they enjoyed over the coasting trade, it is a hypothesis that makes sense. 
 However, it is a supposition that requires challenging, for although initially the figures 
seem to support such a thesis (as demonstrated above), later figures reverse the trend. 1885 
was to prove a peak year for the railways, with over 7,000,000 tons transported by rail 
compared to only around 4,500,000 tons shipped coastwise.204 Thereafter, rail’s lead was to 
diminish, until by 1898 dominance had returned to shipping, transporting 51.3% of London’s 
total important of around 14,250,000 tons as opposed to rail’s 48.6% (canal and road imports 
were responsible for the missing 0.1%).205 Shipping remained - and indeed grew slightly more 
- dominant until the outbreak of World War One.206 
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 This remarkable return to near equal shares of London’s coal supply in the opening 
years of the twentieth century needs to be explained. Having destroyed the easy assumption 
that railways continued their growth uninhibited between the 1870s and World War One, 
another easy presumption presents itself as an explanation of this new scenario: that the 
growth of steam-shipping to replace the old sailing colliers improved efficiency and thus 
restored fair competition between the railways and the coasting trade.  
That steam shipping was far more efficient than sailing was not in doubt. The first 
screw collier was the John Bowes, built for the colliery firm of John Bowes and Partners. The 
maiden voyage in 1852 was a resounding success. It took 120 hours to complete the round 
trip to London from Newcastle, including 24 hours for unloading; two sailing vessels would 
have been required for the same task and these would each have spent over a month on the 
round trip.207 By 1864, the Cory Brothers’ steamer, the James Dixon transported the same 
amount of coal in a year as sixteen sailing colliers and 144 men.208 The improved capacity of 
the steamers was furthered by remarkable advances in the mechanical handling of the coal. 
The Cory Brothers had taken the initiative against the old, manual unloading of coal and 
instead had installed eight hydraulic cranes at their premises on Victoria docks in 1855, which 
could handle around 700,000 tons a year.209 More generally, by 1859, of the 3,299,170 tons 
unloaded in London that year, 1,850,000 of these were done by hydraulic or steam power.210 
By 1863 Cory Brothers had placed 6 hydraulic cranes aboard a floating derrick in the middle 
of the Thames  (named “Atlas”) in order to speed up the discharging of coal, which could deal 
with two ships at once and unload 1,200 tons of coal in ten hours, which was estimated to 
                                                 
207 R. Smith, Sea-Coal, p.285. 
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mean around 500,000 tons of coal a year. Together with its successor, Atlas II (built in 1865 
and moored near its predecessor), the two cranes could handle between 1,250,000 and 
1,500,000 tons of coal. Combined with the Cory Brothers’ other facilities at Victoria, this left 
only around 200,000 tons to be manually unloaded, from ‘small vessels and part cargoes not 
suitable for such delivery’.211 Such means of unloading was a vast improvement over the 70 
tons a day possible under the old manual method of “coal whipping”.212 By 1875 these derricks 
were at full capacity, unloading, as estimated, 1,500,000 tons of coal out of the 2,750,000 tons 
of sea-borne coal imported.213  
Remarkable as these figures are however, the growth of steam ships is 
contemporaneous with the rise of the railways as a method of transporting coal. In 1855, steam 
colliers made 154 voyages to London, unloading 77,341 tons of coal out of 11,857 voyages 
made by the coastal trade, delivering 3,399,561 tons of London’s coal, or around two per cent 
of coastal coal tonnage.214 By 1868, sailing colliers brought in 1,259,394 tons in 4,753 voyages, 
whilst steam brigs brought 1,721,836 tons of coal into London in 2,357 voyages, or 58%. 
However, by 1868, the railways brought in 2,979,000 tons as opposed to 8,377 tons in 1845.215 
Even on the Great Northern line, in direct competition with the new technology, tonnage 
increased from 4,944 tons in 1850 (the first year the Great Northern brought coal to London) 
to 938,405 tons in 1868. The growth of the railways had not, seemingly, been checked by the 
development of the screw collier.  
                                                 
211 Cited in R. Smith, Sea-Coal, p.290. 
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There has been debate amongst historians as to whether the backward nature of 
Britain’s railways was symptomatic of Britain’s economic complacency and decline.216 This 
discussion is also relevant here, as it may be that whilst coastal shipping continued to get more 
efficient, the railway network failed to capitalise on its earlier success with further 
improvements in efficiency. However, there is not sufficient space to grant it a full discussion, 
merely a quick look at the recent historiography rebuffing traditional views on British railways 
in the period before World War One. This area of discussion can be neatly summarised by the 
debate over the delightfully named “silly little bobtailed coal wagons”, which have been held 
up as a symbol of stagnation and backwardness. They stand accused of hindering the railway’s 
growth by raising freight fares and depressing rail profits through inefficiencies caused by their 
use.217 However, Van Vleck has offered a spirited defence of the offending rolling stock, 
arguing instead that overall its use suited the British railway network and, whilst arguably 
inflating a few railway costs, overall brought down the cost of freight transfer in Britain as 
opposed to the use of larger wagons.218 Cain uses these wagons as part of his argument against 
the Edwardian rail system in his discussion of the topic.219 Indeed, he cites the decline of the 
railways’ share of the London coal market as symptomatic of the problems facing the rail 
                                                 
216 For a discussion and rebuttal of the railways as a symptom of Edwardian stagnation, see: R.J. Irving, ‘The 
Profitability and Performance of British Railways, 1870 – 1914’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 
1978), pp.46–66. 
217 Both the criticism and the name are originally articulated in T. Veblen, Imperial Germany & the Industrial 
Revolution (London, 1915), p.130. The criticism is repeated in much shorter form in J. Simmons & G. Biddle, 
British Railway History, p.552, and at length in D.H. Aldcroft, ‘The Efficiency and Enterprise of British Railways, 
1870 – 1914’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, no. 2. (1968), pp.158–174, M. Frankel, ‘Obsolescence and 
Technological Change in a Maturing Economy’, American Economic Review, 45 (June, 1955), pp.296–311 and in P.  
David, ‘The Landscape and the Machine’, in D.N. McCloskey, (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain After 1840, 
(Princeton, 1971), pp.145–205. 
218 Van Vleck, ‘Delivering Coal by Road and Rail’, pp.139–160, and by the same author ‘Reassessing 
Technological Backwardness: Absolving the “Silly Little Bobtailed” Coal Car’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 
55, No. 2 (Jun. 1995), pp.383–385 and ‘In Defence (Again) of “Silly Little Bobtailed” Coal Wagons: Reply to 
Peter Scott, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp.1081–1084. 
219 P.J. Cain, ‘Railways 1870 – 1914: the maturity of the private system’ in M.J. Freeman & D.H. Aldcroft (eds.), 
Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), pp.92–133. 
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industry. The coastal routes from Newcastle were better able to cut their rates as they were 
more efficient and also as extra mileage on a ship had little effect upon overall costs whereas 
for railways there was a set cost per mile in the form of the upkeep of the permanent way.220 
However, Irving distinctly rejects traditional thoughts regarding the over-capitalisation and 
inefficiency across the whole railway industry in the period 1870 – 1914, instead proposing a 
model of gradually improving efficiency especially after 1900 (albeit without distinct reference 
to the London coal trade).221  Indeed, in a later case study, Irving’s proved this to be the case 
with regard to the North Eastern Railway.222 This is of relevance to this discussion especially 
as, whilst the North Eastern itself did not deliver the coal to London, it was not only a point 
of origin for some of London’s coal, but also a significant coal-carrying railway. It carried 
15,058,598 tons of coal and coke in 1870, a number which had increased to 42,595,623 tons 
by 1912.223 If, as Irving asserts, the case of the North Eastern is typical of the major rail lines 
between 1870 and 1914, then there is little reason to argue a case for significant inefficiencies. 
Thus stagnation and lack of efficiency in the rail industry do not appear responsible for the 
switch back towards coastal shipping in the late nineteenth century. 
However, in explaining the remarkable comeback of coastal shipping, perhaps a 
fundamental shift in approach is required. Convenient as it may be to treat coal as a 
homogenous commodity, it is no such thing. Indeed, it comes in a remarkable variety of types 
suitable for many different tasks. Jevons splits coal into five over-arching varieties, under 
which there are numerous other, finer divisions based on size, colliery and seam.224 For the 
purposes of this work, however, the five original distinctions are more than adequate. Firstly 
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Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 76 
there are the ‘highly bituminous coals’, which were used to “some extent” in gas and household 
consumption. Secondly, the ‘bituminous coals’ covered a very wide range of coals, which could 
be used as house coal, but which were also extensively used by the gas companies. The third 
class was that of ‘semi-bituminous steam coals’, which was found almost exclusively in South 
Wales, and it was of this class that many of the world’s navies and the British mercantile fleet 
were able to draw their fuel. Fourthly came ‘dry or hard steam coals’ which are a poorer quality 
of steam coal and finally ‘anthracite’ was used to fuel central heating furnaces in offices, hotels 
and houses. 
Thus clearly domestic users and industrials users wanted different varieties of coal. On 
top of this, there is the question of tonnage. The average household is going to require 
significantly less coal than a gas-production facility, with some small traders, the so-called 
‘coal-shed men’, purchasing coal from the merchants in quantities as little as 7, 14 or 20 tons 
at a time, and then selling them in amounts of as little as 1/4cwt at a time - sometimes in 
amounts as small as 7lbs.225 These small amounts, when combined with the diversity of small, 
household coals of different types and bituminous quantities available from a range of 
collieries throughout the land, resulted in a great possible number of potential purchases for 
London homeowners, thus no individual variety of coal was able to secure a dominant market 
position. The General Manager of the London and North Western Railways, Sir Frederic 
Harrison stated226: 
…Of course, it is a great convenience to coal merchants…to have the coal in truck 
loads of eight or ten tons at a time rather than in boat loads of 30 or 60 tons 
[delivered by canal]. The fact of their being able to receive consignments of 8 or 10 
tons enables the merchant to keep a variety of coal on hand to suit the different 
tastes and requirements of their customers which they would not be able to do if 
they had got to take boat loads. 
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Therefore in a scenario whereby domestic and industrial users want different varieties 
of coal, and in differing amounts, there is clearly a role for the smaller carrying capacity of 
those “silly little bobtailed wagons” in the supply of household coal as they are much more 
capable of delivering suitable quantities of the differing varieties. Sir Frederic also stated that 
between them all, railway companies had 155 depots situated all over London, enabling 
merchants to use a minimal amount of expensive road haulage.227 Thus they would also be 
more flexible in delivering the coal to where it was required without the expense of cartage. 
This would appear to vindicate Van Vleck’s comments on the size of British railway wagons 
allowing for greater flexibility when understood within ‘the wider distribution framework’.228 
 In way of comparison, of course, supplies for large industrial furnaces could be 
relatively homogenous given the size of the orders. The largest consumers in London of 
industrial coal were the Gas companies on Thameside, located there due to their origins in the 
early nineteenth century (before rail supplies were possible). The Gas Light and Coke 
Company entered as a buyer to the Coal Exchange in 1826, the City of London Gas Company 
in 1834 and the Beckton Gas Works were built in 1869-70.229 The chairman of the South 
Metropolitan Gas Company stated that his gasworks used approximately 1,200,000 tons of 
coal a year. 230 In 1902, approximately 8,000,000 tons were brought by sea, and thus one fairly 
typical gas company used approximately one sixth of London’s sea-coal import.231 These 
companies needed large orders of coal to be delivered regularly, something for which the 
steamer was perfect, especially given their location on the Thames.  
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That the railways were specialised towards the import of household coal is also 
indicated by the report on retail coal prices which stipulated that the railways were struggling 
to cope with the increased amount of coal movements brought about by the lessening of the 
coastal trade during the First World War.232 The problem was compounded, for as well as 
significant portions of gas-coal being forced onto the railways, the added congestion caused 
by this and military movements meant that coal wagons were held up for longer before 
returning to collieries, thus merchants (who owned the majority of wagons) were unwilling to 
have their wagons sent as far south as London when they were unsure how long they would 
take to return.233 
Thus there appears to have been some significant distinction between railways 
bringing household coal and steamers bringing industrial coal. In 1915, it was reported that 
whilst no exact figures had been collected or were available, it was reasonable to assume that 
barely any of London’s household coal came by steamer and that nearly all sea-borne coal was 
for “gas works, electrical undertakings and industrial purposes”.234 Indeed, William Cory and 
Sons - a large coal distribution firm - dealt with an estimated five million of the nine million 
tons that were imported by sea in 1915, said that almost exclusively all of their coal was of 
industrial grade.235  
This estimate demonstrates their importance, and is supported by other evidence 
which suggests a sizeable role in the coal business in London. In 1896, for example, the firm 
purchased or amalgamated with a further 7 firms in London: 
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 The most significant development in the sea-borne trade took place in 
1896. In October of that year, eight London firms of coal merchants, 
lightermen, and owners of steam colliers were amalgamated into a limited 
company under the name of the largest of them, Wm. Cory & Son. The 
associated firms handled, it was said, over 5 million tons in the home trade. 
This would mean that their proportion of the London trade was over 70 per 
cent of the sea-borne important (more than 7 million tons) and over a third 
of the total import of 14 million tons.236 
 
This figure tallies with the earlier cited figure of over 5 million tonnes (out of 9 million tonnes) 
in 1915. However, at least one witness to the Royal Commission felt that, whilst undoubtedly 
sizeable, Cory’s dominance of the sea-borne coal market was somewhat exaggerated: 
Sidney Webb alleged that one firm (William Cory and Sons), trading under 
various names, was responsible for a large proportion – possibly as much as 
three-quarters – of all coal distribution in London…A later witness, Mr 
George Rose who was the chairman of an organisation representing the coal 
factors, testified that Cory’s share of the London wholesale trade was 12 per 
cent, not 75 per cent as alleged.237  
 
However, whilst they may not have shipped the coal, it is important to remember the 
significant proportion of coal which was handled by the Cory & Sons’ Atlas and Atlas II 
floating docks. Therefore whilst a definitive total number may be difficult to ascertain, the 
reason for the vastly differing estimates upon Cory & Sons’ share of the London trade relates, 
most probably, to the definition of “handled”.  
Therefore the coal trade between Newcastle and Durham and the metropolitan south 
was transformed by the changes which had taken place in the distribution network of coal. It 
was, of course, mutually supporting, with the improvements in shipping and rail allowing more 
coal to be won, in turn providing fuel and freights for the new distribution channels. There 
were changes not only in the methods of movement, but also in the way that coal was loaded 
and unloaded as innovators sought to increase the competitive advantage of a given mode. 
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However, not all the coal loaded into the colliers on the banks of the Tyne and Wear was 
destined for London. 
Britain’s Industrial Revolution was, by the nineteenth century, rapidly spreading 
around the globe. The steam-powered changes wrought by the age of iron and steam moved 
to countries as far apart as America, Australia and Japan, as well as to European countries 
nearer to home: France, Belgium, Germany and Italy. As was the case with the domestic 
revolution, coal was the main fuel source for this growth and development, a situation which 
the North East was keen to exploit. Whilst the first moves towards industrialisation could be 
made without significant imports of coal (Switzerland’s hydro-electric power supplies being 
an excellent example), coal offered the advantage of being able to store energy.238 Areas 
without coal were able to import it to continue the process of industrialisation as transport 
costs across seas and along canals, railways and rivers fell in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, itself a result of the products of the industrial revolution:   
By the nineteenth century, staple trades from the extreme ‘ends’ of the European coasting 
trade were booming, whether timber from the eastern Baltic or grain from the Black Sea. 
The ships that carried those goods to the Western European economic core returning with 
increasing cargoes of coal from Britain to supply the demands of an ever-larger number of 
urbanising and industrialising places around the European coast.  239 
 
As such, it could be reasonably expected that countries such as Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Italy would provide large markets for British coal exports. The rise of imports of 
coal into Antwerp, for example, demonstrates how a once unimportant import of coal came 
to be the second largest component of the port’s imports by 1900, the total important having 
increased by some 5,625% since 1860 (22,051 tonnes to 1,240,508 tonnes over the period).240 
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However, France was the largest importer of coal from the UK . Although France had 
used British coal since the 16th century, the Napoleonic Wars and the ensuing high tariffs 
limited access until the late 1830s. But once tariffs fell, the rise of imports was swift: 
Table 2.3: French Imports of British Coal241 
 
Years Metric Tons Proportion of total imports Proportion of total consumption 
1841/45 
1846/50 
1851/55 
1856/60 
1861/65 
1866/70 
1871/75 
1876/80 
1881/85 
1886/90 
1891/95 
1896/00 
1901/05 
1906/10 
1911/13 
476,000 
576,000 
702,000 
1,236,000 
1,392,000 
1,854,000 
2,240,000 
3,012,000 
4,032,000 
4,156,000 
4,805,000 
6,232,000 
7,181,000 
10,235,000 
11,107,000 
24% 
24% 
19% 
22% 
21% 
24% 
30% 
35% 
37% 
40% 
42% 
48% 
49% 
53% 
49% 
9% 
8% 
7% 
9% 
8% 
9% 
10% 
12% 
14% 
13% 
13% 
16% 
15% 
19% 
18% 
    
 
However, even countries such as Germany and Russia, blessed with large amounts of 
indigenous coal, imported significant amounts of coal from the UK. Indeed to take an example 
from the middle of the period under study, in 1877, Germany was importing only one million 
tons fewer of coal than France, despite its significant domestic supply (see Table 2.4): 
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Table 2.4: British Coal Exports (excluding Coke and Patent Fuel, (1877)242 
 
Destination 
Country 
Tons (% of Total Coal 
Exported, 1877) 
Value 
Russia 964,393 6.48% £514,042 
Sweden & Norway 1,168,112 7.85% £595,125 
Denmark 760,508 5.11% £374,757 
Germany 2,008,469 13.50% £928,453 
Holland 407,374 2.74% £210,795 
Belgium 259,207 1.74% £126,824 
France 2,953,607 19.85% £1,324,241 
Portugal, Azores & 
Madeira 
256,343 1.72% £127,955 
Spain and Canaries 658,686 4.43% £360,718 
Italy 1,029,446 6.92% £491,460 
Austrian Territories 82,112 0.55% £46,915 
Greece 67,966 0.46% £37,428 
Turkey Proper 217,406 1.46% £114,834 
Total (Europe) 10,833,629 72.80% £5,253,547 
Total (Worldwide) 14,880,899 100.00% £7,477,699 
 
These figures are for the UK as a whole, but the role that Europe played in accepting 
British trade can be clearly seen. A third of all British coal exported in 1877 went to just 
Germany and France, with significant flows also spread across the rest of the North Sea and 
Baltic countries: Russia, Denmark and Scandinavia. If we classify the top six rows of the table 
as Northern Europe, then approximately 37.42% of British coal exports went there, with 
                                                 
242 Data extracted from Browne’s Export List (London,1877). 
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35.39% going to Mediterranean countries (including, and indeed, mainly going to France). It 
is unclear how much of this export trade to France went through the northern ports and how 
much went through the southern ports. However, using data from the end of the period under 
study, it is possible to assess more directly how the north east ports exported to the world in 
1911. 
Table 2.5 demonstrates these flows to various regions of the world, in particular 
regarding European exports from five key port groupings in the north east: the Tyne (minus 
Blyth, which is considered separately given its size), the Wear, Seaham and the Hartlepools.  
The first thing that can be noted from this table is the difference in scale of the various ports, 
with all of the other ports combined shipping less than two thirds of the amount moved on 
the Tyne (13,188,617 tons compared to 20,102,912 tons). A second note is the comparison 
between ports with regard to foreign and home shipments; Blyth sent approximately 84.4% 
of all its coal abroad, indeed, almost 56% of all coal shipped at the port was for the Baltic and 
North Sea trades. Indeed, if the entire North Sea and the north coast of France as far west as 
Brest are taken together, 72.8% of all Blyth’s coal was sent to this range of ports. The other 
ports sent 28.6% (Tyne), 36.6% (Wear), 35.2% (Seaham) and 42.4% (Hartlepools). The Tyne, 
being so much larger than the other ports, clearly had a more diversified foreign trade, whilst 
Seaham, the ports on the Wear, Blyth and the Hartlepools were very much focused on the 
export of coal to nearby ports. If the coal exported solely to Europe is totalled, then the figures  
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Table 2.5: Coal Shipments from the North East Ports (1911)243 
 
 Blyth Tyne Wear Seaham Hartlepools Totals 
 tons % tons % tons % tons % tons % tons % 
Arctic, Baltic, N. Sea 2,424,706 55.8 2,100,862 10.5 1,207,789 25.3 411,350 21.1 542,186 25.5 6,686,893 20.1 
Elbe-Brest 725,048 16.7 3,632,596 18.1 537,392 11.3 274,350 14.1 359,986 16.9 5,529,372 16.6 
Brest-Bayonne 14,593 0.3 563,685 2.8 370,374 7.8 57,858 3.0 60,667 2.8 1,067,177 3.2 
N. Spain & Portugal 17,034 0.4 745,877 3.7 120,025 2.5 4,782 0.2 6,669 0.3 894,387 2.7 
Near Med. 242,838 5.6 3,599,915 17.9 247,934 5.2 51,696 2.7 358,437 16.8 4,500,820 13.5 
Upper Med. 148,035 3.4 733,606 3.6 159,526 3.3   19,182 0.9 1,060,349 3.2 
North Africa 39,589 0.9 560,691 2.8 37,532 0.8 12,533 0.6 50,686 2.4 701,031 2.1 
West Africa 1,186 0.0 177,851 0.9       179,037 0.5 
East Africa   10,825 0.1       10,825 0.0 
Red Sea, Gulf 36,589 0.8 27,846 0.1       64,435 0.2 
Far East   4,991 0.0       4,991 0.0 
Australasia         658 0.0 658 0.0 
Americas, Pacific 3,933 0.1 190,270 0.9       194,203 0.6 
Americas, Atlantic 12,600 0.3 126,527 0.6 105,617 2.2     244,744 0.7 
Foreign Total 3,665,745 84.4 12,475,542 62.1 2,786,189 58.4 812,569 41.8 1,398,471 65.7 21,138,516 63.5 
England, N.E. Coast 2,968 0.1 40,726 0.2 8,932 0.2 46,815 2.4 11.171 0.5 99,452 0.3 
England Thames 38,390 0.9 4,214,159 21.0 982,515 20.6 818,461 42.1 245,110 11.5 6,298,635 18.9 
England, S.E. Coast 7,425 0.2 198,055 1.0 14,360 0.3 31,270 1.6 24,430 1.1 275,540 0.8 
England, S. Coast 208,082 4.8 348,308 1.7 168,974 3.5 17,475 0.9 136,368 6.4 879,207 2.6 
England, S.W.   6,670 0.0 1,360 0.0   3,550 0.2 11,580 0.0 
England, N.W.            0.0 
Wales     60 0.0     60 0.0 
Scotland, West   820 0.0 2,350 0.0 380 0.0   3,550 0.0 
Scotland, N. & E. 24,874 0.6 185,464 0.9 439,497 9.2 125,990 6.5 4,906 0.2 780,731 2.3 
Ireland   94,332 0.5   1,660 0.1   95,992 0.3 
UK Total 281,739 6.5 5,088,534 25.3 1,618,048 33.9 1,042,051 53.5 425,535 20.0 8,455,907 25.4 
Foreign Bunkers 378,658 8.7 2,321,379 11.5 306,552 6.4 58,238 3.0 280,958 13.2 3,345,785 10.0 
UK Bunkers 17,970 0.4 217,457 1.1 58,499 1.2 33,288 1.7 24,107 1.1 351,321 1.1 
Grand Total 4,344,112 100 20,102,912 100 4,769,288 100 1,946,146 100 2,129,071 100 33,291,529 100 
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are more stark to demonstrate the Tyne’s diversity. Taking the first seven categories, that is 
the North Sea round to and including North Spain and Portugal, whilst Blyth (86.8%), the 
Wear Ports (80.2%), Seaham (69.3%) and the Hartlepools (67.1%) were clearly focused on 
exporting to this area, only 56.5% of Tyne coal exported to Europe went to the northern 
coasts ports. This is an indication of the port’s diversified shipping routes.  
When looking at the home trade, by comparison, Seaham sent the majority of its coal 
to the UK, with over 42% going to London itself. Only around one fifth of coal exported 
from the Tyne and the Wear Ports was destined for the Thames, and from the Hartlepools 
the fraction for London was only a tenth. If only coal being shipped coastwise is assessed, 
then the Tyne appears to be the most focussed on London (82.8% of all coal shipped around 
the British coast) closely followed by Seaham (78.5%) compared to 60.7% for the Wear Ports 
and 57.6% for the Hartlepools. The exception is Blyth, which of its UK shipments sent only 
13.6% to London, instead having a heavy focus on the English southern coast, exporting 
almost 5% of its total coal exports there, as opposed to only 0.9% of its total shipments for 
London. Looking at domestic figures only, that results in 13.6% for London and three quarters 
(73.9%) for the South Coast. 
What is clear from the table is that only the Tyne (and to a lesser extent, Blyth) had 
any real export trade that extended beyond the North Sea or domestic shipping. The North 
East ports were very much focused on supplying ports nearby, rather than exporting coal long 
distances past the channel.  
However, it is somewhat of a misnomer to try and separate out the domestic trade and 
that of coastal Europe. Officially, the category of “Home Trade”, when used in official 
statistics and regulations, referred to ports from Hamburg and the Elbe all the way down to 
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Brest.244 Indeed, with regard to the various ports visited by the North East colliers, as Milne 
has pointed out:   
These shipping patterns also raise an important conceptual question that helps place the 
North East in its wider world. Shipping is often grouped into ‘coastal’ and ‘foreign’, but this 
division can hide more than it reveals. The North East ports were not like the major liner 
ports, say, or Southampton – where there were clear distinctions between the types of 
cargoes, vessels and port facilities being used by long-distance and more local shipping…In 
the North East, a large number of similar, medium-sized ships were used interchangeably on 
different routes, making a coastal voyage to London one month (say), and a foreign voyage 
to a Baltic port the next, depending on the charters offered to its owners.  245 
 
 This is certainly notable in the records of Witherington and Everett, a North Eastern 
firm of coal exporter who have left a sizeable collection of voyage logs to the Tyne and Wear 
Archives. To take the example of one ship, the S.S. Mercator, between November 1898 and 
December 1905 it made 217 journeys, of which over 75 per cent (163) were from ports in the 
North East. Of these, 63 were to ports on the British mainland (50 to London), 48 to France, 
25 to Germany and then 20 to ports in Ireland. Fewer voyages were made to the Netherlands 
(5) and Denmark (2). Indeed, to broaden out the study to incorporate more ships operated by 
the firm, the balance between Continental ports and UK based ports (including Ireland) is 
even finer. 
Table 2.6: S. S. Mercator Journeys – Origin and Destination  (November 1898 – 1905)246 
 
To|From Scotland South Wales North East Total 
London 0 46 110 156 
Rest UK 3 66 121 190 
UK Total 3 112 231 346 
Europe Total 8 59 272 339 
Total 11 171 503 685 
  
  
                                                 
244 C.K. Harley, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850 – 1913’, Explorations in Economic History, (Vol. 26, 
1989), pp.312. 
245 G.J. Milne, North East England, p.21. 
246 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Ship Voyage Logs 
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Table 2.7:  Selected Journeys (Witherington & Everett Fleet) – 1898 – 1914247 
 
To|From Scotland South Wales North East Total 
London 0% 26.90% 21.87% 22.77% 
Rest UK 27.27% 38.60% 24.06% 27.74% 
UK Total 27.27% 65.50% 45.92% 50.51% 
Europe Total 72.73% 34.50% 54.08% 49.49% 
     
 
 These 685 journeys (taken from a period over 1898 – 1914) offer an interesting 
window into the North East based coal trade. As can be seen, the UK’s share is only just over 
half of the company’s journeys. Indeed from the North East, it is actually somewhat under 
half, as links to the continent were slightly more important. The Admiralty, eager to 
understand the flow of fuel from the UK to the rest of the world, commissioned a map to 
visually demonstrate how and where the coal shipments went. They took the data from the 
1902 Parliamentary Return on Coals exported and created a striking graphic.248  
 
                                                 
247 Ibid. 
248 The National Archives were as surprised as I was to find it. It is a masterpiece, and truly shows the merit in 
the adage “a picture is worth a thousand words”.  There are extracts from the map used throughout the 
chapters dealing with the export of coal from the UK. It should be noted that this map does not include any 
coastwise shipments that remained within the UK, nor does it include any fuel shipped in ships’ bunkers. 
National Archives, CO 321/209, Correspondence with the Colonies, Coal Export Map (1902). 
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Figure 2.1: Admiralty Map detailing exports of Coal from the UK to the World (1902) – Extract (Europe) 
 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 
89 
Figure 2.2: Admiralty Map detailing exports of Coal from the UK to the World (1902) – Extract (North Europe) 
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As can be seen, the vast majority of the 21,256,630 tonnes of coal which left the North 
East ports that year were destined for Europe, with only around 26.7% (5,679,080) making it 
through the Channel beyond the extent of the “Home Trade”, that is, beyond Brest. Similarly, 
however, the lack of Welsh coal (in red) making it into the North Sea is minimal; it truly is the 
domain of the North Eastern collier. It is interesting to compare the 3,029,938 tonnes of 
North Country coal headed for Bremen and Hamburg compared to only 162,117 tonnes of 
Welsh coal. We can assume that the Welsh coal was destined for ships’ bunkers at these 
important shipping ports. However, the significant amount of North Country coal is too large 
to also be lower quality fuel for steamships. Instead it would seem to demonstrate the assertion 
that despite Germany’s own coal deposits, it was cheaper for industrial firms in the north of 
Germany to import coal from the UK than to have their own supplies moved overland.249 
Indeed, this even seems to be the case for the other side of Denmark, with sizeable flows 
travelling to Kiel and Stettin, a flow of 757,646 tonnes in the latter instance.  
Further east, 893,731 tonnes of North Country coal are for Sweden and Finland as 
opposed to only 93,843 tonnes of Welsh. 470,365 tonnes of this are for Stockholm, with the 
rest going to countless smaller ports up the east coast of Sweden. The remaining sizeable flow 
is of 1,298,718 tonnes of North Country and 176,945 tonnes of coal to St Petersburg and 
Kronstadt. The Welsh coal here, again, presumably being used for steam raising either on land 
or on sea (as both their navy and the Russian State railways were known purchasers of Welsh 
coal).250  This echoes the distribution seen earlier in Table 2.1, albeit without the exporting 
                                                 
249 League of Nations, World Coal-Mining, p.162. See also, for example, M.E. Fletcher, ‘From Coal to Oil in 
British Shipping’, Journal of Transport History, Volume III (1975), p.2. 
250 R.H. Walters, The Economic and Business History of the South Wales Steam Coal Industry, 1840 – 1914 (New York, 
1977), p.321 
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port for comparison to see which ports were most heavily involved in the export of coal to 
particular countries.251 
In terms of the wider European distribution of North Country Coal, in the 
Mediterranean there are two principal flows. The first travels up past Barcelona (which takes 
351,554 tonnes) with a further 146,859 tonnes for Marseilles before ending in Savona and 
Genoa (1,369,442 tonnes).252 The second principal flow is past the south of Sicily, and then up 
the east coast of Italy with 510,802 tonnes bound (mainly) for the ports of Venice and Trieste. 
Of the remainder of the North Country coal that travels beyond Sicily, 183,096 tonnes is 
destined for Constantinople and the Black Sea (with ships like the S.S. Leonis taking it out in 
lieu of ballast), 384,581 tonnes for Alexandria and only 99,669 tonnes going through the Suez 
Canal, approximately one-tenth of the tonnage of Welsh coal heading for the Red Sea. 
However, although clearly focused on Europe, the coal exports did reach around the globe.  
Milne states that by in 1904 Newcastle exported coal to 369 different ports, whilst Blyth sent 
it to 262 ports and Sunderland to 179 locations.253 
The importance of coal to the ports of the North East cannot be overstated. Even 
before the 1850s, the coal trade was by far and away the biggest component of shipping in the 
area. Between 1830 and 1841 over 95 per cent of ships annually calling at ports on the Tyne 
(including Blyth and Hartley), Wear and Tees (including Seaham and Hartlepool) were leaving 
                                                 
251 Bearing in mind that the data from Table 3.1 is from 9 years later than the map being discussed here, it still 
provides some clues. It is likely that that the majority of this coal (if the same patterns were to be observed) had 
come from the Blyth and Tyne ports, who in 1911 exported 73% of all the coal shipped from the north east to 
ports as far south west as Brest. 
252 This extract of the map can be seen in the Chapter on the South Wales trade coastwise and with Europe. 
253 G.J. Milne, North East England, p.26. 
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with coal (see Table 2.2).254 Indeed, the contrast with the traffic of the Humber is quite 
instructive: 
Table 2.8: Percentage of Ships leaving Northern Ports with Coal (1830 – 1841)255 
 
 Tyne Wear Tees Humber* 
1830 94.0 99.5 60.8  
1831 93.3 98.2 70.3  
1832 93.7 98.7 56.2  
1833 94.5 99.5 79.8  
1834 94.5 98.9 90.7 25.5 
1835 95.7 98.5 97.6 16.3 
1836 95.6 99.0 99.5 16.7 
1837 95.9 99.4 97.8 14.7 
1838 95.6 99.7 98.6 20.5 
1839 94.6 99.6 99.2 27.2 
1840 96.3 99.7 99.4 31.4 
1841 95.7 99.8 99.5 31.5 
     
 
 When combined with the continued growth in sheer tonnage exported (the Tyne, for 
example, exported coastwise and to foreign ports 2,208,000 tons in 1830/34 which rose to 
3,426,000 tons by 1845/49) this provided a strong support to the development and growth of 
ports in the north east.256 Indeed, such was the strength of the export trade that prosperity in 
the north east continued even during a nationwide downturn in the fortunes of shipowners 
and builders.  The North East saw sustained growth in its registered tonnage despite the 
nationwide turndown that came after the Napoleonic and French Revolutionary Wars (see 
Figure 2.3):  
                                                 
254 Parliamentary Papers, Ships. Return of the number of ships, with their tonnage, distinguishing British from foreign, that 
have cleared outwards with coal, and cargoes in other branches of trade, from the Tyne and Humber, in each year, from 1830 to 
1841 inclusive (London, 1842).  
255 Ibid. * No data exists for the Humber ports distinguishing between the coal and other trades before 1834. 
“Tyne” includes Blyth and Hartley; “Tees” includes Seaham Harbour and Hartlepool. 
256 S. Ville, ‘Shipping in the Port of Sunderland’, Business History, Vol. 32 (1990),  p.34 
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Figure 2.3: Tonnage Owned at North East Coal Export Ports compared to Others257 
 
There were a number of reasons as to why the north east remained prosperous during 
this period, although all of these were linked to the dominant trade: that of coal. Firstly, the 
fact that so much coal was sent down to London and the east coast helped to insulate the 
ports from the opening up of foreign trade to competition which accompanied the Reciprocity 
Treaties at the end of the French Wars. Exports were only 7 per cent of the total amount of 
coal shipped from Newcastle in 1815, thus this opening up of trade, which was widely 
perceived by contemporaries to be a reason behind the slump that afflicted the British shipping 
trade during the first half of the nineteenth century, was of relatively small significance.258 
Secondly, despite this low starting point, as already demonstrated, exports would grow to be 
an increasingly large part of the north east’s coal trade. By the mid-1840s, Newcastle exported 
almost a third of its coal shipments, whilst Teesside exported 13 per cent and Sunderland 40 
                                                 
257 Ibid., p.34. These have been grouped from the original data to better display the trend. The “coal ports” are: 
Stockton, Sunderland &Newcastle.  
258 Ibid., p.38. 
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per cent, mostly due to the spread of industrialisation to countries which either lacked or had 
yet to exploit their own mineral resources.259  
This was further aided by the spread of railways throughout the North East during 
this period, as shown in the previous chapter. A significant amount of early railway 
development took place in the north east, with the explicit aim of carrying more coal to the 
docks. The rapid expansion of Stockton’s port on the Tees was due to the completion of the 
Stockton and Darlington railway in 1825, although this in turn was superseded by the 
extension of the railway to the deep-water location of Middlesbrough in 1830. In 1828-29 the 
railway had carried 46,216 tons of coal, which had grown to 336,00 tons by 1832-33. This 
growth was accompanied by the birth of Middlesbrough: a population of 25 in 1801 had grown 
to 150 by 1831 but by 1841 the Census showed 5,461 residents.260 Likewise, Hartlepool 
boomed as a result of the coal railway’s port requirements. The Hartlepool Dock and Railway 
Company was granted permission to build a railway serving various East Durham collieries 
whilst simultaneously extending and rebuilding the harbour. By 1841 this railway carried more 
coal than any other in the area, with 90% of its revenues coming from the mineral traffic to 
the port – Hartlepool’s population, like Middlesbrough’s, burgeoned from 1,330 in 1831 to 
5,256 in 1841.261 Seaham offers an even more extreme story, being constructed entirely as a 
dock for coal from Lord Londonderry’s extensive colliery workings. Despite the expense, 
significant savings were expected, and three years after its construction it was a profitable 
enterprise, with over 230,000 tons of coal passing through the harbour.262 
                                                 
259 Ibid., pp.38 – 39. 
260 N. McCord & D.J. Rowe ‘Industrialisation and Urban Growth in North East England’, International Review of 
Social History, 22, (1977), p.35. 
261 Ibid., p.35. 
262 J.A. Jaffe, ‘Competition and the Size of Firms in North East Coal Trade, 1800 – 1850’, Northern History, Vol. 
25 (1989) p.240. 
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Not all of the ports were new, however, with improvements throughout the earlier 
half of the century continuing to boost throughput and lower costs at long-standing ports. 
The Wear had an early form of containerisation: from 1818 “tubs” of one chaldron 
measurement being transferred from the coal keels (which carried it down stream) to the larger 
ships. Not only did this do away with the wages of the men normally required to shovel the 
coal, but it also reduced breakage, saving on average 4s per chaldron (approximately 
2.65tons).263 Another attempt to lower costs was the introduction of “spouts”, which directly 
loaded the coal into the ships from above, avoiding the keel boats once again.264 The keelmen, 
as a profession, were extinct by 1836.265 
Indeed, the dramatic growth of the coal trade from the North East was of such 
concern that William Laird (who had built the first iron ship on the Mersey and founded what 
was to become Cammell-Laird Shipbuilders) felt compelled to write an open letter to the 
Chairman of the Liverpool Dock Trust imploring him to engage with the coal trade.266 Over 
the course of some 60 pages he assesses all the disadvantages that the North East trade had 
to overcome and which did not affect the north-west similarly; before outlining his central 
thesis that if only Liverpool docks were served with high level railway lines for the transfer of 
coal from rail to ship, then given all the other advantages that Liverpool boasted, surely it 
would in short order become a great coal exporting port. In particular he compared the use of 
flat barges on the Mersey (having come down the Sankey, Bridgewater and Leeds to Liverpool 
Navigations) for transhipping to ships with the use of the long-abandoned keels on the Tyne: 
I hope yet to hear similar evidence given by you, sir, on some future Liverpool Dock Bill as 
regards coaling from flats within the docks of the Mersey; feeling certain that when, once the 
plans of shipping coal by railway on the high level in the Liverpool docks is tried, it will 
                                                 
263 Ibid., p.238. 
264 S. Ville, ‘Port of Sunderland’, p.36. 
265 M.W. Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry Volume 2: 1700 – 1830: The Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1984), 
p.170. 
266 W. Laird, The Export Coal Trade of Liverpool: A Letter to Thomas Littledale, Esq., (Liverpool, 1850). 
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supersede the use of flats as completely as the railways have superseded the use of keels (the 
flats of the Mersey) on the rivers Tyne and Wear.267  
 
However, although all of the north east ports were dependent upon coal, there were 
differences in how the various ports developed over the nineteenth century. Of these, 
Sunderland was perhaps the earliest to drastically change, with an Act of 1831 ‘for the 
improvement and preservation of the river Wear and port and haven of Sunderland’ created a 
board of commissioners to be in charge of infrastructure improvements at the dock.268 This 
was followed by the arrival of the Durham and Sunderland Railway in 1836, improving coal 
access, whilst the South Pier’s reconstruction (1832), the North Dock’s construction (1837), 
the North Pier (1842) and the large South Dock (1850) indicated a growing and prosperous 
port.269 Indeed, it is interesting to note that the existence of coal for shipment at Sunderland 
helped bring down the cost of importing timber for shipbuilding from Scandinavia, helping to 
ensure that Sunderland continued its development as a shipbuilding port long after other 
British ports had found the high cost of importing timber prohibitive.270  
By contrast, the Tyne had not been improved at all, and by 1850 was conceived as 
being a ‘treacherous and inconvenient port’.271 Indeed, Sargent, writing in 1912, stated: 
Whatever the special advantages of the Tyne may be at present, it lacked these in the old 
days, in so far as it was not navigable for sea-going ships. Much of the coal was first loaded 
into barges or keels, and then raised into the ships; and the keelmen are an important 
fraternity in the early history of the river.  The full utilisation of the waterway dates only from 
the last fifty or sixty years. The state of the channel was a burning question of local politics 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The improvement of the river failed to keep 
pace with that of the ships which used it. The early charts show us a winding channel, full of 
shifting banks, with a bar of 7 feet at its mouth, and a low-water depth of as little as 6 feet in 
some reaches between Jarrow and Newcastle. The bar has vanished, and it is hard to imagine 
that within the memory of Tynesiders still living a man has walked at low tide across the 
entrance. 272 
                                                 
267 Ibid., p.12. 
268 S. Ville, ‘Port of Sunderland’, p.44. 
269 Ibid., p.44. 
270 S. Ville, Transport and the Development of the European Economy 1750 - 1918, (London, 1990), p.58. Although it 
should be noted that cheap land and low labour costs were also rather important. 
271 N. McCord, North East England: The Region’s Development, 1760 – 1960 (London, 1979), p.51.  
272 A.J. Sargent, ‘The Tyne’, p.476. 
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However, as is clear. That was no longer the case, with a large series of improvements 
over the period determined to improve the lot of Tyneside, particularly against the competition 
from the Wear and Tees: 
Captain Washington…calls attention to places like Sunderland and Hartlepool…The Shields’ 
gentlemen and others were perfectly aware that the great secret of the success of those 
places…while the Tyne had stood still, was due not only to the improvement in the 
approaches, but perhaps mainly to the question of the establishment of docks. That changed 
the condition of things entirely, because every one whom I have the honour to address must 
be well aware that no coppered ships and no ships adapted to the present state of the times, 
and to carrying on that which has become one of the most important trades, the steam coal 
trade, would go, if they could help it, into a place without docks… 273 
 
However, improvements at one port could be detrimental to others. The opening of 
the Northumberland Dock in 1857 was the death knell for the old sailing collier loading point 
of Seaton Sluice, whilst Blyth seemed to be in terminal decline. The opening of the railway as 
far as Blyth had occurred in 1847, and far from proving a boon as it had elsewhere, collieries 
instead were now able to use other ports, rather than rely on their private waggonways to the 
existing port. By 1860, the Blyth and Tyne Railway conveyed 1.5m tonnes of coal, whilst the 
port handled only 250,000 tonnes, and by 1880 this had fallen further to 150,000 tonnes.274 
It was only after the businessmen of the port secured an Act of Parliament in 1883 which 
created the Blyth Harbour commission that a ‘vigorous programme of improvements’ was 
instigated, including new coaling staithes with the North Eastern Railway so that by 1888 coal 
shipments were over two million tonnes.275 
This growth and change needs to be set into the national context however, as the coal 
trade did not operate entirely separate from the rest of the British economy. Indeed, the 
                                                 
273 Evidence from Mr Webster on 24th January, 1855 before commissioners enquiring into the Tyne, 
commissioners which included one I. K. Brunel. Parliamentary Papers Report of the commissioners appointed to inquire 
into the present state of the River Tyne, (London, 1885), p.3.  
274 A.E. Smailes, ‘The Development of the Northumberland and Durham Coalfield’, Scottish Geographical 
Magazine, 51:4, p.210. 
275 P.S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution from 1770 (London, 1974), p.81. 
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improvements outlined above broadly happened within the same cycles as those of the rest of 
the United Kingdom: 
Figure 2.4: Capital Expenditure and Maintenance Costs of UK Ports (1851 – 1913)276 
 
 
 Whilst this data covers the entirety of the United Kingdom during this period, the 
three cycles of dock investment were broadly spread around the country, with near-
simultaneous investment in ports around the country as the various trades which supported 
the different British port cities boomed.277 The vast majority of calls for new docks (with the 
exception of London, and to a lesser extent - as shown by Mr Laird’s letter - Liverpool) were 
for the shipping of coal. Whilst London, Leith and Grimsby received the most tonnage from 
Germany, Newcastle had over twice London’s tonnage clearing to Germany, whilst both 
                                                 
276 A.G. Kenwood, ‘Port Investment in England and Wales, 1851 - 1913’, Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 17, 
No. 2, (Nov, 1965), p.159.  
277 Ibid., p.160. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 99 
Sunderland and Methil had larger amounts than Grimsby. Around 40% of tonnage clearing 
for France comes from identifiable coal ports.278  
This business of coal exporting could also be rather profitable for its shareholders. 
Pyman, Bell & Co., a firm started in Hartlepool but with a branch in Newcastle (which came 
to be the head office after 1885) has left behind records of annual statements in the first years 
of the twentieth century.279 This demonstrates quite how much money there was to be made 
through investing in the industry: 
Table 2.9: Year End Accounts of Pyman, Bell & Co. (1901 - 1911) 
 
Year Reserve 
Funds (1) 
(£sd) 
Preference 
Shares  (£sd)  
Ordinary Shares  (£sd) Carried 
Forward  
(£sd) 
1901 £5,000 0 0 6% £5,662 10 0 25% £29,508 14 1 £13,411 12 1 
1902 £5,000 0 0 6% £5,631 5 0 25% £29,345 17 0 £13,591 8 7 
1903 £5,000 0 0 6% £5,700 0 0 25% £29,704 2 6 £12,031 14 8 
1904 £5,000 0 0 6% £5,700 0 0 25% £29,704 2 6  £8,834 3 2 
1905 - 6% £5,700 0 0 22.5% £26,733 14 3 £5,159 6 4 
1906 £20,000 0 0 6% £5,700 0 0 30% £35,644 19 8 £11,204 16 2 
1907 £15,000 0 0 6% £5,700 0 0 30% + Bonus 40% 
£83,171 0 0  
£8,760 0 0  
1908 - 6% £5,700 0 0 30% + Bonus 60% 
£106,934 17 0 
£23,963 18 0 
1909 - 6% £5,650 0 0 30% + Bonus 10% 
£47,109 14 0 
£24,092 0 8 
1910 - 6% £5,650 0 0 30% + Bonus 20% 
£58,887 2 6 
£22,060 18 1 
1911 
(2) 
£5,000 0 0 6% £7,533 0 0 30% + Bonus 10% 
£47,109 14 0 
£48,127 14 0 
                                                 
278 ‘The ports’ in P.S. Bagwell & J. Armstrong, ‘Coastal Shipping’ in M.J. Freemen & D.H. Aldcroft (eds.), 
Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), pp.238-239 
279 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/PYB, Pyman Bell & Co., Minutes of Annual General Meetings, 1902 – 1912. 
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1) It should be noted that in 1906 and 1907, £10,000 was allocated to a special reserve 
for ensuring continuity of dividends, rather than into the general Company reserve 
fund 
2) In 1911 the company moved from December year end to April year end, so this 
amount includes January - April 1912. 
 
As can be seen, these are excellent dividend payments indeed, with a steady and 
growing amount of money being returned to investors in the company as the 20th century 
rolled on. Pyman, Bell & Co. exported coal to Germany and the Baltic before returning either 
empty or with lumber for pit props. But such a simple trade, done even in a competitive market 
like that of the Newcastle coal exporters, allowed for successful business. Indeed, this despite 
the fact that the 1901 - 1911 period was one of depression for the shipping business. Indeed, 
freight rates didn’t regain the heights of 1900 until 1912, with 1908 being the lowest recorded 
for over 50 years.280 One of the firm’s eponymous founders (in this iteration of the firm), Mr 
Thomas Bell, was able to, in shares alone, net himself a sizeable income for the time (selected 
years only shown): 
Table 2.10: Mr Thomas Bell’s Earnings from Company Shares (Selected Years) 
 
Year Share Earnings 
(£sd) 
Year Share Earnings 
(£sd) 
Year Share Earnings 
(£sd) 
1901 £9,544 16 1 1904 £9,714 0 8 1908 £20,595 16 2 
1903 £9,714 0 8 1907 £16,296 2 2 1910 £11,891 3 7 
      
 
Coal was undeniably important, therefore, in the development of these ports and the 
region as it was the pre-eminent export cargo. The distribution of the coal mined throughout 
                                                 
280 D.H. Aldcroft, ‘The Depression in British Shipping, 1901 - 1911’ in Journal of Transport History, Vol. VII 
(1965), p.14. 
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the North East had shaped the economy and geography of the region, with railways spreading 
to link more collieries and more ports throughout Durham and Northumberland.  
 Much of this coal was exported down the coast to London and other areas of Britain. 
This was done despite the emergence of the railway as a competitor, mainly as a result of 
improvements in the productivity of the ships plying the coasts and their loading and 
unloading equipment. However a market of at least equal importance remains the wider 
European economy. Here the exports were conducted similarly, (and as Witherington and 
Everett demonstrated, often in the same ships), running to the continent and back empty. 
Another approach was to take a back cargo, such as Pyman, Bell & Co’s pit props from the 
Baltic forests. Lambert Brothers (a Welsh firm which had began in 1878 by shipping coal from 
Cardiff to London before selling their fleet to Cory Brothers in 1896) moved into the tramp 
shipping industry and they emphasised a similar approach. However, rather than Baltic wood 
for pit-props they collected grain from the Black Sea. One of the boats in which they had an 
interest was the S. S. Leonis, of which a few voyage records have survived. Two examples, 
back-to-back, are of particular relevance here, covering the period of February 28th - August 
17th (1904).  The Leonis left Blyth for Alexandria laden with coals, then ran to Taganrog (on 
the Black Sea) in ballast before sailing for Amsterdam having loaded with Black Sea grain, a 
journey of 96 days. This was followed by a voyage from the Tyne to Savona, similarly laden 
with coal, before going to Taganrog and Berdianesk (both on the Black Sea) and returning to 
Rotterdam.281   
The correspondence of Witherington and Everett that survives demonstrate a firm 
that was at the heart of a vast network of coal-owners, ship-brokers and other coal-exporters. 
                                                 
281 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/142/MS30897/001, Voyage Logs of S.S. Leonis. 
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Their voluminous daily correspondence, (c. 8,000 telegrams or letters a year) showcase how 
the firm operated across a range of different approaches to shipping and coal.  
One of the key concerns highlighted in the correspondence is the necessity of fast 
discharge and swift return for the next load in order to ensure that the boat was being used to 
its full extent and securing as many runs as possible.  For example: 
We are disappointed to learn from Mr Murst that you will not be discharged before 
Wednesday as we understood from your telegram there was no doubt about her sailing 
tomorrow night. After discharging you will proceed to East Hartlepool to load for Rouen. 
We enclose copy of Charter herewith. Mr E. W. Garbutt of West Hartlepool will supply 
cargo and bunkers, you had better telegraph him your sailings, his telegraphic address is 
‘Garbutt, West Hartlepool’. 282 
 
In some instances this led to telegrams being sent every day during discharge if it was 
particularly sluggish.283 Delays could have large knock-on effects, with future booked cargoes 
being delayed in turn, with either delays having to be managed as best as possible or an 
alternative ship being chartered to carry the load: 
As far as our own boats are concerned we have, as already advised to you, suffered such 
delay over the last few cargoes that it will be next week before we can possibly have one at 
liberty. In order to oblige Mr Treleavern we have tried today to induce a Rouen merchant to 
postpone his cargo for a week so that we could send ‘Bromsgrove’ down to Plymouth but 
unfortunately he is unable to do so.…if tomorrow we can pick up a suitable boat on the 
market we will do so, failing this we will send either ‘Bromsgrove’ or ‘G.N. Wilkinson’ about 
the middle of next week. 284 
 
Witherington and Everett not only ran their own fleet to move coal they had 
purchased. Their fleet also moved coal for other people, either on single loads or for periods 
of 3 to 6 months on a time charter. As such, it was very important that their ships were 
attractive and could command a good price for charter, and that they were recently built with 
the latest coal loading and discharging equipment: 
                                                 
282 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to Captain Waggott, 
SS Swiftsure, Sheerness, 29 January, 1906. 
283 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to Captain Scott, 
GN Wilkinson, Cork, 7 December, 1906. 
284 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to Mundy Redhead 
& Wood, Plymouth, 15 October, 1906. 
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Having had what we consider an excellent offer for this steamer viz £14,750 less £250 
commission to the brokers, we have deemed it advisable in the interests of all concerned to 
accept same, especially as the boat is now four years old and with the reserve fund we will 
be able to return to the shareholders slightly more than the original cost. 285 
 
There was a constant stream of boats being bought and sold, often financed through 
a mortgage with the shipbuilder.286 Indeed, Witherington and Everett were always keen to 
upgrade their own fleet, as within a week of arranging the mortgage of S.S. Tees they were 
potentially considering selling the ship: “We did not build this steamer for the purpose of 
selling her but to trade. If however you can make us a firm cash offer of £21,000 we would 
give it consideration.” 287 
Furthermore, they also operated as a shipbroker in their own right, matching up 
agents with ships and ship owners with cargoes, taking a commission on the freight of 5%. 
The correspondence is heavy with Witherington and Everett working to secure time charters 
and loads for other people’s vessels, as well as them attempting to find a suitable vessel for 
various loads of coal. To cite one such example.  
The coasting business has fallen through so she is now open. They do not entertain the 
Mediterranean round and would prefer to fix her for 6 months certain although if you can 
offer anything suitable for 3 or 4 months we might get him to entertain it. 288 
 
The business was fiercely competitive, with numerous mentions of there being 
multiple ships awaiting the next available cargo and even mention of foreign competition in 
the form of Norwegian sailing vessels, and this competition is borne out by the slim margins 
that Witherington and Everett made on the coal business. Whilst full profit and loss ledgers 
                                                 
285 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to James Hartley 
Cooper & Co. Ltd., London, 19 April, 1907. 
286 For example, telegraphs to James Wallace, Sunderland, 20 March 1907 and 4 April 1907 (Tyne and Wear 
Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett). 
287 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to Walter Mc Farlane 
& Co., London, 17 April 1907. 
288 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Telegram to J. J. Barnfoot, 8 
October 1906.  
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have not survived, some key ones have, including the income and expenses of the coal 
account – for the trading they did under their own name: 
Table 2.11: Witherington & Everett Coal Income & Expenses & Brokerage Income289 
 
Year Coal Expenses Coal Income Coal Profit Brokerage 
Income 
1899 £2,462 £2,647 £185 £1,161 
1900 £8,099 £8,331 £232 £1,691 
1901 £9,551 £9,880 £329 £1,790 
1902 £22,832 £23,647 £815 £1,810 
1903 £23,886 £24,825 £939 £1,529 
1904 £22,056 £22,428 £372 £1,887 
1905 £20,823 £21,318 £495 £2,157 
1906 £16,912 £17,215 £303 £2,689 
1907 £22,551 £23,491 £940 £3,252 
1908 £30,790 £31,570 £780 £2,210 
1909 £43,353 £44,287 £934 £2,517 
1910 £33,530 £34,065 £535 £2,542 
1911 £20,784 £20,243 -£541 £3,623 
1912 £12,970 £13,546 £576 £5,422 
1913 £19,356 £19,618 £262 £5,390 
     
 
As can be seen, despite the varying amount of coal being bought and sold (their fleet 
varied in size from 4 to 10 vessels at any one time during this period) the level of profit for 
any given year remained small. When combined with the multiple discussions of how ships 
were chasing loads, it suggest a highly competitive market was in operation, with very little 
excess cost in the coal shipping industry.  
Therefore the coal trade of Newcastle and the wider North East was diverse and 
varied. Different grade of coal left the region for London by ship or by rail, depending on 
their end customer, whilst the coal export trade shows a number of different operating 
models. This includes specialised colliers such as Witherington and Everett, who ran a 
                                                 
289 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 915, Witherington & Everett, Financial Records 1898 - 1963 
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number of ships up and down the east coast of the UK and to and from the continent, their 
ships designed especially for the fast loading and unloading of coal, but also other firms such 
as Pyman, Bell & Co. which remained focused on the mining industry, bringing in pit-props 
after unloading coal through to the Lambert Brothers’ interest in S. S. Leonis, which was a 
traditional tramp shipping operation, with coal providing an alternative to ballast for most of 
one leg, but not necessarily to the final destination. Instead the Leonis simply had to take 
coal to near the Black Sea, and in return it took grain back to near the North Sea.  
The surviving correspondence from Witherington and Everett showcases how the 
trade was diverse, complicated and competitive, managing and operating a number of 
different models (such as time chartering their boats and those belonging to others, as well 
as single loadings on their own account) whilst being closely engaged with coal owners, 
shipbrokers and ship builders to ensure that coal was not left stationary for any longer than 
required; instead being transported in ships that were specially built and of the latest design. 
These were national and, indeed, international freight businesses managed from Newcastle, 
operating a vigorous and vibrant trade in what, at first glance, would appear to have been a 
very simple business. However, the complexities of getting coal from a pithead in the North 
East to a quayside in Rouen resulted in an advanced and dynamic sector which was highly 
competitive. 
Therefore the distribution of coal from Newcastle was a complicated and interesting 
aspect of the coal trade, far more than simply dumping coal on to a boat for a run to 
London or Hamburg. However, it only demonstrates a part of the British coal trade, and it is 
to the other key part that we now must turn.  
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 “Our organisation is today better than it has ever been, we know our business thoroughly and 
with the resources at our command we are able to meet competition in a way that must astonish some of 
our neighbours. Sometimes we think we have as much business as we can safely manage, but when we 
see the chance of a little more we succeed in doing it, and making a profit out of it.”290 
 
Chapter Three: The South Wales Coal Export Trade 
 
Another key part of the British export coal trade centred around the ports on the south 
coast of Wales.  Here the trade was of a different complexion than that of the North East, for 
unlike the Newcastle trade, which had grown up supplying the burgeoning demands of 
London before 1850, the Welsh coal trade was significantly smaller. During the decade of the 
1830s, coal shipped abroad or coastwise rose from one million to one and a half million tons, 
although over 95% of this was shipped coastwise to the Bristol Channel, Cornwall and 
Plymouth, or to the Irish ports south of Dublin.291 Thus it was that in 1840, coastal shipments 
were 1,374,419 tons and exports to foreign countries a mere 63,857 tons.292 These figures, 
combined with the estimated consumption of ironworks and domestic consumers, give an 
estimated total output of approximately four and a half million tons in 1840.293 
 However, output from the South Wales coalfields was set to dramatically increase over 
the coming seventy years, as Welsh coal came to play a growing role in the British coal export 
trade: 
 
                                                 
290 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Twenty-Eighth Annual 
General Meeting (1907), Chairman’s Remarks. 
291 J.H. Morris & L.J. Williams, The South Wales Coal Industry 1841 – 1875, (Cardiff, 1958), p.2. 
292 Parliamentary Papers, Coals, cinders, and culm. Accounts of coals, cinders, and culm shipped coastways, and exported to 
foreign parts; with the rates and amount of duty charged thereon:-- of coals exported from the United Kingdom from 5 January 
1828 – 5 January 1842:--of coal shipped to foreign countries in 1841, &c. 
293 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.8. They estimated that approximately 2 million tons were used by 
the ironworks, 1 million for other industries and domestic consumers (supplied by inland transport) which, 
combined with the 1.5 million tons shipped at the port gives a round estimate of 4.5 million tons. 
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Table 3.1: Comparative output of coal in South Wales and the United Kingdom294 
 
 
Output of 
South Wales 
Percentage 
thereof: 
Output of 
North East 
Percentage 
thereof: 
Output of 
the UK 
1855 8,552,270 13.3 -  64,453,070 
1860 10,255,563 12.8 -  80,042,698 
1865 12,656,336 12.9 -  98,150,587 
1870 13,594,064 12.3 27,613,539 25.0 110,431,192 
1875 14,173,143 10.6 - - 133,306,485 
1880 21,165,580 14.4 34,913,508 23.8 146,969,409 
1885 24,347,856 15.3 - - 159,351,418 
1890 29,415,035 16.2  39,711,273  21.9 181,614,288 
1895 33,040,114 17.4  39,827,904  21.0 189,661,362 
1900 39,328,209 17.4  46,315,240  20.6 225,181,300 
1905 43,203,071 18.3  50,091,061  21.2 236,111,150 
1910 48,699,982 18.4  52,553,289  19.9 264,433,028 
1911 50,200,727 18.5  56,401,343  20.7 271,891,899 
1912 50,116,264 19.2  51,272,045  19.7 260,398,578 
1913 56,830,072 19.7  56,352,264  19.6 287,411,869 
      
 
Not only was Welsh coal production soaring, but it was doing so faster than the UK 
as a whole, leaping from around a tenth of output in 1875 (admittedly a low point) to almost 
a fifth by the outbreak of the war, rivalling the north eastern fields of Durham and 
Northumberland. It is necessary to understand how this dramatic leap forward came to be 
achieved. Before the 1840s and the rise of railways, the main consumers of coal in Wales had 
been the ironworks of East Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire.295 Indeed, the coal-mining 
industry as such was a subsidiary section of the iron industry, with most of the ironworks 
obtaining their coal from their own pits; the entire production of the Dowlais collieries (some 
1,500 tons a day) being used in their eighteen blast furnaces.296  
                                                 
294 Table reproduced from H.S. Jevons, The Coal Trade, p.116 for South Wales and p.62 for the North East 
(Durham and Northumberland fields). 
295 In particular the four giant works at Merthyr (Cyfartha, Dowlais, Penydarren and Plymouth) as well as, in 
Monmouthshire; the Rhymney, Tregedar, Sirhowy, Ebbw Vale, Victoria, Nant-y-Glo, Blaina, Clydach, 
Blaenavon and Varteg ironworks.  
296 Parliamentary Papers, Children’s Employment Commission. Appendix. First Report of Commissioners. Mines. Part II, 
(London, 1842), p.639 & p.649. 
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However the demand of the iron and steel industries was not to last. The number of 
works peaked in 1857 at 26, with a total of 164 furnaces in operation (along the northern edge 
of the coalfield where the ironworks were clustered). By the 1870s, not only had this number 
fallen, but there was considerable excess capacity, with approximately only half of the furnaces 
still operational in blast.297 This is mirrored by the output of pig iron as shown in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 - Pig Iron Output for South Wales & UK in Selected Years 1788 - 1880 (tons)298 
 
Year South Wales UK Total Output South Wales as % of 
UK Output 
1788 12,500 63,300 18.3 
1796 34,101 125,080 27.3 
1806 78,045 258,206 30.2 
1823 182,345 455,166 40.0 
1830 277,643 677,417 41.0 
1839 453,880 1,248,781 36.3 
1840 505,000 1,396,400 36.2 
1843 457,350 1,215,350 37.6 
1847 706,680 1,999,608 35.3 
1852 840,070 3,218,154 26.1 
1860 969,025 3,826,752 25.3 
1865 845,035 4,819,254 17.5 
1870 979,193 5,963,515 16.4 
1875 541,809 6,365,462 8.5 
1880 889,823 7,749,233 11.5 
    
 
                                                 
297 M. Atkinson, The Growth and Decline of the South Wales Iron Industry, 1760 - 1880, pp.12-13. 
298 Ibid., p.15 
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The year of peak production was 1871, however, as the data shows the Welsh iron industry 
more or less plateaued in output from 1852 onwards (1875’s output is particularly low due to 
industrial action).299. Even were this not to be the case, however, the role of Wales iron industry 
in consuming Welsh coal would have declined as a result of the growing efficiency of iron-
working in this period. From requiring 5.8 tons of coal per ton of pig iron in 1817, the amount 
required dropped to 2.65 tons in 1856 and to a miserly 1.51 tons by 1870.300  
The decline of the iron industry’s demand for coal meant that alternative markets 
would be required to take the output of the South Wales coalfield. However, fortunately, such 
a market was developing in the burgeoning transport industry: steam-shipping. 
As has been pointed out in previous chapters, different sorts of coal were better suited 
for various purposes, and Welsh steam coal was uniformly regarded as the best in the world 
for the task of steam-raising. Indeed, as Court put it:   
For many purposes…it is a serious mistake to think of the coal industry as producing simply 
coal. Those who run the mines think of themselves as supplying their customers with gas-
coal or coking coal or household coal or large steam coal or some other variety of coal which 
is in demand. Some industries can afford to be catholic in their tastes… But for many 
industrial purposes the different sorts of coal are no more interchangeable than are the 
different kinds of steel… Household coal producers have their own interests and special 
view of the world. 301 
 
However, as Morris and Williams have noted, the later dominance of Cardiff steam 
coal in world markets for shipping has led to a tendency to assume that this was always the 
case, with the difference instead being a matter of scale and growth.302 However, in the period 
up to the 1840s the main coal shipped from Cardiff (as opposed to that destined for the iron 
works) was house coal, with any steam-coal sent to important markets (such as London) 
                                                 
299 Ibid., pp.5-6. 
300 Ibid., p.40. 
301 Quotation of W.H.B. Court, ‘Problems of the British Coal Industry’, p.2, in M.W. Kirby, British Coalmining, 
p.11. 
302 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.20. 
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instead coming from west Wales.303 This was in line with the general flow of coal from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with Wales being the main source of coal for the Channel 
Isles, south-west English coastline and southern Ireland.304  
Indeed, of the 249,000 tonnes shipped in 1820 from across all of Great Britain, 165,000 
were from Newcastle and Sunderland, with the remainder being composed of 50,000 from 
Liverpool and Whitehaven, 18,000 from Scottish ports, less than 12,000 tonnes from London 
and only 4,500 from the entirety of South Wales.305  None of which was from Cardiff, in line 
with earlier premonitions. In 1782, the Customs Officer at Cardiff reported “We have no coal 
exported from this port, nor ever shall, as it would be too expensive to bring it down here 
from the internal part of the country.”306 Whilst the Customs Officer may have been accurate 
in his diagnosis of the problem, the canal and later the railway (see Chapter 1) would come 
and solve such concerns. Indeed, by 1850 Cardiff would be exporting 750,000 tonnes of coal, 
more than either Newport or Swansea, and half of which was destined for coastal shipment, 
the other half for the far flung reaches of the globe. 
Although some coal did indeed travel down the Glamorganshire Canal to the port, 
prior to 1831 this had a disadvantage to coal brought down the Monmouthshire Canal one 
county over, which as a legacy of its Canal Act (1797) enjoyed a relief on some duties, meaning 
that coal for coastal shipment to Bristol and Gloucester could be a whole 1s per ton cheaper.307 
Both of the canals had originally been built for the iron trade, around which the Welsh 
                                                 
303 Ibid., pp.20 - 21. 
304 A.R. Griffin, The British Coal-Mining Industry, p.128. 
305 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.443. 
306 Custom House Records, Report of Cardiff’s Customs Officer to the Custom House, (London, 1775).  
307 E.D. Lewis, ‘Pioneers of the Cardiff Coal Trade’, Glamorgan Historian, XI, (Barry, 1975). 
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economy was centred, but by 1840 the greater bulk of traffic on both canals (although not the 
greater value) was in coal.308 
The reason that Cardiff was to go from zero to pre-eminence were to lie in three 
developments of the 1840s: the coming of the railways, the provision of docking facilities and 
better exploitation of the steam coal reserves.  In this way it is no coincidence that two of the 
most authoritative texts on the industry start their histories in 1840 and 1841.309  
Generally speaking, Wales produced two types of coal in this period: the bituminous 
household coal and anthracite coal for more specialised purposed. Lewis, having had access 
to the papers of George Insole, one of the leading Welsh coal exporters at the time, before 
they were destroyed when the company was later closed down in 1940, has provided much 
understanding of how events unfolded. Whilst it is unnecessary to go into excessive detail 
regarding the slow development of Welsh coal’s markets, a brief tour of some salient points 
will prove of relevance in developing an understanding of this aspect of the coal trade.  
The credit for the initial development of Welsh coal shipment from Cardiff is 
traditionally placed in the hands of 4 men and one woman. Walter Coffin (who opened the 
first colliery explicitly aimed at exporting via Cardiff), George Insole (another shipper of coal 
from the Rhondda Valley), Thomas Powell and John Nixon (who both worked in exporting 
steam coal from the Aberdare Valley).310 The woman in question is Lucy Thomas of Waun 
Wyllt, wife of Robert Thomas who mined coal near Merthyr.311 As a result of a transaction 
                                                 
308 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.11. 
309 The above noted text begins in 1841 and R.H. Walters, The Economic and Business History of the South Wales 
Steam Coal Industry, 1840 - 1914, (New York, 1977) who starts his survey in 1840. 
310 John Powell is best covered in a series of articles by W.W. Price, in The Powell Duaryn Review, (1942-43), John 
Nixon through his own memoirs written with J.E. Vincent, A Memoir of John Nixon, (London, 1900). As for 
George Insole and Walter Coffin, they are fleetingly mentioned in J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, 
pp.19 - 20 and covered in depth by E.D. Lewis, ‘Pioneers’, which is itself taken from his unpublished thesis The 
Industrial Development of the Rhondda Valleys to 1910, (University of Wales, 1940).   
311 Whilst tradition dictates that she should be mentioned, sadly that is often all she receives in historical texts 
(cf. J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, or R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p.5. However, on the 
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wherein George Insole sent a cargo of Lucy Thomas’ Waun Wyllt coal to London, where it 
met with much smokeless success, she is often termed “The Mother of the Welsh Steam Coal 
Trade”.312 Having achieved a relatively regular flow of coal to London for use by the river 
steamers, Insole lamented in 1832 that “if I could have obtained five times the quantity I could 
have sold every tonne there”, however the export of coal from Cardiff continued to be mostly 
centred around the export of Walter Coffin’s house coals to Ireland, along with some small 
shipments to Malta and along the coast.313 
It was John Nixon who famously took Insole’s coal (having seen it burn smokelessly 
in a Thames steamer, no less) and sold it to a sugar refiner in Nantes, beginning the modern 
era of shipments to France which would last until the mid-twentieth century. He also managed 
to get French river steamers to place an order for 3,000 tonnes and the French government 
to take Welsh coal in preference to Newcastle coal, which implies he was quite the salesman.314 
Combined with some initial moves to supply some Government Steam Packets (at Woolwich 
amongst others) and the start of the Welsh coal trade can be seen.315 
However, the scale of the trade was to change with the development of the Bute West 
Dock in 1839, Newport Dock in 1842 and the Taff Vale Railway in 1841. The improved 
transport links, combined with increased appreciation of the merits of Cardiff steam coal had 
a noticeable impact on the origin of Welsh steam coal as shown in Table 3.3: 
 
 
                                                 
basis that some elementary digging by Morris and Williams through John Nixon’s papers indicates that she 
hardly seems to have been expansionary in outlook, and in fact, her husband was still alive during the period 
she was meant to be pioneering the steam coal trade as a widow, this perhaps is all she now merits.  
312 C. Wilkins, The South Wales Coal Trade (Cardiff, 1888), pp.72-73. 
313 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.20. 
314 Ibid., pp.29-30 
315 E.D. Lewis, ‘Pioneers’. 
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Table 3.3: Coal Shipments from Selected Welsh Coal Ports, 1840 & 1851316 
 Coals Shipped Coastwise (tons) Coals Exported (tons) 
 1840 1851 1840 1851 
Cardiff 162,283 501,002 3,826 249,001 
Newport 482,398 451,491 7,256 151,668 
Swansea 460,201 352,247 33,089 41,502 
Llanelly 192,769 219,460 19,275 9,785 
Milford 76,768 49,573 411 269 
Total 1,374,419 1,573,773 63,857 452,225 
 
As can be seen, Cardiff went from supplying approximately 12% of the coals shipped 
coastwise to almost a third, whilst it increased its share of exports from these ports 
significantly, rising from 6% of the total in 1840 to over 55% in 1851. 
No small part of this was a result of the trials set in train by the Admiralty to assess which was 
the most suitable coal for their new steam-powered warships. 
From the form and ceremony, however, attendant upon the experiments, from the 
publication of details under the authority of Parliament, and from the importance attached 
to the results by the competing parties, the conclusions educed are equivalent to certificates 
of merit.317 
 
These trials had their results published in three reports, with around 100 different 
varieties of coal tested for their suitability, including 17 from the North Country and 37 from 
Wales (owing to the large variety on offer).318 In addition to generally having greater 
evaporative power, the main advantages of Welsh coal over its northern equivalent was that it 
required less space to store, was easier to light, resulted in minimal ‘clinker’ left in the grate 
                                                 
316 Data reproduced from J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.32. 
317 Colliery Guardian, 12 March, 1864. J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.34. 
318 Parliamentary Papers, Reports on the Coals suited for the Steam Navy, 1847-8 (915, xxviii), 1849 (1086, xxxii) and 
1851 (1345, xxxiii) 
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and, crucially, it gave off very little smoke. It did have some downsides, namely that Welsh 
coal tended to generate more ash (if less clinker) and that it was significantly more fragile in 
terms of its friability, which meant that extra care had to be taken in transporting it - especially 
to overseas stations. By 1859, Wales supplied 188,507 tons out of the 249,527 tons bought by 
the Admiralty that year.319 That Welsh coal was better than north alone was not in doubt - in 
1856, for a naval review, the Mining Gazette reported that all ships present needed to burn 
Welsh coal only to ‘obviat the chances of collision’ - but the northern colliery owners switched 
tactics, arguing that their coal, when mixed with the Welsh steam coal, would provide the best 
balance, being cheaper than a wholly Welsh fuel whilst still offering its many advantages.320  
The Admiralty, ever keen to save on fuel costs, therefore ordered that a two-third Welsh to 
one-third North Country blend be used, however this was unpopular amongst those at sea. 
After an exercise in the late 1860s, the Vice-Admiral of the Channel Fleet reported that: 
...the smoke produced by the present mixture of north country and Welsh coal, combined 
with that from guns in action, renders seeing signals, or even ships, impossible.321 
 
The general outcome of this was that all Admiralty ships leaving the UK left on fresh, 
Welsh steam coal, whilst stations abroad tended to continue using a mixture, as north country 
coal dealt better with the transit and helped to burn the small coal which resulted from the 
transport of the friable Welsh steam coal.322 
This leads, naturally, to a focus on the export of this coal to the rest of the globe (see  
Chapter 5). However, with all of the Royal Navy’s ships to bunker, as well as high demand 
from other merchant fleets, in addition to the existing (and growing) demand for Wales’ older 
                                                 
319 Mining Gazette, 16 June 1860 
320 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, pp.36 - 38. 
321 Parliamentary Papers, Reports as to the use of North Country Coal in the Navy, together with any remarks thereon 
(London, 1872), xxxix. 
322 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.40. 
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output of household and coking coals, there was still a sizeable amount of coastwise shipping 
from Cardiff. 
Indeed, if we return to the 695 journeys of Witherington and Everett, then we see that 
if we look at origins rather than destinations, this facet of the trade can be appreciated. 
Although Witherington and Everett were based in the North East, a substantial proportion of 
these journeys began in South Wales: 
Table 3.4: Witherington & Everett – Origin of Trips323 
 
Scotland 
 
South 
Wales 
Tyne Wear Tees Humber 
11 171 405 50 40 8 
1.61% 24.96% 59.12% 7.30% 5.84% 1.17% 
 
Indeed, it is clear from the records that when the ship had been south of London then 
it was sent around to load at Cardiff. Of the 171 journeys which started in South Wales, 46 
were to London, 66 to other ports in the UK (mostly along the south coast) and 59 were to 
European destinations. Therefore it is interesting to note that the coastal trade of Cardiff was 
conducted in much the same way (and, it would seem, in the same ships) as the home trade 
between the north east and Europe.  However, Wales was not such a large supplier to domestic 
users as the North East. For example,  whilst coastwise shipments of Welsh coal to London 
increased from 60,069 tonnes in 1840 to 587,621 in 1874, that remained a small proportion of 
London’s imports (approaching 7.5 million tonnes in in that year).324 The extra length of 
journey caused by routing around Land’s End increased the freight rates compared to the 
straight route of the north eastern colliers, therefore limiting Welsh imports to the capital to 
those parts of the market which required the clean burning properties of the steam coal. Whilst 
                                                 
323 Tyne and Wear Archives, DT/WE/Accession 2880, Witherington & Everett, Ship Voyage Logs. 
324 Ibid., p.43 
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the coming of the railways provided some relief from this, the narrow and standard gauge 
railways from the colliers down to the main corridor were incompatible with the broad gauge 
South Wales or Great Western railway. The added transshipment costs and increased potential 
for breakage therefore would have reduced any benefits from the more direct route.  As can 
be seen from Table 3.5 below, the main growth was in coal exported abroad, rather than coal 
which was shipped around the UK for various purposes.  
 
Table 3.5: Coal Output in South Wales (1855 - 1913) and amount of which exported or kept 
for use in the UK. 325 
 
 Output Exported 
(Foreign) 
% Retained in 
UK 
% 
1855 8,550,270 1,113,982 13.0% 7,436,288 87.0% 
1860 10,805,713 1,695,015 15.7% 9,110,698 84.3% 
1865 12,656,336 2,381,705 18.8% 10,274,631 81.2% 
1870 13,664,112 3,463,474 25.3% 10,200,638 74.7% 
1875 14,173,143 3,686,002 26.0% 10,487,141 74.0% 
1880 21,165,580 6,893,839 32.6% 14,271,741 67.4% 
1885 24,342,856 9,824,116 40.4% 14,518,740 59.6% 
1890 29,415,025 12,597,636 42.8% 16,817,389 57.2% 
1895 33,040,114 14,651,725 44.3% 18,388,389 55.7% 
1900 39,328,209 18,457,238 46.9% 20,870,971 53.1% 
1905 43,203,071 20,053,007 46.4% 23,150,064 53.6% 
1910 48,699,982 25,215,303 51.8% 23,484,679 48.2% 
1913 56,830,072 29,784,930 52.4% 27,045,142 47.6% 
                                                 
325 Output figures are from R. Hunt, Mineral Statistics, 1854 - 1873, Parliamentary Papers, Mines Inspectors’ Reports 
1873 - 1887 and Annual Statistical Tables 1888 - 1914. 
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However, it is not possible to determine to which purposes this domestically retained 
coal was put, as it is not recorded in the official statistics. Parliamentary Papers began recording 
the amount of coal shipped on board vessels as fuel in 1896, although this remains related 
only to ships leaving UK waters to clear foreign, rather than the coastwise trade until 1901. 
Furthermore, coal moved by the railway do not distinguish the end location (as demonstrated 
in the Chapter 1 with coal movements on the North Eastern Railway).  
A calculation was made of the uses of South Wales coal in 1893 by the secretary of the 
Coalowners’ Association: 
Table 3.6: Purpose of Output from South Wales Collieries (inc.Monmouthshire) in 1893326 
Purpose Identified Output (Tonnes) % of Output 
Exported from Bristol Channel Ports as coal, coke or 
patent fuel 
18,540,000 61.3% 
Sent to Liverpool, London and Southampton for 
shipment or bunkers 
1,925,000 6.4% 
Consumed at Iron Works, Tin Works, Smelters etc. 4,086,000 13.5% 
Locomotive coal supplied to Railway Companies 950,000 3.1% 
Converted to Coke 1,067,000 3.5% 
Consumed at the Collieries 1,513,000 5.0% 
Supplied to Workmen 580,000 1.9% 
Supplied for House Coal and Manufacture of Gas at 
Newport, Cardiff and Swansea 
390,000 1.3% 
Balance: supplied and consumed for various purposes 1,212,000 4.0% 
 30,263,000 100.0% 
 
                                                 
326 W.G. Dalziel, Records of the Several Coal Owners’ Association of Monmouthshire and South Wales, 1864 - 1895, 
(Cardiff, 1895), p.612 
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These numbers would certainly tally with the earlier estimates on locomotive use in 
the UK, for example, and having been conducted in 1893 is after the decline in the role of the 
South Wales iron works which had originally consumed so much Welsh coal. As such, and in 
light of the absence of further evidence, these proportions can be used as a guide to the 
consumption of Welsh coal shipped domestically (either by rail or by coastal shipping) in the 
1890s and up to the outbreak of the First World War.  
Of that identified as leaving via the ports, broadly speaking the uses bear resemblance 
to the beginnings of the trade back in the 1840s, with shipments to Ireland continuing to be 
used for domestic and industrial purposes as it had when sent there by Walter Coffin, as well 
as for use by Irish railways. Some was used for gas, industrial or smokeless domestic use, but 
the remainder, shipped to London, Liverpool, Southampton, naval dockyards and other ports 
was used as bunker fuel for steamers, with one estimate placing this use as high as 20%.327  
However, whilst shipments coastwise in Table 3.5 increased by 364% over the period 
1855 - 1913, shipments exported increased by a fantastical 2,674%. From only 13% of all 
shipments in 1855, (including, presumably, the fruit of John Nixon’s salesmanship in 
Nantes) it increased to over 52.4% of the total coal mined in South Wales. It is to this 
important export market that we now turn. The dramatic growth in absolute tonnage 
exported meant that South Wales increasingly grew to be the dominant supplier of coals for 
export from the United Kingdom: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
327 R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p.318. 
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Table 3.7:  Proportion of Coal Shipped from Principal Districts of the United Kingdom in 
Selected Years328 
 
 Bristol 
Channel 
North 
West 
North 
East 
Humber 
Ports  
Other East 
Coast Ports 
East 
Scotland 
West 
Scotland Total 
1850 13.3 8.3 63.6 2.0 2.1 6.1 4.4   100* 
1860 24.4 8.6 53.5 3.4 0.9 5.8 3.4   100 
1870 31.2 4.9 46.9 4.5 0.4 7.5 4.6   100 
1880 39.0 3.4 39.5 6.7 0.6 7.8 3.0   100 
1890 43.6 2.1 31.1 7.7 0.5 11.4 3.6   100 
1900 41.9 1.6 29.7 9.5 0.6 13.1 3.6   100 
 
* Other ports accounted for 0.2% of this total. 
 
As can be seen, the balance in the proportion of coal shipped by the North East and 
by the Bristol Channel ports changes significantly over this period. The Bristol Channel’s 
growth is quite spectacular, although other ports also increased their share: notably on the 
Humber and ports in the East of Scotland. However, both of those port categories were still 
focused on the trade with the Baltic and the North Sea, whereas due to geography, Wales was 
better placed to face the growing markets abroad, away from the Home Trade. Europe 
remained, as for the trade of Newcastle, the main recipient of much of Wales’ output – in 
particular France and the Mediterranean.329  The Romanian Railway company, for example, 
had a list of approved coals, all twenty four of which were from South Wales. This meant that 
the Welsh steam coal merchants were (rather) well-placed to deliver the needs of the Romanian 
Railways, which they did, immediately setting up an association between four large firms to 
                                                 
328 Table reproduced from D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p. 498. The categories in the original table 
are as follows: Bristol Channel: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea, &c.; North West: Liverpool, Manchester, &c.; 
North East: Newcastle, Blythe, North and South Shields; Humber: Hull, Goole and Grimsby; the others 
categories remain unchanged and are relatively self-explanatory.  
329 ‘France and the Mediterranean’ is a broad term. For the purposes of this chapter I will be using the 
definitions of D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’. Therefore this includes the broad sweep of the 
Mediterranean, that is to say: France, the Channel Islands, Portugal, the Azores and Maderia, Spain and the 
Canaries, Gibraltar, Italy, Malta, Egypt, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, South Russia, 
Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, etc. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 120 
control bidding for railway contracts (including the Romanian Railways contract).330 
Interestingly, the list of firms able to supply those coals numbered only four, and they 
promptly agreed between themselves the price of the coals per ton, designing the system so 
that the contract would go to a particular of their number (Pyman Watson were the winners 
in 1907). Altogether the Association had contracts with 25 railway companies across Europe, 
including Denmark, Portugal, Turkey France, Sweden and Romania, as well as Egypt. 
However, there are important distinctions to be drawn in other trades: 
Table 3.8:  UK Coal Exports to Selected Destinations from Selected Regions (1902)331 
 
 
Destination 
Bristol Channel Ports North Eastern Ports 
tons % of regional 
total 
tons % of regional 
total 
The Baltic 900,155 4.6% 6,937,857 53.9% 
The Mediterranean 13,780,408 70.8% 5,333,993 41.5% 
Atlantic South America 2,132,360 11.0% 102,429 1.5% 
Total Exports (Region) 19,450,948 100% 12,859,841 100% 
 
Whilst, as has been established, Newcastle was dominant in the short distance trades 
to the Baltic and North Seas, a relatively large proportion of Welsh output went to Atlantic 
South America. This is an excellent example of how the coal export trade was closely 
associated with the location of British imports. Aside from coal, Britain’s exports were either 
invisible (as shipping, financial or other services) or high-value, low bulk goods such as 
machinery, textiles (when compared to the bulk and value of the imports required to make 
them) or manufactured goods, neither of which require a large merchant marine tonnage. By 
comparison, Britain’s imports were huge quantities of the bulky raw products to transform 
                                                 
330 The four firms in question were Cory Brothers, L. Gueret Ltd., Pyman, Watson & Co. as well as Watts, 
Williams & Co. See Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Association 
Agreement & Correspondence re: Romanian Railway Contract with Taylor Lewis.. 
331  D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’. Ignoring the coastal trade to London, the combination of exports 
from the ports of the Bristol Channel and the North East (to all destinations) represented 75 per cent of the 
total from across the country in 1902.  
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inside “the workshop of the world” into those exports or to feed the burgeoning population. 
Indeed, within the coal fields of South Wales themselves, the remaining iron industry met a 
growing proportion of its demand for iron ore from abroad (see Table 3.9): 
Table 3.9: Ores used in South Wales 1856 - 1880 (tons) 332 
Year Total South Wales 
ironstone production 
Ore sent from 
Furness and West 
Cumberland 
Foreign Imports 
1855 1,665,500 324,630 (1)  
1860 590,888 117,349 (2) 19,561 
1865 323,305 214,147 (2) 61,683 
1870 471,334 248,989 139,249 
1875 395,434 110,291 172,477 (3) 
1880 278,361 42,063 1,371,209 
Notes:  
1. 1855 Return not available; 1856 figure used instead 
2. West Cumberland only; no Furness return available 
3. 1875 was an unusually low import figure; the average for 1873 - 1877 was 436,989 tons per 
year 
 
This provided an excellent opportunity to export coal in place of the bulky ore 
imported, thus keeping the ship gainfully employed. Ore and pitwood was slowly 
complemented and to some extent replaced after the 1870s by the import of grain from 
abroad.333  
The overall national imbalance between imports and exports in terms of tonnage was 
enormous. In 1869 Britain imported articles weighing 12,776,000 tons and exported (exclusive 
                                                 
332 R. Craig, ‘Trade and Shipping in South Wales - The Radcliffe Company, 1882 - 1921’ in C. Baber & L.J. 
Williams (eds), Modern South Wales: Essays in Economic History (Cardiff, 1986), p.168. 
333 Ibid., p.171. 
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of coal) merely 3,000,000 tons.334 By 1898 imports were weighing in at 37,137,000 tons and 
exports without coal were merely 7,760,000 tons. Therefore nigh on 30,000,000 tons of 
shipping would have to leave Britain in ballast, thus forcing up inward freights and therefore 
reducing the amount that Britain could therefore import for the same cost. As Thomas 
succinctly puts it: 
More than four-fifths of the weight of our exports consists of coal; without it the great 
bulk of the shipping bring corn, cotton, wood, wool, sugar, &c., to our chores would be 
compelled perforce to clear without cargo, and in ballast. No outward freights would be earned 
in the majority of instances, and consequently, in order to earn profit, or, for the matter of that, 
to make both ends meet, a very much heavier freight would have to be charged on articles of 
import, which would thereby be heavily increased in price to the consumer. Indeed, it is hardly 
conceivable that our foreign trade could have reached its present dimensions had it not been for 
the outward freight provided by coal…335 
 
Britain’s export of coal thus balanced Britain’s imports of food and bulky raw 
materials.  In 1840, the number of ships entering Britain with cargo was some 25% higher 
than those clearing with cargo.336 By 1900 this had been converted into a deficit of over 17%, 
despite the dramatic increase in bulky imports (a 600% increase in corn, 800% increase in 
wool, 600% increase in wood, a 500% increase in sugar imports and 6,000,000 more tons of 
iron ore when compared with 1850).337 This spectacular growth was matched by an equally 
remarkable escalation in coal exports. From 1855 to 1913 there was a nigh on twenty fold 
increase in the amount of coal exported from the United Kingdom (from 4,977,000 tons to 
97,719,000 tons). Whilst there was a dramatic increase in coal production in the UK 
(64,307,000 tons to 287,412,000 tons over the same period) the proportion of total coal raised 
exported rose from 7.74% to 34%, demonstrating how important the coal trade was in 
providing outward freights to shipping. 338  
                                                 
334 Import/Export figures in this paragraph are from D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’ p.455. 
335 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.454. 
336 Ibid., p.455. 
337 Ibid., p.455. 
338 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, pp.675–676. 
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Coal’s role as Britain’s only bulk export resulted in it, in many cases, essentially being 
an alternative to ballast; freights on coal were correspondingly remarkably low.339 Of course, 
it only compensated in terms of bulk, and not in value as the coal was worth significantly less 
than imports (the rest of Britain’s balance of payments was held by services, which made a 
heroic contribution – shipping services and administration alone brought £107.4m to Britain 
in 1913).340 With regard to the physical scenario however, and linking back to the Welsh coal 
export to Atlantic South America, Tower used the example of wheat imports from the River 
Plate.341 Herein the total cost of the journey requires approximately 40s freight per ton. 
Without coal the grain would bear the entire cost of this import. With coal paying 14s – 16s 
the ship, whilst making a loss on the outbound journey of some 4s – 6s, is able to cut the 
freight costs of the grain from 40s to a mere 24s. This is reinforced by the location of coaling 
stations at the locations from which Britain’s imports came. Thus Cardiff coal was cheaper at 
Buenos Aires and Constantinople (28s and 22s per ton respectively) than at Mauritius (41s per 
ton) in 1904.342 In the former examples, the extensive wheat and grain imports from the 
pampas and the Black Sea were the main sources of revenue for the ships, and the shipment 
of coal to these locations was merely an alternative to ballast, and a way to make some money 
towards the cost of the journey. Likewise, St. Vincent, Cape Verde, whilst not as cheap as 
Buenos Aires, also could provide coal at low prices due to its location just off the west coast 
of Africa on the main route from Britain and Europe to South America, Africa and Australia. 
In 1893 coal was available there at 24s/6d, and freights for the coal there were only 8s/3d 
                                                 
339 J.R. Smith, The Organisation of Ocean Commerce, (Philadelphia, 1905), pp.16-17. 
340 S.N. Broadberry, Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850 – 2000, (Cambridge, 2006), p.147 & p.155. 
341 The following example is taken from W.S. Tower, ‘The Coal Question’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Sep., 
1923), p.110. 
342 J.R. Smith, Ocean Commerce, p. 62. 
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from Cardiff.343 It should be noted that obviously this had an impact on the Argentinian side, 
too, in facilitating the export trade by lowering transport costs, both externally (through the 
cutting of freight rates) and internally, by supplying coal to power railways which further 
brought down costs. That this trade was dominated by Cardiff coal is not in doubt. Boyns has 
conducted analysis of consular reports on the state of the trade and states that between 1896 
and 1913, of the coal imported into Argentina, the amount that sailed from the Welsh ports 
rose from 76.75% to 84.75%.344   
Indeed, this link between coal shipments and imports is also marked in regard to India, 
as set out in Table 3.10 below. In years with great wheat imports, coal exports are 
correspondingly higher. There is quite clearly a strong link: 
Table 3.10:  UK Coal Exports to, and Wheat Imports from, India (1902)345 
 
Year 
Wheat, &c., Imports to 
UK from East Indies 
Coal Exports from UK 
to Indian Continent 
 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
(in tons) 
440,000 
106,000 
 27,000 
477,000 
410,000 
-- 
(in tons) 
805,000 
528,000 
195,000 
331,000 
433,000 
100,000 
 
Thus Welsh coal exports were not subject to the normal conditions of freight carriage. 
Despite India being a significant producer of coal itself (production rose from 987,000 tons in 
1876 to 14,706,000 tons by 1912) Welsh coal continued to be shipped out, both due its role 
                                                 
343 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, Freight rates from the meetings held on 8 January 1892 and the price of coal from 6 December 
1892.  
344 T. Boyns & S. Gray, ‘Welsh Coal and the Informal Empire’ p.57.  
345 Table re-printed (in summarised form) from D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p. 456. 
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as an excellent fuel for steamships, but also as an alternative to ballast.346 A further example of 
this ballast alternative role can be found in the story of the Radcliffe Company, where this 
successful firm specialised in the export of Welsh coal to the Mediterranean ports before 
returning to Cardiff with Black Sea grain.347 Welsh coal exported to the Mediterranean was 
often used for navigation, both on land and at sea. The French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish 
navies (as well as the Russian) on occasion got their fuel from South Wales, whilst merchant 
marine also bought large amounts, including companies such as the Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, Austrian Lloyds and Navigazione Generale Italiano having annually renewed 
supplies with Cardiff. Similarly, on the land, railway companies bought welsh coal for steam-
raising until the First World War limited supply. These included Adriatic Railways, Egyptian 
State Railways, Portuguese Railways, the Romanian State Railways, Meridionali Railways, 
Chemin de Fer de l’Ouest, Italian State Railways, French State Railways, the Paris, Lyons and 
Mediterranean Railway, Algerian Railways and the Madrid and Saragossa Railway, to name but 
a few.348 Similarly, much of that exported to Malta, Gibraltar and Egyptian ports was to provide 
fuel for steamships, be they from the Royal Navy or merchant navy.  
These flows can perhaps be best seen through the Admiralty map mentioned in the 
previous chapter.349 Whilst the map of the German Ocean and the Baltic Sea was the domain 
of the blue North Country Coal, the Mediterranean is instead a comparative sea of red ink. 
Similar to the North Country coals, the flows can be split into two principal flows: up through 
                                                 
346 Figures from Parliamentary Papers, Statistical Tables relating to the Production, Consumption and Imports and Exports 
of Coal in the British Empire and the Principal Foreign Countries in recent Years (London,1912). 
347 R. Craig, ‘Trade and Shipping in South Wales’ p.187. 
348 R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p321. These notices appeared in the Colliery Guardian, and I can heartily 
concur that the “references are too numerous to list”. Suffice to say that most issues seemed to contain news of 
one of the large European/Mediterranean railway firms placing a contract in Cardiff for the year’s supply.  
349 National Archives, CO 321/209, Correspondence with the Colonies, Coal Export Map (1902). 
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the Balearic Sea to Marseille and Genoa, or past Sicily and then either north to the Adriatic or 
east towards Suez. 
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Figure 3.1: Admiralty Map of Coal Exports (1902) – Extract (Mediterranean) 
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Only 4,163,903 tonnes of North Country Coal made it past Gibraltar in 1902, 
compared to 9,448,986 tonnes of Welsh coal. Welsh coal therefore made up just shy of 70% 
of coal exported from the UK to the Mediterranean. Marseilles received 767,644 tonnes of 
Welsh coal (almost certainly steam coal) compared to only 146,859 tonnes of North Country 
coal.  Similarly, Genoa and Naples received more Welsh than North Country Coal. 
Interestingly, in the Adriatic, whilst Venice received 488,785 tonnes of Welsh coal compared 
to 249,006 tonnes of North Country coal, Trieste received 203,180 tonnes of North Country 
as opposed to 72,073 tonnes of Welsh. This, presumably, reflects its role as the major seaport 
for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and is how coal for manufacturing and other uses was 
delivered. Of the rest of the second principal flow, over three quarters of a million tonnes of 
coal were sent towards Greece and Constantinople, compared to only 183,096 tonnes of 
Northern coal. 919,999 tonnes of Welsh coal went through to the Red Sea, almost ten times 
as much as the 99,669 tonnes of North Country coal. Finally, unlike many other flows 
identified, the flows going towards Alexandria are not as unbalanced as the other flows: 
477,371 tonnes of Welsh coal as opposed to 384,581 tonnes of coal from the North Country.  
Over one million tonnes of Welsh coal were sent to Port Said to provide fuel for steamships 
on their way through the Canal, compared to only 50,696 tonnes of North Country coal.  
This leads to a relatively neat division. Obviously there are exceptions, and it is nothing 
more than a generalisation, but it is fair to say that, broadly speaking, (and in terms of 
European trade only) North Country coal served markets in the North and Baltic Seas, 
countries that could be easily reached from the ports of the north east, whilst Wales served 
the south of Europe, that which clustered around the Mediterranean. The former is undeniably 
more accurate than the latter; absent some flows for steamers’ bunkers to Hamburg, Bremen 
and Kronstadt and Welsh coal’s presence in the North Sea would essentially disappear, 
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whereas North Country coal did at least enter the Mediterranean in a sizeable amount, it was 
merely small in comparison to the amount of Welsh coal flowing to the region.  
Figure 3.2: Admiralty Map of Coal Exports (1902) – Wider Extract350 
 
Once the focus is adjusted to a worldwide scale, the dominance of Welsh coal outside of the 
North Sea and the Baltic region is clear.  
Whilst its role as the exclusive fuel for steam shipping may have been in decline by the 
end of the nineteenth century, as technology enabled lesser grades of coal to be burnt and 
alternative supplies came on stream, the amounts exported continued to grow until the 
outbreak of the First World War. However, having now assessed the scale of the growth in 
                                                 
350 National Archives, CO 321/209, Correspondence with the Colonies, Coal Export Map (1902). 
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exports of the Welsh coal industry, it is necessary to determine how this growth was 
accommodated and developed. 
For a long period the limiting factor in the growth of the trade was the ability to get 
the coal to the sea for easy transport. Unlike many of the coal seams in the North East, few 
of the Welsh ones emerged near the sea, although this is not necessarily the case in the area 
between Port Talbot and Llanelly. On this stretch of coastline, near the copper works of 
Llanelly and Neath, the coal not only adjoined the sea but due to the nearby copper workings, 
there was a ready supply of shipping bringing in ore which required a return cargo.351 It was 
from here that the coastal trade had begun, much like in the North East where easily accessible 
coal near the sea had enabled the coal trade. Further east, behind Newport and Cardiff, the 
difficulty of transport coal from the inland fields to the coast for shipment had been solved 
by the creation of a network of canals (and their respective feeder tram-roads) which had 
dramatically broadened the area from which coal could economically be delivered to the docks, 
although by 1840 these were running near capacity.352  
The railway, working in tandem with dramatic improvements of dock facilities would 
overcome this barrier. Whilst the growth of the railway has already been covered earlier, a brief 
recap of the developments of the docks is appropriate. The West Bute Dock at Cardiff opened 
in October 1839, and the figures of coal exported from the dock rose from 3,641 tons in 1840 
to over 200,000 tons by 1843.353 This was mainly down to the coming of the railway, which 
dramatically widened the area served by the port, as can be seen below: 
  
  
                                                 
351 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.10. 
352 Ibid., p.3. 
353 Ibid., p.4. 
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Table 3.11: Mineral Traffic on the Taff Vale Railway in Selected Years354 
 (Tons)  (Tons) 
1841 41,669 1883 8,614,715 
1842 114,516 1890 10,812,942 
1843 152,100 1893 11,342,905 
1853 874,362 1903 16,168,838 
1863 2,772,011 1912 14,475,068 
1873 4,527,641 1913 19,392,267 
 
Indeed, the natural layout of the Welsh landscape favoured the export of coal from the docks. 
The mines, all being located uphill from Cardiff, could load trains full of coal which would 
then run down the relatively short railways (they were all 30 miles or less) to the docks mostly 
under their own weight. The purpose of the locomotive was more to act as a brake on the 
downhill stretch and to haul the empty wagons back up the hill, which enabled significantly 
smaller locomotives to be used than would otherwise be required.355 By contrast, the rail routes 
to England and the domestic market were long and hilly and would have required a 
significantly more powerful engine. Between 1830 and 1914, 109 railway companies were 
formed in South Wales, helping to create one of the densest railway networks on the planet 
by the 1890s.356  
 These, combined with a tremendous development of harbours and a series of 
dockworks enabled such exports to continue thriving. Indeed, ‘the developments in the larger 
ports of Cardiff and Swansea were testimony to the enterprise of coal and shipping 
entrepreneurs, and to the quality of, and the demand for, the ‘admirable Welsh steam coal’.357 
The demand pushed the port facilities to their limits, resulting in a remarkable and consistent 
                                                 
354 Table reproduced from H.S. Jevons, The Coal Trade, p.100. 
355 J.H. Morris, & L.J. Williams, South Wales, p.15 
356 Number of Railway Companies from R. Taylor, ‘Capital Formation by Railways in South Wales, 1836 - 
1914’ and density from J. Williams, ‘The Climacteric of the 1890s’, both in C. Baber, Modern South Wales 
(Cardiff, 1986) pp.96-166 and pp.192-202 respectively. 
357 R. Craig, British Tramp Shipping, 1750 – 1914,(St. John’s, 2003) p.139. 
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push for improvement and increased capacity. Despite continual improvements and new 
docks at Cardiff, Swansea and Newport, colliery owners - despairing of the inadequate facilities 
at Cardiff - set about the construction of a new dock at Barry (opened 1889).358 
 
Table 3.12: Chronology of Selected Welsh Dock and Harbour Works359 
1798 
1837 
1839 
1843-1849 
1845 
1852 
1855 
1857 
1859 
 
 
1861 
1865 
1867 
1874 
1877 
1881 
1884 
1887 
1889 
1898 
 
 
1907 
1909 
Cardiff 
Aberavon 
Cardiff 
Neath 
Swansea 
Swansea 
Cardiff 
Cardiff 
Cardiff 
Swansea 
Penarth 
Briton Ferry 
Penarth 
Porthcawl 
Cardiff 
Neath 
Swansea 
Penarth 
Cardiff 
Barry 
Swansea 
Barry 
Port Talbot 
Cardiff 
Swansea 
Sea Lock, Glamorganshire Canal 
Dock 
Bute West Dock 
Harbour Improvements 
‘New Cut’ 
North Dock 
Bute East Dock (first section) 
Bute East Dock (second section) 
Bute East Dock (final section) 
South Dock 
Ely Harbour 
Dock 
Dock 
Dock 
Roath Basin 
Harbour 
Prince of Wales Dock 
Dock Extension 
Roath Dock 
No. 1 Dock 
Prince of Wales Dock Extension 
No. 2 Dock 
Dock 
Queen Alexandra Dock 
King’s Dock 
 
Indeed, it has been estimated that at least £15 million was spent between 1830 and 
1914 on dock facilities and improvements in Glamorgan, as the export of coal continued to 
grow.360 The port at Barry and the town to support the docks were created, along with the rail 
                                                 
358 A.G. Kenwood, ‘Port Investment in England and Wales, pp. 156-167. 
359 Table reproduced from R. Craig, Tramp Shipping, p.139.  
360 Ibid.,p.139. 
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link to the Rhondda were built by the Ocean Coal Company in an effort to avoid using 
congested dock facilities elsewhere and to expedite their product’s export.361 
Such concern regarding the export of the product was rare. In 1920 the South Wales 
Coal Annual remarked that “It is a matter of for some surprise that South Wales Colliery 
Companies in the past have not shown more enterprise in establishing their own export 
departments.”362 As in coal-mining more generally or the use of the ten ton railway wagons, it 
seems that the Victorian entrepreneur in the coal trade is not able to shake off the designation 
of failure. Aside from some of the larger concerns, such as the Cambrian Combine and Cory 
Brothers or the previously mentioned Ocean Coal Company, most coal firms sold most of 
their coal to middle-men and that was the extent of their engagement with the coal trade. 
Much of the output was sold as ‘free on board’ in Cardiff docks, that is emptied into the holds 
of the purchasers’ ships.363 The tradition with coal sold free on board was for any necessary 
trimming to be undertaken by trimmers employed by the coal vendor, however for this service 
a charge was made to the ship.364 Very few firms conducted contracts under the terms of a 
‘cost, insurance, freight’ contract, apart from those who had absorbed a previously 
independent exporting merchant (such as Ocean Coal Company after its merger with Wilsons 
Co.) or who had, themselves, started as exporting agents and vertically integrated by buying 
up collieries (such as Cory Brothers).365 Such contracts were common with foreign railway 
companies (although these were usually taken with coal exporters  
                                                 
361 R.J. Rimell, History of the Barry Railway Company, 1884 - 1921 (Cardiff, 1923), pp.11 - 23. 
362 South Wales Coal Annual, (Cardiff, 1920), p.50. 
363 The two main ways of selling coal in the period were under f.o.b. contracts, wherein the coal was the 
purchasing party’s concern as soon as it had been placed in the hold, and c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) where 
the colliery or coal vendor covered everything up until arrival in the destination port. There was also the rarely 
used ‘free on truck’ contract, which added the unloading stage at the destination port to the coal vendor’s 
responsibilities. 
364 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.295. 
365 R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p.305. 
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Contracts were particularly welcome in the coal industry as they enabled a steady 
stream of output to be taken away from the collieries. Most of the collieries had minimal space 
for storage at the pithead, particularly in the Welsh valleys’ challenging geography. Hill’s 
Plymouth Collieries, for example, which had an output of around 500,000 to 600,000 tons was 
only able to stock 6,000 tons at any one time.366 Indeed, this lack of storage capacity was the 
reason that merchants were charged demurrage on railway coal wagons – if wagons weren’t 
returned promptly, there was a risk that production would have to be reduced at the pithead.367 
Thus it was that between 60% and 75% of coal raised was sold on contracts in any 
given year, with that proportion being estimated to rise to 85% in certain years (with the rest 
being sold on the spot-market or via auction).368 The Welsh sector, given its preponderance of 
exports to large buyers overseas, was the closest field to achieving what Jevons opined was the 
ideal situation:  
What the colliery proprietor wants is to deliver his coal regularly to the docks or elsewhere 
in a steady stream of so many tons per day, and to have all of this sold beforehand at 
remunerative prices. If the colliery relied entirely upon day-to-day sales the labour of selling 
would not only be greatly increased but he would be obliged at frequent times when ships are 
scarce, perhaps through storms, to sell his coal at a ridiculously low figure to any one who could 
store it, or else stop his colliery. In contracts, the purchaser is usually made responsible for 
finding the ships to take the coal in equal monthly instalments of the whole contract.369 
 
These contracts were not just with the coal exporting firms (such as Wilsons, Cory’s 
or sundry others) but also with key clients such as the Admiralty, foreign shipping lines or 
foreign railways who dealt direct with the colliery. However, the majority of output went to 
the coal shippers and exporters for onward shipment, rather than direct to the client. This had 
two advantages, firsly middle men were able to absorb the output from the collieries using the 
collieries’ preferred medium of freight on board contracts, and then sell these on to end-users 
                                                 
366 Ibid., pp.308 - 309. 
367 J. Simmons & G. Biddle, British Railway History, p.93. 
368 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.293. 
369 Ibid., p.293. 
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utilising cost, insurance, freight contracts. Secondly it ensured a steady steam of movements, 
with agents and firms around the world able to buy steady shipments from collieries, but move 
it to where demand required, be it the River Plate during the grain harvest or the ports of New 
Zealand come lambing season as their contracts required or supported.  
With the middlemen responsible for finding the ships to move the freight onwards, 
the collieries could focus instead on producing coal, safe that they had a contract which could 
absorb a large part of their output – the risk of a slump in the market affecting purchases had 
been passed on. Indeed, through contracting with middlemen they spared themselves the large 
amounts of capital tied up in the shipping of coal overseas; Pyman, Watson & Co. reportedly 
had between £100,000 and £150,000 tied up in this manner in the years before 1914.370  
The contracts were normally a year-long and arranged in the September and October 
of each year, although this differed when the market was at its peak or its nadir. In these 
instances, either buyers or producers wanted as short a contract as possible, rather than 
‘locking in’ disadvantageous prices, and so contracts in these periods tended to be of only 
three or six months’ duration.371  
The noticeable inelasticity of demand for coal meant that the coal industry was prone 
to extreme cycles of high prices followed by long depressions. Once supply was no longer 
adequate to service growing demand, prices rose rapidly as ships still needed to sail, railways 
need to run, factories to be fuelled and homes to be heated, etc. These different factors 
affected the different coalfields in different ways, with the Welsh coal industry focused on the 
first two of these demands. The resultant high prices would encourage more pits to be sunk 
to increase output, which would invariably overshoot the new level of demand, resulting in 
                                                 
370 M.J. Daunton, Coal Metropolis Cardiff (Leicester, 1977), p.61. 
371 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.292.  
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excess coal on the market. As noted previously, having sunk a pit it was seldom worth 
mothballing or closing it (indeed, often the former was impossible) and thus production had 
to continue. Therefore there was a continuous cost-cutting process in the industry during these 
depressions, as colliery owners sought to minimise losses or maximise profits.  
What mainly influences him in adding to the already excessive supply is the desire to keep 
down and reduce the cost per ton in his own particular case, and so lessen his loss, or increase 
the meagre profit he may happen to be making… Unfortunately for his calculations, every one 
of his neighbours is influenced by the same motives and is making the same efforts to increase 
the output, and the reduced cost of a few pence per ton is immediately swallowed up in a reduced 
selling price of perhaps a shilling or more.372 
 
Through engaging middlemen to take on the majority of the risk with freight rates and 
such like, therefore, enabled the colliery proprietor to focus instead on improving the 
production process to break even, Sisyphean as this may have proved in times of depression. 
The risk was now with the middle men juggling the price of coal, the rate of freight, the 
worldwide demand for coal, the availability of ships and more besides as they sold their coal 
cost, insurance, freight to end users (aside from certain European merchants, who, doing the 
same task, bought it freight on board and then took out their insurance, etc.). 
A further reason for the importance of middlemen in the sale of coal was the practice 
of mixing coals to order, often from different collieries. Unsurprisingly, this was not 
undertaken by the collieries themselves, but instead by middlemen, including the coal agents 
who had ordered it, who found that:  
Many of the best grade of Cardiff coal are obtained by mixing different kinds and qualities 
in definite proportions, as it is found by experience that the disadvantages of certain coals are 
corrected by the opposite qualities of others, and that it is not only possible to improve the best 
coals by mixing but also practicable to use cheap coals so as to produce a result as good as any 
obtained from higher priced coals.373 
 
                                                 
372 Extracted from the pithily titled D.A. Thomas, Some Notes on the Present State of the Coal Trade in the U.K. with 
Special Reference to that of South Wales and Monmouthshire together with a Proposal for the Prevention of Undue Competition 
and for Maintaining Prices at a Renumerative Level (1896) quoted in Daunton, M. J., Coal Metropolis Cardiff, p.63. 
373 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.307. 
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This process was growing in popularity before the First World War as it enabled 
customers to suit their coal mixture to their current bank balance and the requirements of the 
job at hand; prioritising different aspects of the strengths of various coals to provide a truly 
bespoke mixture. The mixing process, however, caused some disruption at the port. The 
normal approach is for truck-loads of the various different component coals to be tipped, 
successively into the hold of the ship. With up to four different types of coal sometimes being 
mixed, from different collieries which had arrived on different trains, the marshalling required 
at the dock could prove extensive, let alone the sorting afterwards to return the correct trucks 
to the correct services for the correct collieries.374 
Despite the complexities of the business and the large amounts of risk that had been 
passed to the coal shippers in dealing with the various factors which controlled their trade, 
there does not seem to have been any hindrance to the growth in the number of coal shippers 
and exporters in Cardiff: 
Table 3.13: Coal Exporters in Newport and Cardiff (Selected Years)375 
Year Newport Cardiff 
1830 1 2 
1844 11 8 
1859 9 25 
1880 17 49 
1891 15 51 
1914 35 113 
   
 
However, what is of particular interest is when these figures are compared with the 
market share of the coal exporters at Cardiff. The increase in the number of coal exporters 
                                                 
374 Ibid., pp.307 – 308. 
375 Table re-printed from R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p306. 
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between 1880 and 1914 is of particular interest, as whilst the absolute number increased, the 
market structure does not seem to have materially differed:  
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Table 3.14: Percentage of Coal Exported by Cardiff’s Largest Coal Shippers376 
 1882 1889 1908 1911 
Largest 5 38.5% 35.4% 35.2% 34.5% 
Next Largest 5 16.2% 16.3% 17.8% 20.7% 
Next Largest 5 11.6% 11.6% 9.3% 10.4% 
Largest 15 66.4% 63.4% 62.4% 65.7% 
     
 
The largest fifteen firms remained in control of approximately two thirds of the export 
throughout the period, despite the dramatic increase in the number of coal exporters over the 
same period. Either exporting coal was an incredibly profitable sector of the industry (despite 
the adoption of much of the risk of market fluctuations) and so firms were rushing into the 
business but staying relatively small, or it was coming to seen as a fundamental part of a wider 
range of businesses; a service that was expected to be offered by firms at Cardiff docks. A 
further explanation can be developed through the increasing network of ‘coal agents’ at ports 
across the world, through which firms could sell their wares to ships at quaysides far away 
from Cardiff itself. Firms such as Wilson Co & Sons, which started as a stevedoring, lighterage 
and towage firm in Bahia, Brazil were able to take coal from Cardiff and sell it to ships (see 
Chapter 6) on behalf of multiple firms, either in exclusive agreements at key ports or for certain 
customers, or offer a range of different exported coals for purchase.377 
 Daunton has assessed the links between the key four trades of Cardiff: ship-owning, 
shipbroking, coal shipping and timber importing during the late nineteenth century: 
  
                                                 
376 Table re-printed from M.J. Daunton, Coal Metropolis Cardiff, p.57. 
377 See Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of the business of coaling. 
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Table 3.15: Functions of Cardiff Merchants (Selected Years)378 
 1882 1889 1900 
One Function    
Shipbroker 29 43 50 
Coal Factor 28 29 76 
Timber Importer 17 15 19 
Shipowner 12 22 43 
Two Functions    
Shipowner, Shipbroker 24 26 18 
Shipbroker, Coal Factor 14 25 76 
Timber Importer, Shipowner 2 1 - 
Timber Importer, Shipbroker 2 3 3 
Coal Factor, Timber Importer 2 1 8 
Coal Factor, Shipowner - 2 - 
Three Functions    
Shipowner, Shipbroker, Coal Factor 19 13 14 
Timber Importer, Shipowner, Coal Factor 1 - - 
Timber Importer, Shipbroker, Coal Factor 1 3 10 
Four Functions    
All of the above 1 2 1 
    
 
This table suggests that, indeed, coal shipping grew to be an established part of a large 
number of businesses during the twenty year period under study. Coal Factors, as a single 
function merchant, grew by the largest absolute number (76) over the period. The total 
number of firms involved in the coal trade increases from 43.4% of the table in 1882 to 58.2% 
in 1900. However it is in the firms with more than one function that growth of the coal trade 
as a ‘required’ business, so to speak, can be particularly noted. If firms in a single function are 
excluded then the number of firms in the coal trade increase from 38 (57.6% of the sample) 
in 1882 to 109, (83.8%) in 1900. Firms, clearly, were expected to be engaged in the coal 
business by 1900; although the similarities in the percentage of coal exported by the largest 
fifteen firms suggests that many of the increasing number of firms offering coal shipping (a 
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total of 185 firms in 1900) were not doing so on a particularly large scale. It is interesting to 
note that the largest groups in 1900 were those of Coal Factor (76), Shipbroker (50) or Coal 
Factor and Ship Broker (76 again). These middlemen, working the markets, receiving 
intelligence on freight rates and market requirements and constantly adjusting to them, were 
the successful and competitive outward face of Cardiff’s port. In doing so, the speed of 
transaction was rapid indeed. Firms often held offers for boats or tonnage open for half an 
hour, meaning that non-resident owners were often at a disadvantage as they relied on 
telegraph and telephone to receive authority to accept such an offer. As such, there was a 
move towards consolidation in Cardiff as opposed to Barry, Newport or Swansea. Whilst ships 
still left from these ports, their cargoes were assigned in Cardiff at the Coal Exchange 
(originally, rather suitably, termed the Coal and Shipping Exchange).379 
Cory Brothers, in addition to running their own ships, bought a stake in many different 
shipping firms, in exchange for being granted monopolistic coaling rights, either worldwide or 
at certain foreign coaling depots. For example, in 1895, they purchased an interest in a steamer 
with Gillison and Chadwick of Liverpool, from where the Cory Brothers Agent (W.G. Killick 
& Co.) informs them that:  
…their intention is to give us all their coaling of their 3 steamers, but as they 
have verbally explained to us they can hardly give you in writing as binding 
agreement to that effect. This firm is of high standing and their word is quite 
sufficient for us.380 
 
 The South Wales coal trade was therefore a very important and valuable part of the 
British economy. The export of coal as an alternative to ballast enabled Britain as the 
‘workshop of the world’ to import large amounts of raw materials and food at lower freight 
rates than would otherwise have been possible. Whilst part of the South Wales coal trade was 
                                                 
379 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.310. 
380 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Letter dated 30th October, 
1895 ‘Gillison & Chadwick’. 
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recognisably comparable with that of the North East, namely the shipping of coal along the 
coast to London or to the north of Europe, Wales’ strengths lay in the wider pattern of the 
ships calling at the ports. Unlike Newcastle’s dedicated collier fleet, which reliably sailed 
between the ports of the Tyne and Wear and countries bordering the North Sea (and, indeed, 
occasionally Cardiff itself) the nature of ships calling at Cardiff was different. Instead these 
were the tramp steamers, sent by the coal factors and the ship brokers wherever a suitable 
cargo could be found, and taking the Welsh coal with them. Whilst the coal owners of South 
Wales were later to be similarly smeared as un-entrepreneurial or lacking in drive to expand 
their markets, they had instead passed this requirement on to specialists in the field who 
adopted the risks of the market. The Welsh coal exporters also acted as the buffer between 
the requirements of the collieries for steady, reliable purchases of coal on contract and the 
more wild swings of the market. Much of this coal was used by steam ships and railways 
abroad, the smoke-raising reputation it had developed in the UK fast spreading across the 
globe. Indeed, many of the firms involved in the export of coal sent some of the coal to 
networks of coaling stations around the world, and it is worth noting that many of the firms 
which ran these coaling stations were Welsh in origin: Cory Brothers, Wilson’s, and D. A. 
Thomas’ combination of companies for example. It is interesting to note that where records 
have survived of coaling firms, these are linked to Welsh rather than North Eastern names, 
despite the latter’s head start in the coal trade; having supplied London and Europe for 
significantly longer than Wales, which began doing so in earnest only after mid-century.  
The combination of businesses cannot have engendered a greater level of business 
entrepreneurial drive than in the North East, as whilst many firms were shipbroking, coal 
shipping and even ship owning the 1900s, the example of Witherington and Everett offers a 
perfect counter example from the north. Both were dynamic, competitive markets with 
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intertwined interests in shipbroking and coal shipping, therefore the reasons that Wales export 
coal rather than North Eastern coal went to specialised in coaling stations cannot be found 
there. Yet, whilst the Welsh coal was better suited for naval use, and the Bristol Channel faced 
the world, as opposed to Northern Europe like the Tyne and Wear, more than just geography 
was at play. With shipping already going worldwide, the extension of selling coal across the 
globe, rather than in the UK’s near hinterland was a natural ‘next step’ for an industry seeking 
expansion for growing output.  However, these coaling stations provided more than a ‘safety 
valve’ for the export of surplus coal in order to meet contractual requirements, and instead 
not only enabled global trade to flourish in the latter half of the nineteenth century (see 
Chapter 5) but also provided for a dynamic and complex market with firms and agencies 
delivering bespoke and specialist services to a vast range of clients, from top quality steam 
liners to the lowliest tramp shipping (see Chapter 6).  
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 “The Chairman stated that he had informed the President of the Chamber of Commerce that 
the time was not ripe for giving an answer and It would be polite to await a lead from the Governmen 
before giving an opinion.”381 
 
Chapter Four: The Coal Trade & The Government 
In discussing the business of the coal trade, it is of importance that the understanding 
of the relationship between the industry and government can be defined, and if not 
definitively, than with at least some degree of illumination. This chapter briefly aims to do this, 
however it is important to note that Government legislation, for example, tended to focus on 
the either the condition of the works in the coal-mining industry more generally or with regard 
to rail and sea safety, and these are discussed elsewhere and it is not the promise of this chapter 
to discuss such legislation, important as it is to those broad industries.382 However, the coal 
export trade was explicitly targeted during the period under study by the imposition of the 
Coal Export Duty to help pay for the Boer War. The example of this, and how coal shippers 
fought against it provides the second half of this chapter, as a question about how much 
influence the trade carried in the House of Commons. Through looking at how the trade could 
not prevent the imposition of the Coal Export Duty in 1901, it will be clear that whilst 
respected Members of Parliament were involved in the coal trade, they were not enough to 
prevent a policy that was injurious to their interests. Certainly there is no evidence of a “Naval 
                                                 
381 Glamorgan Archives, DCOMC/3/2/1 – Cardiff Chamber of Commerce, Minutes from the Chamber of 
Shippers and Shipowners Meeting, July 1903) 
382 For example The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 1876 which introduced the Plimsoll Line, the 
1872 Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act prohibiting the employment of children under 12 or the 8 Hour Act 
of 1908. Whilst these are of great importance, they affected the related trades rather more than directly 
changing the behaviour of coal exporters and merchants – although some would have been affected by 
shipping safety regulation given the links between shipping and the coal trades and how many coal merchants 
also were shipbrokers and owners. 
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Industrial Complex” in terms of fuel supply, influencing Government policy to promote its 
own interest.383  
The issue of the Coal Export Duty will be considered in more depth later in this 
chapter. Before that it is important to consider the role played by the Admiralty in connection 
with the coal trade as the British navy switched from wooden warships reliant on wind power 
to iron and later steel ships powered by coal burning steam engines. The navy of Nelson and 
the Victory, triumphant at Trafalgar in 1805 were replaced by the steam-powered 
Dreadnoughts of the early 20th century before they, in turn, gave way to the use of oil-burning 
engines after the First World War.  
Between 1850 and 1914 the Admiralty became the largest single user of Welsh coal, 
and it relied on these private firms to ship coal to its stations abroad and for coaling warships 
directly in harbours384. Each generation of ships required proportionately more coal than the 
last: In 1861 the Warrior had bunkers to take 850 tons for its 9,120 ton size; by 1914 the Tiger 
(of 28,430 tons) carried 3,320 tons.385 The Admiralty had dallied with collier ownership, 
purchasing the Kharki in 1901, however this was converted into an oil tanker in 1906, 
suggesting that it was not a great success.386 In 1908 the Mercedes was purchased second-hand, 
and has the honour of being the only collier owned by the Royal Navy upon the outbreak of 
war in 1914, and never left home waters.387 Similarly, the Admiralty, unlike many large users 
of coal, owned no railway wagons for its movement and/or storage, instead relying on the 
                                                 
383 R. Lloyd-Jones, & M. J. Lewis, ‘Armaments Firms, the State Procurement System and the Naval Industrial 
Complex in Edwardian Britain’, Essays in Economic & Business History, Vol. XXIX, (2011), pp.2 –39 or A. Porter, 
‘Britain, the Cape Colony, and Natal, 1870 – 1914: Capital, Shipping and the Imperial Connexion’, Economic 
History Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov. 1981) pp.554-557. 
384 R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p.313. 
385 O. Parkes, British Battleships, (London, 1953), p.20 & p.551.  
386 T. James, The Royal Fleet Auxiliary, (London, 1985), p.6. 
387 J.T. Sumido, ‘British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 3 
(Jul., 1993), p.465. 
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coal merchants’ wagons when moving coal by rail.388 In stark contrast with the famous 
purchase of shares in British Petroleum by Churchill before the First World War to enable the 
British government to control its oil fuel supplies, no such attempt was made with regard to 
securing British coal deposits.389 Although there were some suggestions that the Government 
should interfere and attempt to secure a supply for the Admiralty of the finest coal, these were 
generally unheeded. The Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, for example, includes this 
exchange as part of its evidence gathering, when questioning Mr W. R. Heatley, a coal exporter 
from Durham: 
I note you say that you think it is a prudent step for the Government to acquire a portion of 
the South Wales coal-field, to be held as a reserve for use in the Navy, in order to strengthen 
our national defences. By that answer you mean to propose to the Commission that they 
should recommend the Government to take a certain portion of the Welsh coal-field, and 
conserve it purely for the Admiralty, I suppose? – Yes 
Would this rather be in your mind: instead of the Government depending upon private 
sources for their coal supply that they should purchase those sources, and supply themselves 
as they are doing now, but take an area sufficient to last a very much longer period than the 
coal-field is likely to last, with its best coal being sent abroad so profusely as it is at the present 
time? – Yes, say, by putting aside a certain portion and earmarking it for each decade. 
For each year? – Yes, each year if preferred.390 
 
 Mr Heatley’s suggestion is later discounted by another witness, this time from Fife, 
saying that he disagreed with the idea entirely, a stance in which he was kept company by the 
Royal Navy themselves.391 Setting aside some unworked land in the steam coal region of Wales 
was even suggested in the House of Commons, however there was no guarantee that 
underneath the purchased land there would be suitable steam coal and the Admiralty was not 
interested.392 Indeed, even when offered a colliery for purchase the idea was dismissed out of 
                                                 
388 Ibid., p.475. 
389 Although more recent work on this topic is available, one of the most readable and concise summaries of 
the factors leading up to the purchase of 51% of its shares can be found in M. Jack, ‘The Purchase of the 
British Government’s Shares in the British Petroleum Company, 1912 – 1914’, Past & Present, No. 39 (Apr. 
1968), pp.139-168. 
390 Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, Minutes and Evidence (London, 1903), Q. 19383, 19386 
& 19387 
391 Ibid. Q. 21855 (8). 
392 Hansard 4:130:1388, 1 March 1904. Sir Leslie Knowles, the MP for Salford termed the rapidly diminishing 
stocks of steam coal ‘a national danger’ as commended that 10,000 acres of land be set aside – a scheme 
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hand, instead the Admiralty Coal Agent carried on the task of monitoring coal shipments from 
the port and ensuring that they matched the contracts made centrally by the Navy.393 
Approximately thirty-five collieries were on the List of approved suppliers, the 
“Admiralty List” before the War, inclusion on which was seen as a seal of approval and could 
boost demand for that particular variety of coal. Indeed, in 1886, a Commission studying the 
Navy’s procurement heard that: 
 There are some firms from whom we scarcely ever make a purchase; but the reason of that 
is that their principal object is to be upon the Admiralty list; they have a large and ready sale 
for their output, and they quote with no intention of competing.394   
 
 Although the spread of coal purchases was “spread very evenly” amongst collieries, 
although in any given year the individual orders could vary in size.395 Taking 1907 as an 
example, one contract was for only 3,250 tons, whilst another was for 90,000 tons.396 All told 
the Admiralty took fewer than 1.5 million tons of coal in any year before the war (in 1907 it 
was 1.3 million tons out of a total output in South Wales of c. 45 million tons). Whilst it was 
true that the Admiralty constituted an important market for British coal, especially that from 
South Wales, the Royal Navy was not a crucial customer. In the sample year of 1907 only 3% 
of South Wales coal went to the Admiralty, indicating that supplying the Royal Navy was of 
                                                 
suggested in 1902 by no other than the indefatigable D. A. Thomas. The issue was the perception that the best 
coal was being worked out and sent abroad, and that therefore storing some would be sensible. However, this 
relates sole to the sheer amount of coal, rather than the system of purchase, management and shipping thereof.  
393 The Admiralty Coal Agent in South Wales was Harrison, Moore and Harrison prior to 1900, before this was 
adjusted to Messrs. Harrison, Moore & Co. from 1900 – 1909. Interestingly, after this date the Admiralty Coal 
Agent was a firm based in the North East – William Mathwin and Son of Newcastle – who had been the north 
eastern Admiralty Coal Agent for a number of years. Presumably amalgamating the supervisory and monitoring 
functions under one contract was deemed easier, and the north east firm instead nominated agents to do its 
work on behalf of the Admiralty in South Wales.  
394 Parliamentary Papers, Commission on Supply and Contracts to the Navy (London, 1886), Q.23 
395 Ibid. Q. 23. 
396 Parliamentary Papers, Statement showing the total estimated cost of each work, as shown in the Naval Works Act, 1905, 
and as subsequently revised, the estimated expenditure for loan funds thereon during 1907-08 and 1908-09 and the expected date 
of completion (London,1907).  
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marginal importance to the coal trade overall, even if individual colliery firms fought to be on 
the list.  
Being on the approved list of potential contractors was an excellent marketing tool 
and often affected the ability of firms to win other contracts.397 The Commission on Contract 
and Supply to the Navy heard from a number of disgruntled coal merchants and colliery 
owners that omission from the list was a reason for loss of contracts or the ability to tender 
for others:  
The only other point which I wish to mention is the system of admitting the Admiralty list; 
that is the worst fault of all, the this reason, the Admiralty supply a list of coals suitable for 
the Navy to all nations possessing a Navy, and the result is that, though our coal may be as 
good as anybody else’s coal, we are not asked to tender because it is not upon the list. We 
had a case of a Durch Government contract we had held it for several years ourselves, yet 
because out coal is not now upon the Admiralty list the Dutch Government say, ‘We are very 
sorry, but your coal is not upon the Admiralty list,’ and we are excluded.398 
 
 The way that the Admiralty’s contracts were structured was similar to those of other 
coal purchasers, such as overseas depots (see Chapter 6). Large contracts were delivered 
monthly, with a base being that this was evenly split into monthly shipments, although the 
Admiralty had the ability to add or subtract 20% of that monthly shipment at their own 
discretion. This meant that at the most, one-tenth of the total annual contracted amount could 
be delivered in one month, or as little as one-fifteenth. Whilst this helped to ensure a steady 
flow of coal deliveries from the collieries, it also meant that in periods of high prices, the 
Admiralty could struggle to order any additional coal outside of that for which it had already 
contracted that month, as the coal merchants would rather sell on the higher spot market and 
would want to move as little as possible on pre-contracted movements at lower prices. The 
Admiralty Coal Agent could end up traipsing around Cardiff’s docks: 
                                                 
397 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.304. 
398 Parliamentary Papers, Commission on Supply and Contracts to the Navy (London, 1886),  Q.2958 Evidence of Mr 
J. B. Ferrier (Barnyeat and Company) 
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“Round office after office, practically hat in hand to beg for coal. When his own persuasion 
fails he asks Captain Tunnard to accompany him to give ‘moral support’. At times of the worst 
pressure the Director of Contracts goes down to add influence as well.”
399 
 Despite this, however, the Admiralty remained content with the system in place. 
Spreading the purchase of coals around multiple collieries that were on the Admiralty List not 
only ensured that prices remained competitive and that all the colliery firms could feel 
included, but also ensured the widest possible supply in the time of war. A clause in the 
contract to supply the Admiralty with coal included the stipulation that in the event or war or 
emergency (as defined by the Admiralty), the total production of all the pits under contract 
would be at the disposal of the Admiralty for first refusal.400 Indeed, plans from 1900 showed 
that the Cardiff-based Admiralty Coal Agent would dispatch agents to the other South Wales 
ports in times of war in order to ensure fast dispatch and priority was given to all coal on the 
Admiralty account – mobilisation of the fuel supply had essentially been outsourced to private 
businesses.401 In the event, the main issues with supply of coal during the war were not related 
to contractual obligations with other purchasers inhibiting supply to the Admiralty, but a range 
of other factors including rail wagon ownership, miners joining up to serve and, perhaps most 
crucially, the strike in 1915 which precipitated Government takeover of the industry.402 
For the Admiralty’s foreign coaling requirements a number of options were available, 
three of which (given the rather small Admiralty collier fleet of one, sometimes), involved the 
Admiralty Coal Agent chartering vessels. The first was a long-term time-charter, used 
                                                 
399 M.W. Brown, The Royal Navy’s Fuel Supplies, 1898 – 1939: The Transition from Coal to Oil, (unpublished PhD 
thesis, King’s College Longon, 2003), p.23. 
400 Ibid., p.25. 
401 S. Gray, ‘Fuelling Mobility: Coal and Britain’s Naval Power, c. 1870 – 1914’, Journal of Historical Geography 
(2017), p.7. 
402 R.A. Redmayne, The British Coal-Mining History During the War (London, 1923), pp.57–64). As the Navy 
consumed more of the output in wartime than it had in peacetime (roughly half of South Wales’ output) and 
prices rose to reflect the increased demand, merchant shippers moved to cheaper grades of coal instead. See 
C.E. Fayle, War and the Shipping Industry (London, 1927), p.44 and also C.E. Fayle, Seaborne Trade: Volume Three 
(London, 1924), p.78.  
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particularly for shipping larger amounts of coal to overseas stations, where the colliers then 
discharged their coal into shore based stores (or hulks) or directly into the warships. A number 
of firms were involved in this trade (including Witherington and Everett); although overall 
numbers of vessels in any one year on such long-term charters were low; there were five in 
1906, for example.403 Although some firms specialised in this work, with J. T. Duncan (Cardiff) 
ordering two colliers especially in 1912 for the purpose of coaling large warships.404  
A second option was the coastwise charter, which was similarly a time-based charter, 
albeit of shorter duration. Used during manoeuvres which resulted in durations of between a 
fortnight and a month, the colliers would be loaded with Admiralty coal at Cardiff and then 
sent to replenish depots or warships directly in the harbours during the various exercises 
throughout the year.405 The third option is that most similar to those used by the coal 
merchants and the depot owners themselves, the explicit chartering of a vessel from Cardiff 
(usually) to a specified foreign port (which was usually Malta – wherein more coal was issued 
to Royal Navy vessels than at all other overseas stations put together).406 This seems to have 
satisfied the Admiralty’s requirements, with a report in 1905 suggesting that whilst most 
conflicts would require the Navy chartering 100 colliers, over 300 were to be found suitable 
for employment and that fifty nine of these were not only in Cardiff but could deliver coal to 
even the biggest ships directly.407 
The fourth approach, and one used by many foreign navies, was to simply place a 
contract and work with a coal merchant and his agents around the world to provide fuel for 
the ships as required. There were close links between some of the coaling firms and the Royal 
                                                 
403 M.W. Brown, Fuel Supplies, p.29 
404 J.A. Macrae & C.V. Waine, The Steam Collier Fleets (Wolverhampton, 1990), p.73. 
405 M.W. Brown, Fuel Supplies, p.30 
406 Ibid., p.30. 
407 Ibid.., p.30. 
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Navy. Whittall and Co., for example, had contracts with the British and French navies and T. 
B. Rees and Co to supply the Dutch and German fleets at certain locations.408 Similarly at some 
locations private coaling concerns leased land off the Navy to store coals destined for use in 
Navy steamers (amongst others).409 
Other navies had a much harder time supplying their ships with coals than the British, 
especially when the British were not being co-operative. Through denying use of British coal 
(and indeed, British coaling stations) the Russian Baltic Fleet on its doomed trip to the Pacific 
in 1905, Britain caused significant inconvenience and delay.410 Britain’s dominance of the world 
shipping infrastructure is clear: “How were we to continue when there was not a single port 
on our route where we could coal or re-victual unmolested?” lamented one Russian sailor.411 
Britain’s control of coaling not only affected the Russians however. In 1907 – 1909 
sixteen American battleships circumnavigated the world. However with only eight colliers in 
US Navy hands, it was forced to use one Austro—Hungarian collier, seven Norwegian and 
forty-one British colliers in support – even to extent of relying on the British collier fleet to 
bring them coal in their own port of Honolulu.412 A logistical error by the American Bureau 
of supply left the Americans in Australia without coal and the British Admiralty refused to 
offer naval supplies as standard practice.413 Similar errors occurred at Port Said where the US 
                                                 
408 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements Agreement between G Whittall 
& Co, T. B. Rees & Co., N. L. Poudapoulos & S. E. Canavas (1897). Interestingly supplies for all the other 
national fleets were to be supplied alternately by members of the combine.  
409 For example, the Navy, itself leasing from the Governor of the Seychelles, provided extensive land to Cory 
Brothers for the storage of coals. Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, 
Correspondence with the Royal Navy re: Seychelles.  
410 S. Gray, ‘Fuelling Mobility’. p.7. 
411 A. Novikoff-Priboy, Tsushima, (New York, 1937), p.48. 
412 S. Gray, ‘Fuelling Mobility’, p.8. 
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Navy ended up scrounging around private merchants and dealers for coal supplies, rather than 
having a scheduled delivery awaiting them.414 
Therefore with regard to the Royal Navy and its supply, the reliance on the private 
businesses of the coal trade appears to have been relatively benign for the British, although 
somewhat problematic for that of other nations: 
 Although the number of organisation involved, and the fact that most were commercial 
interest, added to the complexity of supply…in general this relationship between state and 
private enterprise appears to have been largely unproblematic, yet it does highlight how state 
power was very much contingent on commercial mobilities and infrastructure, necessarily 
underpinned by networks of trust and security.415 
 
In essence, it appears to have been the nationality of the supplier which mattered; the 
Navy safe in its knowledge that British firms would not be able to trade with foreign navies 
whilst they were at war. With Britain controlling the best steam coal (in Welsh steam coal and, 
later, New Zealand coal), the world’s coaling infrastructure and even the vast majority of ships 
suitable for moving coal from place to place, this guarantee was enough to potentially hobble 
any opponent should the need arise.416 
Thus from the perspective of both the coal trade and the Admiralty there was no 
Navy/Coal complex. Important as naval demand for coal was, it was never more than a small 
percentage of total output and did not dominate the usage of either colliers or coaling stations. 
A small number of firms made a business of supplying the navy but the overwhelming majority 
did not. Similarly, the Admiralty resisted pressure to take control of mines to ensure supplie 
either at the time or in the future. It also resisted any tendency for it to own and manage a 
fleet of colliers or too many of its own coaling stations, preferring to rely where possible on 
                                                 
414 R.A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage Around the World, 1907 – 1909, (Boston, 1965) p. 198. 
415 S. Gray, ‘Fuelling Mobility’, p.6. 
416 There is of course the issue of an armed naval ship simply taking coal by force, which was considered by the 
Navy as an issue that might potentially be problematic. For example, Admiral Colomb lectured on this in 1880 
– see: Sir J.C.R. Colomb, The Defence of Great and Greater Britain (London, 1880) whilst the expenses prepared in 
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those owned and managed privately. Unlike other navies the Admiralty could rely on the 
network of privately owned British coaling stations, and the supplies they carried, to keep itself 
stocked with the vital coal its latest ships required.   
However, whilst the Admiralty was content to let the private sector carry on and supply 
it without significant interference beyond some contract clauses, the Exchequer was eyeing 
coal exports covetously as an approach with potential to help plug a gap in the nation’s budget. 
The extra expense of the Boer War resulted in the British Government needing to find some 
funds to help reduce the deficit caused not only by rising Army and Navy costs, but also 
through general expenditure on items such as education, and had ramifications through the 
rest of the pre-War period.417 
The Chancellor sought, in presenting his budget for March 1901, to place a 1s per ton 
tax on all coal exported from the United Kingdom. Rumours of the proposal led the Chamber 
of Commerce in Cardiff to have its most well-attended meeting in its history.418 The 
Chancellor, in defending his tax plans, echoed the thoughts of many (including those who 
suggested that the Admiralty should be given some first rate steam coal land) who felt that 
Britain was perhaps exporting too much coal, and that some ought to be better kept for future 
generations: 
But supposing the increase in the export trade of coal in this country was checked, 
supposing it was even diminished, I am not quite sure that even that result would be an 
unmixed evil. What would happen? Either that the coal would continue to be produced, in 
which case it would be sold more cheaply to the consumer here, or it would not continue to 
be produced, and it would be husbanded for future consumption.419 
 
                                                 
417 A.L. Freidburg, ‘Britain Faces the Burdens of Empire: The Financial Crisis of 1901 – 1905’, War and Society, 
5:2, pp.15-37 offers an excellent, concise summary of how planned austerity didn’t quite achieve its aims, 
despite the coal export and sugar import duties. The main issue (as in the previous footnote), being the expense 
of the Navy and Army. 
418 Glamorgan Archives, DCOMC/1/3/1 – Cardiff Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, 1901 (1902).  
419 Hansard, House of Commons Debate 18 April 1901 vol. 92 c.644. 
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The Chancellor (Sir Michael Hick Beach) proceeded to clarify that whilst he was not a 
believer that Britain was running out of coal, but that if it was then that could be an additional 
benefit of the tax, which instead would tax coal owners, who were well-placed to pay such a 
tax. This initial proposal was met with widespread concern in the industry on two fronts. 
Indeed, D. A. Thomas spoke in the debate regarding the imposition of the sugar import tax 
with regard to the first of them: 
I as a coal sale agent have entered into contract, and the foreign consumer will not 
pay the duty on them…With regard to the contract which have already been entered into, the 
imposition of the duty will be a very serious matter to the middlemen and merchants of 
Cardiff and Newport, and will practically mean ruin to the small man. He is not a producer 
of coal himself; he makes contracts for hundreds of thousands of tons, on which he sees a 
probably profit of 3d or 6d per ton. After he has made his contract the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer comes along and says he must pay a duty of 1s per ton. This is not a question 
which will affect coal-owners and miners only – it is really a duty upon tonnage, the right 
hon. Gentleman says he is not going to put the duty upon bunkers, but he is going to put it 
on all coal exported from this country, whether used on boats sailing under the British flag 
or not. A very large proportion of the coal exported from this country is used by British ships 
and British subjects abroad. A French boat coming into Newport to take bunkers on board 
and to sail to Malta will pay no duty at all upon those bunkers, but a British boat, sailing under 
the British flag, coaled by British people in Malta, and coming from Malta back to Newport, 
will have to pay 1s a ton upon that coal. Where does the principle come in? The right hon. 
Gentleman says the foreign consumer will have to pay. In this case the foreigner is let off 
free, whilst the British subject has to pay.420 
 
The issue of existing contracts would prove to be one on which compromise would 
be found. Under significant lobbying in both the House of Commons from coal-owning 
districts (D. A. Thomas, Sir W. Harcourt, Mr S. T. Evens and Mr A. Thomas were all MPs 
from coal related constituencies who joined the battle) and also from bodies directly related 
to the coal industry, the Chancellor agreed that all existing contracts entered into before the 
announcement of the tax in the Budget would be free of the duty until the end of December 
1901.421 The other compromise that was given to the industry was that the tax would not apply 
to loads of small coals when the price fell to 6s per ton (f.o.b.).422 D. A. Thomas’ other point, 
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regarding the issue of coaling stations was also considered, with a proposed amendment to the 
bill clarifying that coal exported to coaling stations was still affected by the tax (by Mr Warr, 
MP for East Toxteth in Liverpool). However the amendment was not carried forward, as it 
was felt that the existing wording of the Bill was clear enough.423 
However, whilst the industry was fervently against the imposition of the tax, the 
budget passed the House of Commons with a large majority; whilst a motion taken to the 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce Annual Meeting by the Newcastle Chamber 
on behalf of Cardiff and Newcastle complaining against the tax and urging its discontinuation 
was defeated quite squarely by around 200 votes to 5 in favour.424 Indeed, more general 
reaction to the tax was muted, and whilst its imposition had stirred up a fuss in the House and 
sent letters to the Times prophesying a retaliatory trade war, generally the Chancellor’s 
compromise on small coals and existing contracts had assuaged his opponents. 425 Although 
such a decision had had a cost; the concessions reduced the estimated yield of the tax by 
£800,000 – and yet as soon as the following year the tax was being held as a success, as it had 
yielded £1,305,000 during 1901-02 and that far from reducing coal exports, it was instead a 
year of good exports and that the tax “has not produced the evil effects prophesied of it.”426  
By way of contrast, the Royal Economic Society was not particularly enamoured with 
the tax, its Economic Journal stating; 
A much more doubtful case is presented by the new export duty on coal. Amongst the 
objections which may be made to this impost there are: - 
                                                 
423 Hansard; House of Commons Debate 25 June 1901 vol. 95 cc. 1495. For the record, the concern was the 
replacement of the phrase “in pursuance of [contracts]” with “for the purpose of fulfilling [contracts]” which it 
was thought better described the process used by coaling station wherein some coal was bought in without a 
definite buyer for later sale. 
424 Glamorgan Archives, DCOMC/1/3/1 – Cardiff Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, 1901 (1902). 
425 A letter from Prof. A. Marshall to the Times for example (22 April 1901); reprinted in The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 11., No 42 (Jun, 1901), pp.265–267: upon reflecting as to this factor, he concludes ‘My doubts have never 
been resolved; but I admire the courage of the Chancellor.” 
426 F.R. Fairchild, ‘The Financing of the South African War’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 20, Finance (Nov., 1902), pp.60–84.  
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1) The uncertainty of yield – the export trade in coal in notoriously fluctuating, and 
it is easy to conceive circumstances in which the duty would prove a most disappointing 
one.  
 
2) Again, the incidence (if so old-fashioned a term may be allowed) of the tax is 
uncertain. Mine-owners, lessees, miners, shippers, foreign consumers will each and all 
believe that the incidence is altogether on themselves, while Jevons may be right in 
holding that the real charge would be on the consumers of imported commodities.427 
In fact, the tracing of the incidence of an export duty is one of the hardest of problems. 
A natural consequence is the magnifying of the apparent, as compared with the real, 
pressure of the tax. A moderate charge will seem to be paid two of three times over, 
and this erroneous feeling is one of the elements that should be considered in estimating 
the evils of a tax.  
 
3) The duty may produce its principal effect by checking British trade at 
competitive points, and hence reducing profits without making any contribution to the 
revenue. The best that can be said in favour of the tax is that it is very moderate in 
amount, and that increasing exports of coal are not altogether advantageous. But it must 
be confessed that its probable removal in the near future need not be a cause for 
sorrow.428 
 
However, it is hardly a stinging rebuke to the Chancellor. The real issue was who was 
to be responsible for paying the coal tax, and where that was perceived to fall, be it on foreign 
buyers or the people of Britain through increased charges for coal or foreign imports.  
The coal trade was not to be defeated quite so easily, however. The Cardiff Chamber 
of Commerce sought to have coal exporters represented on the Royal Commission for Coal 
Supplies, given how important the export of South Wales coal was to both the question 
regarding British coal supplies, but also as it was seen as being a way to raise questions and 
issues with regard to the coal tax.429 The Chancellor was not to be moved however; “I am to 
remind the Chamber that the export of Coal forms a comparatively small part of the enquiries 
entrusted to the Commission which will be mainly concerned with the larger subject of our 
coal supply.”430 The Chancellor went to accept that whilst the Commission might not directly 
represent coal exporters who were only intermediaries between home producers and foreign 
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buyers, enough people on the Commission were suitably qualified to discuss the export trade 
with knowledge and experience. 
However, aside from a lowering in price of small coals from around 7s to always being 
6s or less, there ensuring reports from the Chamber regarding the tax are not particularly 
negative about the tax, aside from wishing it to be gone.431 There is some concern over German 
trade in France taking some customers that had previously been Welsh coal purchasers, but in 
1904 Foreign Exports increased by over half a million tonnes on the previous year, aided by 
the war between Russia and Japan.432 The Chancellor had envisaged that the duty would not 
have a significant impact, citing the example of the previous coal export duty in the 1840s: 
When Sir Robert Peel imposed this tax in 1841 the representatives of the coal-
owners, as anyone who refers to the debates of that and succeeding years will find put 
forward precisely the same arguments as to the ruin of their trade as are put forward today. 
And yet what happened? Why, the export of coal, under a tax of 2s a ton on large coal and 
of 1s a ton on small coal – more than double what I now propose – was actually increased 
in the year 1843 under that tax as compared with what it was in 1841, before the tax was 
imposed.433 
 
However, H. H. Asquith, the newly elected Liberal Chancellor was taken to task in 
1906 for repealing the coal export duty (on the advice of the Royal Commission into Coal 
Supplies) as it was felt in the House generally that tax relief on tea (which would have affected 
38,000,000 people as opposed to helping coal merchants) was more desirable.434 The industry 
was happy that the tax had been removed, although again, whether or not it needed to be was 
a question, given that 1906 was a record year for coal exports, despite there being no Russo-
Japanese War to boost demand, and with a significant increase in the amount of coal shipped 
to France.435 “The removal of the Coal Tax…also had a beneficial influence, although the 
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impost was taken off too late in the year to benefit the trade of that particular period to any 
great extent.”436 
 That the tax was repealed was no doubt a result of continuous questioning and 
agitating on the part of the coal trade: letters to MPs, letters in the Times and submissions to 
the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies all claimed that the industry had been egregiously 
harmed by the imposition of the shilling a ton charge.437 Yet this influence had not been 
enough to avoid the imposition of the tax in the first place. Special pleading for extra 
representation of the coal export trade on the Commission was explicitly turned down by the 
Chancellor, suggesting that despite the noise and heat generated by some of the trade’s loudest 
voices in the House of Commons (such as D. A. Thomas) there was not any real undue 
influence of the coal trade in Parliament. What influence there was achieved the removal of a 
tax on coal exports, not the introduction of protection for British coal or special privileges for 
the coal trade. 
When combined with the general ‘hands off’ approach of the Admiralty to the supply 
of coal to the Navy, the coal trade does appear to have been an area where the Government 
felt it best to leave well alone – with legislation on shipping, railways and mining instead doing 
the basic duty of ensuring safety for workers. As the trade was the successfully matching of 
coal demand and coal supply, albeit at a complex and worldwide scale, the Government was 
content to leave the systems in place that already evolved. Although there was the Commission 
on Coal Supplies, to try and definitively answer how much coal was left in the UK, once this 
had reported that there was no cause for alarm, one of the main reasons given for more 
extensive Government involvement in the industry had disappeared, namely that the 
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Admiralty needed a specialist supply to be reserved for it. Instead the Government could rely 
on the trade to fill its evolving and changing demands dynamically, without the issues of 
ownership of a coal mine or several. 
Indeed, in its small niche, the coal trade remains a trade that was left without overly 
intrusive interaction with, influence in or control from Westminster in either direction, despite 
the Government being its largest single customer. This is with the notable exception of a raid 
from the Treasury on the trade’s profits for a number of years, although it does not appear to 
have had too averse an effect on the direction and size of the trade on a broader scale. 
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 “There are some subjects of great national importance, which are of so uninviting a character, 
that even the statesman and politicians are apt to recoil from their discussion, whilst the great mass of 
the people can only be induced at intervals, and after long agitation, to take a transitory interest in their 
consideration, Merchant Shipping stands unhappily in this category.” 438 
 
Chapter Five: The Role of Coaling Stations 
 
Steam-shipping, as it rose to a dominant position in the late nineteenth century and 
gradually replaced sail on longer and longer routes, was joined by a growing worldwide 
network of coaling stations to feed the insatiable boilers of the growing world fleet. The first 
coaling stations were set up on the Atlantic coast of the United States, American coal being 
somewhat of an unknown quantity compared to the reliability and quality of British steam 
coal.439 However, as American coal soon proved itself, coaling stations were somewhat 
unnecessary in the North Atlantic, given the large supplies of quality coal at either end of the 
journey. 
Instead coaling stations would prosper in locations where native coal was in short 
supply or entirely absent all together. Here was a location that the British coal trade could seek 
to supply. A particular example is that of the Canary Islands, which not only lacked a supply 
of coal, but also brought together the routes to/from South America, West Africa and 
Australasia, funnelling them up towards Western Europe. In 1912 approximately 1,250, 000 
tons of coal was imported, which it can be safely assumed was destined for steamship bunkers, 
as the islands lacked local industry which would require substantial coal imports. Furthermore, 
                                                 
438 W.S. Lindsay, Our Merchant Shipping: its present state considered (London, 1859), p.1. 
439 F.M. Binder, ‘Pennsylvania Coal and the Beginnings of American Steam Navigation’, The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct., 1959), p.433. 
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despite this lack of industry, over 7,000 steamships (representing around 16,000,000 net tons) 
called at the Canaries that year.440 
However, the creation of a network of coaling stations around the world was neither 
instantaneous nor planned. As steam ships developed to become capable of longer 
movements, the network spread to accommodate them. Thus agents for the various and 
nascent coaling firms could first be found in Hamburg and along the north European coast, 
before spreading to the Mediterranean ports as steam shipping simultaneously made inroads 
to the dominance of sailing vessels on these routes in the mid nineteenth century. The Suez 
Canal again provides an important marker in this trend; Port Said would grow to receive over 
a million tonnes of coal annually to support the steam-shipping using the Canal.441   
Similarly, Stemmer has noted that the increase in exports of coal to South America 
closely follows the establishment of steamship services, starting with Brazil and then spreading 
to the Rio de la Plata countries. This expansion in steam-shipping displaced a large amount of 
sailing tonnage, which could be used to ship the coal from Britain to South America, as the 
tramp steamer only became competitive in this market in the 1880s.442  This is shown by the 
export of coal (in metric tonnes) rose from an index of 4 in 1840 to 100 in 1870, before 
increasing to 805.4 by 1910.443  
Thus it was that coaling stations and steam-shipping extended in a symbiotic 
relationship across the world - following world trade and the requirements of the shipping 
industry. It is important to recognise (but not overstate) the role that the Royal Navy had in 
                                                 
440 A.J. Sargent, Seaways of Empire, (London, 1918), p.4. Although Sargent admits that 1912 was a somewhat 
abnormal year in terms of imports: a round million tons of coal is perhaps a more normal figure, with a 
consequent decrease in tonnage calling at the ports to around 12,000,000 net tons. 
441 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction, p.469. 
442 J.E.O. Stemmer, ‘Freight Rates’, p.43. 
443 Ibid., p.30 
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this expansion; as the Navy’s coaling needs were met mostly from commercial coaling stations, 
with certain exceptions (such as Gibraltar).  
 Harley has written a number of papers on the export of British coal and spread of 
steam-shipping the latter nineteenth century, which are generally dismissive of the role played 
by coaling stations:444 
After 1850 steamers only gradually displaced sailing ships on longer voyages 
because the length of a voyage increased the proportion of capacity that had to be 
devoted to fuel. Coaling stations along the route alleviated the problem only slightly 
during most of the period since the coal used in ocean navigation came almost entirely 
from British coal fields. Any savings realised from freeing cargo space were effectively 
offset by the higher price of coal at coaling stations such as Aden.445 
 
 This argument can be broken down into three segments, which shall be discussed each 
in turn. Firstly, as was indicated in Chapter 3, freight rates varied widely by product, with coal’s 
role as an alternative to ballast resulting in a significant discount. Thus the idea that the cost 
of coal rose at coaling stations to a level matching or exceeding the value of the cargo space 
freed is not necessarily correct, depending on the cargo carried. Cardiff coal could be carried 
to San Francisco for eight shillings a ton, whilst the return cargo would be valued at thirty, 
forty or fifty shillings a ton.446 Thus not only had the ship made eight shillings more per ton 
towards the cost of the outward leg than if it had done the same journey carrying sand or 
gravel, but it also had provided fuel (at a low transport cost) for the journey back. 
Simultaneously, it had also created more space for the more valuable return cargo as less 
capacity was required for bunkers. With such a low freight cost, the cost of coal at coaling 
stations was not necessarily that far in advance of the cost of coal in Cardiff, depending upon 
                                                 
444 Harley’s papers under discussion are: C.K. Harley, ‘The Shift from sailing ships’, C.K. Harley, ‘Ocean 
Freight Rates’ & C.K. Harley, ‘Coal Export’. 
445 C.K. Harley, ‘Ocean Freight Rates’ ’ p. 863. 
446 J.R. Smith, Ocean Commerce, p.17. 
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the importance of the trade route served and the consequent number of ships competing for 
a cargo from Cardiff to the foreign destination.  
Coal at Port Said was therefore barely twice the price of coal at Cardiff ($5.10 per ton 
compared to $2.52 per ton) which, in turn, was cheaper than the price of coal at Savona, Italy 
($5.25) or Rønne, Denmark ($5.50), despite them being closer to Wales. Indeed, prices at the 
far east of the Mediterranean and South America could often be remarkably similar. A ton of 
Welsh coal could be purchased for $7.68 in Salonica, Turkey (modern day Thessaloniki in 
Greece) or for $7.92 in Santos or $7.98 in Rio de Janerio.447  
 W. S. Lindsay, the famous shipowner, had it as a rule of thumb to not load too heavily with 
coal on the outbound leg: 
Whatever may be gained by not requiring to stop at any intermediate port I 
consider it a mistake, in a commercial point of view, to suppose any advantage is to be 
derived from taking on board a steamship, especially when engaged on foreign voyages, 
sufficient coal to carry her out and home. The space the coals occupy in a steamer ought 
to be of more value for the reception of cargo than the cost of sending coals in sailing 
vessels to the ports abroad where required, and than any loss sustained by the expense 
and detention of shipping them there. for the entire voyage.448 
 
However, the “ought” in that quotation demonstrates that it is not perhaps a cast iron 
rule as much as guidance. If the route that the tramp was operating on offers the possibility of 
coaling at several different locations (which nearly all long distance routes did), then the 
question becomes as to whether the steamer should stop frequently for coal and carry the 
greatest possible amount of freight or should it instead carry fewer tonnes of freight and 
instead carry more tonnes of coal from the most favourable purchase place: 
That question is answered by comparing the profit derived from carrying the extra 
tons of freight, with the loss from buying en route the extra tons of coal that are made 
necessary. The changing price of coal and the changing profits from freights, and the 
difference in coal price at different stations make this a fluctuating balance. If the profit 
                                                 
447 Prices in this paragraph taken from US Navy, Coaling Stations of the World (New York, 1888). 
448  W. S. Lindsay writing in 1874, quoted in W.E. Minchinton, ‘British Ports of Call in the Nineteenth 
Century’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 62:2, pp.145 - 158. 
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in carrying a ton of freight from New York to Australia is $5 per ton, and the loss in 
purchasing coal from Cape Verde rather than New York is $4 per ton and at Cape Town 
$8 per ton, the steamer will probably coal at Cape Verde and pass Cape Town. If the 
freight profit drops to $3, and the Cape Verde coal margin remains at $4, the coal will 
most likely be secured at New York for the entire voyage. Decisions of this character 
make constant fluctuations in coaling practice.449 
 
 Therefore, if we return to Harley’s argument, which argues that ‘any savings realised 
from freeing cargo space were effectively offset by the higher price of coal at coaling stations’, 
we can see that this is based on two inaccuracies. Firstly, it treats each journey as a one way 
trip. But if the outbound journey is taken into account alongside the inward, then provided 
the money made from the transport of the coal to either the far end of the route or an 
intermediate stop (as opposed to making the journey in ballast), when combined with the 
profit from the extra cargo imported to the UK (in the place of the extra bunkers required to 
avoid stopping), exceeded the cost of re-fuelling at a coaling station, then there was an increase 
in the net profit. Secondly, it also treats freight rates as a single figure which increased relative 
to distance from the original location. Yet freight rates for coal were not the same as the freight 
rates for other goods, due to its role as a replacement for ballast, and furthermore, they did 
not necessarily increase in line with distance from the UK, but were additionally linked to the 
proximity of profitable return freight sources. 
Furthermore, not all tramp steamers travelled a direct route between Britain and some 
other location before returning, to enable such a simple approach to be applied in all instances. 
This is the second aspect about Harley’s argument that needs to be re-assessed when the focus 
is broadened to the worldwide shipping trade. Sargent’s detailed work from 1918 discussing 
the structure of the pre-war trade, and that of his American counterpart Smith on the tramp 
and charter trade demonstrate this. 450 Indeed, as the speed of communication increased with 
                                                 
449  J.R. Smith, Ocean Commerce, p.64.. 
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the development of the telegraph, tramps became ever less tied to specific ports and routes as 
their orders could be changed at each port of call. The spread of the telegraph was relatively 
rapid and for merchants based in Western Europe’s commercial and industrial centres, it 
allowed for much better integration of markets to meet supply and demand. The spread is 
shown in the table below:   
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Time (in days) for Information to Travel from Selected Locations 
to London (and year of connection to telegraph network)451 
 
From 
Surface Mail 
(1866 - 69) 
Via Telegraph 
(1870 onwards) 
Year of Connection 
(inter-continental 
system) 
Australia (Sydney) 60 4 1876 
New Zealand 65 4 1876 
Asia    
Bombay 29 3 1870 
Calcutta 35 3 1872 
Hong Kong 51 3 1871 
Madras 40 3 1870 
Shanghai 56 4 1870 
Yokohama 70 5 1871 
Africa    
Alexandria 11 2 1868 
Capetown 30 4 1868 
Lagos 12 3 1886 
Madeira 8 2 1874 
North America    
Galveston 17 3 1866 
Montreal 14 2 1866 
New Orleans 17 3 1866 
New York 14 2 1866 
Central America    
Barbados 26 4 1868 
Havanna 24 4 1868 
                                                 
451 Table from J. Ahvenainen, ‘Telegraphs, Trade and Policy. The Role of the International Telegraphs in the 
Years 1870 – 1914’, pp. 505 – 518, 1900’ in E. Fischer, M.N. McInnis & J. Schneider (eds.), Emergence of a World 
Economy. 
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From 
Surface Mail 
(1866 - 69) 
Via Telegraph 
(1870 onwards) 
Year of Connection 
(inter-continental 
system) 
Jamaica 25 4 1868 
South America    
Baia (Bahia) 15 3 1873 
Buenos Aires 32 3 1875 
Colombo 33 3 1875 
Natal 36 4 1875 
Rio de Janeiro 30 3 1875 
Valparaiso 46 4 1875 
    
 
As an example of this, it was common for ships carrying wheat and maize from 
Argentina to be consigned “for orders” rather than with a fixed destination. The same 
happened for grain ships from Australia, or ships coming from California via Cape Horn. In 
these case the ships would instead call in to Las Palmas or Tenerife, at which point they would 
be instructed as to where the best price for their cargo could be found.452 This, essentially, 
enabled the mass expansion of tramp shipping by providing the flexibility needed.453 Given 
that over half of the British fleet was involved in tramp shipping in 1913, the ability to respond 
to changing market conditions and source both cargoes and destinations enabled much of 
Britain’s maritime activity.454 
Despite the importance of Britain’s fleet in terms of world trade, it is misleading to 
assume that this meant an increasing number of ships calling at British ports. Whilst Britain’s 
                                                 
452 W.E. Minchinton, ‘British Ports of Call’, pp.148-158. 
453 See, for example, L. Scholl, ‘The Global Communications Industry’ p.200 or S.P. Ville, Development of the 
European Economy, p.94.  
454 See R. Thornton, British Shipping, (Cambridge, 1939) or A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping.  
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merchant fleet may have possessed 63% of the world’s carrying capacity by 1890, this does 
not mean that all these ships called regularly at Britain.455 Indeed, 20% of British registered 
tonnage seldom or never called at British ports.456 This is not to mention the significant 
number of steamships which were registered to other countries which also did not regularly 
call at UK ports. 
Indeed, Lloyds tracked the movement of 60,000 ships continuously by the mid-
1870s.457 This ability to instantly communicate and change anent the latest market information 
was responsible (in addition to the new direct routes through the Suez Canal to Europe) for 
the decline of London’s dominance as Europe’s entrepôt facility and shipping marshalling 
point.458 Thus with ships freed to compete on a purely bilateral basis, the age of the tramp 
steamer had truly arrived, and ships could not return to London for years. For example, a 
steamer could make a living taking coal from Australia to India, then textiles to South Africa, 
before taking coal over to South America. Then it could transport wheat from Argentina to 
continental Europe before finally taking manufactured goods back to Australia; each step 
being directed by London-based clerks, without the need for the ships to call into Great Britain 
at all. Therefore, Harley’s argument that it was cheaper to fill bunkers with cheap coal in Britain 
for the duration of its time away from its shores cannot have been true, as if so the shipowners 
would have engineered schedules resulting in regular, if not alternate, stops in Britain for 
bunkering purposes. In that instance it would result in huge amounts of trade coming through 
                                                 
455 R. Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990), p.307. 
456 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, p.339. 
457 R.C. Michie, ‘The City of London and International Trade 1850 – 1914’ in D.C.M. Platt, (ed.), Decline and 
Recovery in Britain’s Overseas Trade, 1873 – 1914 (London, 1993), p.42. 
458 Ibid., p. 43 & M. Fletcher, ‘The Suez Canal’, p. 566; A. Lewis, ‘The Rate of Growth of World Trade, 1830 – 
1973’ in S. Grassman, & E. Lundberg, (eds.), The World Economic Order: Past and Prospects (London, 1981) pp.38-
65 & R. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875 – 1914 (Philadelphia, 1933), pp.67–69. 
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Britain as steamers stopped for coal – which clearly did not happen as illustrated by London’s 
declining role as an entrepôt.  
Consequently, not all steamships were coming to Britain to take on coal in direct 
exchange for another bulky good on a bilateral basis, and whilst this approach was significant 
in affecting the course of the coal export trade, it would be foolish to overestimate it; instead 
they were loading up for the first leg of a long and complicated journey. Thus, coal also formed 
an important export in its own right, as part of the network of trade; not only to coaling 
stations to provide ships not travelling to or from countries blessed with natural and 
convenient steam coal resources but also to nations such as France and Italy which had to 
import fuel for their own industrial revolutions. A common route would be to take coal from 
British shores to the Mediterranean (usually to Italy or coaling stations on the Suez route) 
before travelling, in ballast, over to South America and picking up grain to bring back to the 
UK.459 The transport of coal did not, necessarily, require an immediate return cargo, as often 
the import was required anyway. Like Cape Verde or the Canary Islands, ships could travel 
there with coal, drop it, and then carry on in ballast to destinations, provided (as earlier 
demonstrated with the example of Madeira) that freights were high enough to cover the costs 
of the period spent ‘running light’. A very good example of this is similar to the one outlined 
above. Having dropped off coal at Genoa or Port Said ships, rather than return in ballast to 
the UK for another load of coal, would instead scatter across the Eastern Mediterranean or 
the Indian Ocean in search of another cargo (the latter course favoured by low charges levied 
on ships traversing the Suez Canal in ballast).460  
                                                 
459 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.456. 
460 A.J. Sargent, Seaways, p.58. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 170 
Harley’s argument is also based on the point that ‘the coal used in ocean navigation 
came almost entirely from British coal fields’.461 Therefore ‘there would be no net gain [in 
using a coaling station] since that freight earned on cargo would have to be immediately paid 
out in the higher cost of coal freighted to overseas bunker stations.’462 Essentially the price of 
coal at a coaling station is equal to the cost of coal in Britain plus the cost of freight. It has 
already been established that coal freight rates were uniquely low due to its status as 
replacement for ballast and that it is important to look at the entirety of the tramp’s journey 
rather than treating each leg as a unique event. Harley’s hypothesis is also inaccurate for bunker 
coal was increasingly provided by other countries as the industrial revolution gathered pace. 
Australia, South Africa, America and even India (despite being a net importer of coal) all 
provided coal for bunkering purposes, the first three in relatively significant amounts.  In 
South Africa, for example, Wales went from supplying Capetown with 200,000 tons of steam 
coal in 1882, and 700,000 tons in 1902 (when trade peaked) to a mere 50,000 tons in 1912, 
despite the growing amount of bunkers shipped from the port (1,400,000 tons in that same 
year).463 Therefore it was perfectly plausible for ships to access relatively cheap coal (or at least, 
coal could be bought for less than the money earned by freights for extra cargo) all over the 
world, as there were multiple sources of bunker coal. Whilst, as Sturmey indicates, Welsh coal 
remained competitive despite other production centres due to its higher thermal energy, better 
calorific value and thus greater efficiency for steaming), it was increasingly selling alongside 
other, frequently cheaper, varieties.464 Indeed, the Indian Ocean, by 1913, was essentially off-
limits to British bunker coal exports apart from Welsh coal for the Royal and foreign navies 
                                                 
461 C. K. Harley, ‘Ocean Freight Rates’, p.863. 
462 C.K. Harley, ‘The Shift from sailing ships’, p.217. 
463 A.J. Sargent, Seaways, p. 25. 
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and some of the liner firms. This was mainly due to the charges of the Suez Canal, which made 
Welsh coal prohibitively expensive when compared with coals from South Africa, India, Japan 
and Australia, which didn’t have to pay such tariffs.465 Whilst numerically, the 750,000 tons of 
British coal sent to the Indian Ocean in 1912 sounds significant, it is still less than one seventh 
of the capacity of British traffic traversing the canal with cargo.466 
As can be seen, if the exports of British and Australian coal are looked at in the eastern 
trade, then Australian coal clearly comes to be the dominant partner as of the turn of the 
twentieth century, however after a certain point it plateaus and then rebounds a little. This 
suggests that as long as coal was used in the region, there would be a demand for Welsh coal 
from some users (liner firms, some railways and the Royal Navy and other navies), as well as 
a supply (sailing ships travelling around Cape of Good Hope using coal as an alternative to 
ballast for example).  
 
  
                                                 
465 H.S. Jevons, British Coal Trade, p.687 & D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.493. 
466 A.J. Sargent, Seaways, pp.58-59 
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Figure 5.1: Coal Exports from N.S.W. and the U.K. to Identical Markets:1861 – 1901 
(Sample Years)467 
 
 
Indeed, Wegerich has established how British coal was gradually reduced in its export 
markets of India and South Africa from the 1880s onwards, a finding which corroborates the 
earlier work of Thomas.468 
Using a large set of bunker coal price data from stations across the globe, Wegerich shows 
how the high premium prices charged by Welsh coal at stations overseas was gradually 
eradicated as domestic supplies become available. In particular, he looks at the examples of 
India and South Africa as countries which both received significant coal tonnages from the 
                                                 
467 Figures taken from Burley, K. H., ‘The Overseas Trade in New South Wales Coal and The British Shipping 
Industry, 1860 – 1914’, The Economic Record, Volume 36, Aug. 1960, p. 404. U.K. Figures up to 1903 are from 
D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’ and relate to India, the Far East, the Pacific Islands and the Pacific 
Coast of the Americas. The later UK figures are extrapolated from the Coal Tables series of Parliamentary 
Papers. The N.S.W. figures are all exports minus those to New Zealand. 1912 Figures are affected by the 
National Coal Strike in Great Britain. Interestingly NSW coal in South America was benefitting from a similar 
arrangement as the British equivalent – namely as a ballast alternative, although in this instance it was a three-
legged affair. Ships with general cargo from Europe would arrive in Australia, take New South Wales coal to 
the west coast of South America (the east coast was still solidly British in terms of its coal supply) and then ship 
fertilisers or grain back to Europe from there. See M. Clark, ‘Bound Out for Callao! The Pacific Coal Trade 
1876 – 1896: Selling Coal or Selling Lives?’, The Great Circle Vol. 28, No. 2, (2006) pp.26–45. 
468 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.493. Thomas established that the only British coal exports to India 
were those to Bombay and Karachi, with Calcutta having ‘long since been completely lost to us’. He was less 
impressed with Natal coal, however: ‘The local coal is very inferior, but its far lower price may possibly make it 
a formidable competitor in the future.’ 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 173 
UK whilst simultaneously having a domestic coal industry. Indeed, India provides an 
interesting example as supplies from Cardiff arrived into the west (Karachi and Bombay) 
whereas the Bengal mines (which supplied c. 2m out of the 2.75m tonnes produced in India 
in 1894)  were located nearer the eastern cities of Calcutta and Colombo.469 As could therefore 
be expected, Calcutta ceased importing significant amounts of Welsh coal by 1879 whilst 
Karachi and Bombay offered Cardiff coals until 1916 and 1917 respectively.470 This was due 
to both the quality difference and that transport costs from the domestic mines remained 
relatively high during the period, whereas British coals (the price of which was, as already 
established, related strongly to the amount which Britain was importing from the nearby area 
or the amount of tonnage passing) remained comparatively cheap for the distance travelled. 
Indeed, between 1904 and the outbreak of war the price difference between Welsh and Indian 
coals (adjusted for quality) at Karachi and Bombay remained within +/- 0.05%.471 
 South Africa, though similar to India in importing Welsh coal whilst also developing 
a domestic industry, differs in that coal from the Natal area was of high enough quality to be 
used for bunkering purposes. In 1907 the Kenilworth Castle, of the Union-Castle Line made the 
first journey from Durban back to Britain which was powered by some 2,100 tonnes of native 
Natal coal, rather than with Welsh. By 1909 almost half (46.8%) of Natal’s output was supplied 
to the bunkering station of Durban.472 Indeed, it is around this date that Durban appears to 
have ceased offering imported Welsh coal, whilst, inhibited by high domestic transport costs, 
                                                 
469 A. Wegerich, Coal Price Convergence, p.17. 
470 A.B. Ghosh, Coal Industry in India: an historical and analytical account (Chennai,1977) p.58. 
471 A. Wegerich, Coal Price Convergence, p.19 
472 P. Alexander, ‘Challenging Cheap-Labour Theory: Natal and Transvaal Coal Miners, 1890 - 1950’, Labour 
History, Vol. 59, No. 1, (2008), p.48. 
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Cape Town (the other key coaling station in South Africa) offered Welsh coal to passing 
steamers throughout the period under study.473 
Overall, Wegerich finds that, during the 1883 - 1938 period, domestic supply of coals 
decreased the price of bunker coal at a port by approximately 45% as opposed to when no 
competition took place; vigorous competition between different imported coals had only a 
13% impact on the price.474 This links back indirectly to Harley’s “cost of coal plus freight” 
approach to bunker fuel, of course, and it is therefore worth noting that this spread was not 
uniform, even in places which had a native coal industry. British coal was often cheaper than 
indigenous supplies in parts of North Germany. The colliers crossing the North Sea were 
specialised and efficient (as earlier stated), whilst those from nearby Westphalia were cartelised 
and charged higher prices. As a result the Westphalian output directed to areas of lower 
competition.475As he concludes, in a way opposed to Harley’s original statement: 
Global bunker coal prices differences became less a function of British export 
prices plus transportation costs, but were increasingly determined by a greater number 
of supplying countries and a more complex web of trading relationships.476 
 
Indeed, as seen in previous chapters, the coal trade was significantly more complex 
than British coal prices plus transportation costs. In addition to the alternative countries of 
supply, there was the complexities of managing an international supply trade on changing 
information and market signals on various grades of coal, some of which were mixed in a 
bespoke fashion. The business decisions involved in this process and those of the buyers 
themselves resulted in a far more complicated structure to the trade than Harley is allowing. 
The general broadening of supplies away from British steam coal was additionally brought 
                                                 
473 A. Wegerich, Coal Price Convergence, p.21. 
474 Ibid., p.16. 
475 R. Fremdling, Anglo-German Rivalry p.21. 
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about through technological improvements, reducing the need for the nothing but the finest 
Welsh coals: 
Now we are using coal, which, ten or twenty years ago we should not have 
thought of using; we used the very best steam coals we could get then  - the largest – 
but now we take small coal, and we find it answers our purpose perfectly well. That is 
on account of the improvements in marine engines and the use of larger boilers and 
other improvements.477 
 
The constant drive of technology to improve the ability to burn coal more efficiently, 
regardless of grade, is part of why the colliery owners from the north east strove throughout 
the nineteenth century to have their product considered alongside the traditionally preferred 
South Wales product by the Admiralty. Twenty one separate trials are officially counted in the 
Parliamentary Papers, running until late into the 1870s. This addition of northern coals into 
an area traditionally dominated by Welsh will have further increased the options available to 
the buyer as well as complicated the nature of the trade from the UK and increased the 
complexities of the business. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note (if outside of the relevant time period) that improving 
technology reduced the need for the specificity of bunker coals to a great degree after the 
period under study. Shipping magazine Fairplay, which generally had been precise in noting 
the provenance of coals, became notably less specific in the mid-twentieth century. A coal 
which would have been classified (say) as “New River” during the period prior to the First 
World War, became merely “American” from the Second World War and by the 1950s some 
descriptions read only “Bunker”.478 Of course, the declining role that coal-fired ships played 
in world trade by this point may also have a significant role to play in such generalisations. 
                                                 
477 Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on Coal Supplies (London, 1905), p.22808, quoted in S. 
Palmer, ‘The British Coal Export Trade’, p.341. 
478 A. Wegerich, Coal Price Convergence, p.11. 
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Having established that coaling stations contributed to the steamship revolution, 
enabling ships to call at ports not naturally supplied with the mineral, and furthermore that 
coal exports in general contributed to a general lowering of freights due to its role as a 
replacement for ballast, there comes the challenging task of quantifying the importance of 
coaling stations within that latter context. Alas, no exact figures exist for the overall export of 
coal to coaling stations but it is possible to ascertain their importance through inference from 
the few cases where numbers do exist, and also from the importance ascribed to coaling 
stations by contemporaries in this regard. Thomas, the contemporary who appears the most 
dedicated to finding this figure had to admit defeat, despite asking the government himself in 
the Commons.479 Still, the Board of Trade monthly returns did, after 1903, begin to stipulate 
what kind of coal was being sent abroad, and within the first three months of 1903, 83% 
(12,000,000 of the 14,500,000 tons shipped, inclusive of bunkers) was steam coal.480 If that 
percentage is maintained, then of the total shipped abroad that year (63,805,000 tons), some 
52,958,120 tons was for the purpose of steam-raising.481 The Economist’s earlier cited estimate 
that of the 57,860,327 million tons of coal Britain exported in 1900, around 30,000,000 were 
destined for steamer consumption around the world) is, whilst a smaller figure, still a 
significant percentage of the coal export.482 The Royal Commission on Coal Supplies 
concurred, with the evidence before it demonstrating “the general assumption was that about 
half the total coal exported was used for bunkering British steamers”, although they didn’t 
clarify how much of this was for the purpose of supply bunkers abroad.483 Of these numbers, 
it is necessary to deduct the amount loaded as bunker coal in the UK. Figures for this are even 
                                                 
479 The Western Mail, (Cardiff), 4 August 1900. 
480 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.468. 
481 Total export figure is from H.S. Jevons, The Coal Trade, p.676. 
482 The Economist, Issue 3039, 23 November 1901 
483 Parliamentary Papers, The Royal Commission on Coal Supplies Volume III, (London, 1903), p.175. 
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harder to come by, although Jevons estimated that of the 97,719,000 tons exported in 1913, 
nearly 20,000,000 tons were in the form of bunkered coal.484 Once again, taking the 
assumption that proportionately this remains roughly similar (which whilst not entirely 
accurate is approximate enough for the attempt to be worthwhile), then in 1903 20% (or 
12,761,000 tons) was bunkered in Britain. This leaves us with 40,197,120 tons to dispose of. 
Thomas estimates that 4% of the total export was used by foreign industry, and so, discounting 
2,552,200 tons for that purpose, approximately 37,644,920 tons (or 59%) remain.485 This 
figure is, undoubtedly, a significantly generous overestimate, but individual statistics from 
certain coaling stations suggest a large amount did indeed go to coaling stations. In 1902, 
Cardiff exported 700,000 tons to South Africa, as earlier stated.486 Thomas demonstrates that: 
…Cardiff alone ships over a million tons annually to Port Said, over half a million 
to Malta and Gibraltar, about the same quantity to Cape Verdes and the Canaries, over 
300,000 to Colombo, and large quantities to Aden, practically the whole of which goes 
to bunker steam vessels calling to coal at those depots. Again, Cardiff ships over million 
tons to Genoa, over half a million to Marseilles, a very large proportion of which is for 
bunkering purposes. The same may be said of the coal exports to Havre, Cape Town, 
Buenos Aires, Monte Video, and Rio.487 
 
Allowing for the growth of trade, Sargent’s figures from 1912 suggest he is not wide 
of the mark. The Canaries imported 1,250,000 tons of coal in 1912 (an admittedly 
extraordinary year, and Sargent suggests a more normal figure average annual figure of 
1,000,000 tons) and Port Said imported 2,000,000 tons for the purpose of bunkering ships on 
the Suez route, with Egypt (and its other bunkering ports) absorbing another 1,000,000.488 
Until further study provides more detailed statistics, it is dangerous to use precise numbers as 
                                                 
484 H.S. Jevons, The Coal Trade, p.676. 
485 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.469. 
486 A.J. Sargent, Seaways, p.25. 
487 D.A. Thomas, ‘Growth and Direction’, p.469. 
488 A.J. Sargent, Seaways for the Canaries figures see pp.5–6 & Egyptian figures on p.58. 
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they result in a false appearance of clear fact rather than general trend, but it is evident that 
coaling stations took a considerable portion of Britain’s coal export. Mitchell proposes a figure 
of 15% of total British output was sent abroad to coaling stations, on the basis that “perhaps” 
the same amount of coal was sent abroad for bunkering as was used for bunkering in the 
UK.489 Church agrees, arguing for a figure approximating one-sixth of total British output.490 
Palmer, meanwhile, suggests that perhaps one-fifth of British exports were exported to coaling 
stations, although she attaches many caveats to this value.491 Walters cites contemporaries as 
assuming that approximately 30% of Welsh coals exported was for bunkering steam ships 
abroad.492 There is, alas, no consensus in these figures. However, given that in the inter-war 
years, despite the decline of coal-powered tonnage (from 44,000,000 tons, or 97% in 1914 to 
32,000,000 tons, or 49% in 1937), Britain’s second biggest market remained the bunker trade, 
it can be said that a significant amount of British coal was involved in bunkering steamships 
abroad.493 
Thus, the coal trade was very important to the British economy. Its use in steamships 
lowered freights during the nineteenth century, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, be 
this with shipping coal to Argentina from South Wales or coal to the Baltic ports from 
Newcastle in exchange for pit props. Not only was it an export in its own right, but also its 
role as a replacement for ballast enabled freights to be lowered further on inbound goods. 
Within this context, coaling stations played a very important role. As well as accepting a 
significant portion of this export, not just from South Wales but increasingly from the North 
East too as technology improved, they also (in contrast to Harley’s hypothesis) aided the rise 
                                                 
489 B.R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 1984), p.20. 
490 R. Church, History of the British Coal Industry Volume III p.34. 
491 S. Palmer, ‘The British Coal Export Trade’,pp.331 – 354. 
492 R.H. Walters, South Wales Steam Coal, p.311. 
493 W.H. Voskuil, ‘Coal and Political Power in Europe’, Economic Geography, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1942), p.256. 
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of the steamship through the supply of coal in places otherwise bereft and also through 
enabling an increase in the amount of tonnage dedicated to cargo as more regular stops could 
be made to re-fuel without sacrificing the profitability of the journey. Coaling stations provided 
additional options to captains or merchants in this regard. Therefore the British coal trade 
provided both freight and fuel for the British and world economies. However, in terms of 
coaling stations, Britain not only supplied the raw product, it also operated the key businesses 
that supported, developed, ran and profited from the world’s need for coal. 
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Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel 
A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COAL TRADE: 1850 - 1913 
 
 “There are some subjects of great national importance, which are of so uninviting a character, 
that even the statesman and politicians are apt to recoil from their discussion, whilst the great mass of 
the people can only be induced at intervals, and after long agitation, to take a transitory interest in their 
consideration, Merchant Shipping stands unhappily in this category..” 494 
 
Chapter Six: The Business of Coaling Stations 
 
Having established that coaling stations were indeed important to the Victorian 
economy, the task that remains is to create a framework for further study of them. Therefore 
this chapter endeavours to identify broad trends in and the key characteristics of the coaling 
station industry.  
The curse of the Victorian business historian is that frequently good ideas can be 
scotched by a lack of useful, corroborative data, or alternatively swamped under a tidal wave 
of Victorian ink and irrelevant memoranda. An approach of using case studies has thus been 
adopted, though it is important to note that this is therefore reliant on the firms which left the 
most material behind which was suitable for inspection. The information in this study was 
drawn almost exclusively from the minute books of annual general meetings, coal ledgers or 
directors’ meetings of the companies concerned. Wilson Sons & Co. were perhaps the most 
munificent, leaving behind detailed records from 1878 to 1911. Whilst this approach may 
result in scope being sacrificed for brevity, it does not limit the depth to which the individual 
firms may be utilised as tools for understanding the wider aspect of coaling stations and the 
coal trade. 
The British were the key players in the coaling station market. In the Canary Islands, for 
example, the British Consul was able to report that “give major companies are currently 
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operating. The entire coal handling business in the Port remains in the hands of British 
companies.”495 
Of course, relying on such limited sources of data does present potential pitfalls to the 
historian. However if the outcomes of this study are viewed as an exploratory foray into the 
field, attempting to increase understanding rather than provide complete understanding, and 
the appropriate caveats therefore are firmly attached, then some useful conclusions can be 
drawn, to demonstrate how this branch of the coal trade operated.  
Coaling stations, much like the coal trade itself, were very much part of the world-wide 
economy. As such, they were affected strongly by prevailing trends within it. The coal trade 
was part of the wider trade network. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of freight prices 
which were of great importance to the firms that ran these stations. Freights used up, on 
average, 66% of Wilsons’ coal revenue between 1878 and 1902.496 That figure however, hides 
certain extremes, as the graph below demonstrates. 
                                                 
495 M.S. Bora, ‘The Role of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Coal Route from the End of the Nineteenth 
Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Corporate Strategies’, International Journal of Maritime History, 
16:1 (June, 2004), p.107. 
496 See Appendix Two. 
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It could rise to be as high as 83% (1889) or as low as 53% during the ensuing slump 
in 1892. Shipping was famously a cyclical industry due to the long construction times and 
heavy capital expenditure required, and coaling stations were not immune to the vagaries of 
the shipping business cycle.497 Gluts of tonnage after a construction boom or during a 
depression in trade would send freight rates down, whilst a lack of tonnage would result in the 
opposite. Therefore firms would contract for the transportation of the coal in advance at fixed 
prices wherever possible. Thus in 1889, Wilsons signed contracts for the following year with 
William & Son (40,000 tons) and Brown, Jenkinson & Co. (35,000 tons) at 11s/6d per ton, 
for coal to be sent to St. Vincent, Cape Verde.498 This contrasts with the rate set in the 
aforementioned slump; by 1892 the rate was set for the following year at only 8s/- per ton.499 
                                                 
497 For the cyclical nature of the business, see C.K. Harley, ‘The shift from sailing ships’, p.226. 
498 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, 24 December 1889. 
499 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, 06 December 1892. 
Figure 6.1: Freights as a percentage of Coal Revenues (Wilson Sons & Co.): 1878 - 1902 
 
 
 
Source: See Appendix Two 
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These small differences added up when the substantial amounts of coal being moved are 
considered. In the six months from February to July, 1888 (in all respects, an unexceptional 
year for the company’s coal sales), St. Vincent received 23,200 tons of coal. The larger depots 
of Rio and Montevideo received 43,000 tons and 40,000 tons respectively.500 With a total of 
332,983 tons being sold in 1888, the three and odd shilling difference in freight rates per ton 
results in a sizeable cost to the company.501 
Figure 6.2 compares the freight rates of Wilsons against the general freight rates of 
Isserlis’ index. Whilst Isserlis’ figures are undoubtedly of finer mathematical provenance (see 
Appendix One for an explanation of the Wilsons freights), with both figures indexed (1880 = 
100) there appears to be some remarkable discrepancies. The divergence in 1889/90 is, 
presumably, due to Wilsons’ particular market, with Wilsons’ main sphere being Latin 
America, with multiple depots operating by the outbreak of the First World War. The 
Directors’ Report for 1889 mentions the remarkably high cost of freights, and in 1890 briefly 
alludes to “the unsettled state of affairs in South America”, referencing, one assumes, the 
republican coup in Brazil.502 
                                                 
500 These deliveries for the previous month were reported in London Metropolitan Archives, 
CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, on: 19 March 1888, 16 
April 1888, 14 May 1888, 18 June 1888, 23 July 1888 & 13 August 1888. 
501 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons,  Twelfth Annual General 
Meeting (1888), Directors’ Report. 
502 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons,  Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Annual General Meetings (1889 & 1890), Directors’ Reports. 
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However, the earlier peak in the first half of the 1880s is harder to fathom, as Wilsons’ 
directors did not treat it as any cause of particular concern. A more accurate test would be to 
place the Wilsons’ freights figures alongside Isserlis’ freight index for coal to Rio from Wales, 
which, in a generalised sense, is the route that Wilsons were taking. Obviously, once again, 
Wilsons’ freight rate is a looser set of data, which lacks Isserlis’ exact mathematical accuracy, 
but the general trend should remain similar. Therefore it is clear that the coaling station freight 
rate was akin to the prevailing freight rate for a similar route. Aside from slightly wilder swings 
around the peaks and troughs, the general sense from Figure 7.3 is that Wilsons and Isserlis’ 
freight index agree, roughly, on the trends in the price of freighting coal to Rio: 
 
Figure 6.2: Wilsons Freights set against Isserlis’ General Tramp Freight Rates (1880 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: See Appendix One 
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However, it is disappointing that the Isserlis index does not go further back than 1892, 
as that initial peak in the Wilsons’ freight rate remains unexplained. Still, it can be demonstrated 
from the above figures that the coaling stations did indeed tend mirror general trends in 
freights. As such, coaling stations were very closely tied into the wider economy. Yet freights 
also affected coaling stations uniquely. This is indicated by the Directors’ Reports for the Aden 
Coal Company. That firm discussed freight rates in nearly every annual Directors’ Report, and 
usually within a negative context as the reason why profits were smaller than expected.503 Low 
freights outward from Britain through Suez affected the company in two different ways. Firstly 
there was a notable decrease in the growth of business, as the ever-upward growth of tonnage 
using the canal was temporarily checked. It is interesting to note that the years where the Aden 
Coal Co. was particularly aware of the low freight rate there is a corresponding decline the 
                                                 
503 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, Minutes of Annual General Meetings, 1881 – 1925. 
Nigh on every year between 1881 and 1910 freights are mentioned in some form or other.  
Figure 6.3: Wilsons Freights set against Isserlis’ Freight Index of Coal to Rio (1892 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: See Appendix One 
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growth of traffic through the canal. In 1883 & 1884, for example, Aden’s lamented the current 
low freights to the East as causing a drop off in business.504 Indeed, growth in canal traffic was 
severely below trend, increasing by only 1.66% over the previous year, when compared to an 
average for the 1871 – 1913 period of 10.3%.505 Similarly, 1889, 1890 and 1894 – 1896 merited 
mention of freights in the Aden company books, with growth rates of only 2.14%, 1.58%, 
4.96%, 5.09% and 1.32% respectively.  
Low, unremunerative freights also affected coaling stations more directly. If freights 
were significantly below trend, then ships would often take on extra bunker coal in London, 
rather than using that capacity for outward freight. As delineated in earlier, the cost of coal at 
a coaling station had to be below the total extra profit earned from storing cargo rather than 
coal. At times of low freight rates, this became harder to achieve. Aden was particularly 
affected by this as the combination of expensive Suez Canal dues eating into shipowners 
profits, and the availability of cheap coal in India, meant that at times of low freights sales fell 
rather noticeably. To take the example of 1884 as above, sales fell from 68,464 tons in 1883 
through 46,782 tons in 1884 to a mere 39,480 tons in 1885.506 Thus freight rates were not only 
a significant cost factor in their profit and loss account, but they also directly affected the 
volume of their business more broadly. 
Thus having established that coaling stations were tied into general trends throughout 
the world economy regarding freights, they were also beholden to certain local, independent 
events. The 1889/90 coup in Brazil as mentioned above is just one example. In 1897, the 
interdependence of coal exports and bulky imports, as delineated in chapter two, was made 
                                                 
504 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 6 February 1884 & 4 February 1885, Minutes of 
Annual General Meetings, (1883 & 1884), Directors’ Reports.  
505 Suez Canal Tonnage figures from D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez, (Oxford, 1969) p.751. 
506 Figures from Appendix Two. 
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starkly apparent. There was a crop failure in Uruguay and Argentina, resulting in significantly 
less traffic for Wilsons’ coaling stations.507 The Boer War was another “local” scenario which 
resulted in significant changes for coaling stations nearby.  The press felt compelled to 
comment that the price of coal had increased between 4s and 7s in the period of October 
through December, and “presumably a good deal more can be got in the foreign markets 
depending on Cardiff and Newcastle Coal” and that this rise was the extensive purchasing by 
the Admiralty.508 It also affected coaling stations in that it cut off supplies of Cape coal, and 
therefore 100,500 tons of coal were shipped to Natal from Great Britain in Decmber, 1899, 
compared to less than 20,000 tons in December, 1898.509 By removing South African coal from 
the market and by driving up the cost of Welsh coal, the Boer War had a significant effect 
upon the economics of coaling stations. 
A dissimilar event with similar circumstances was the South Wales Coal Strike of 1898. 
Welsh steam coal was perceived throughout the world as being the best coal with which to 
fuel steamers. Smokeless, efficient, and with a high calorific value, it was widely accepted as 
being far superior to its nearest rivals, wherein it could claim a high price premium. This could 
be quite extensive. At Alexandria, Welsh coal was 27s per ton compared with North Country 
at 21/6 per ton.510 At Colombo it retailed at 35s per ton, compared with 21/6 for Indian coal 
or 25s for best Natal coal and in Singapore the difference between Bengal and Welsh coal was 
some 15/6 per ton. However, when the strike suspended supplies of Welsh coal, there was no 
alternative but to offer the other types as a replacement. Coaling stations limited their 
remaining stocks of Cardiff coal to only their oldest and most reliable customers, the rest being 
                                                 
507 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons,  Twentieth Annual 
General Meeting (1897), Directors’ Report. 
508 The Economist, 9 December 1899, Issue 2937. 
509 The Economist, 27 January 1900, Issue 2944. 
510 Prices are from A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, Appendix XI. 
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offered North Country or local coal. The Aden Company replaced Welsh coal with North 
Country coal in 1898, and Indian in 1900, remarking that whilst “steamship owners object to 
North Country coal”, arrangements had been reached which were “satisfactory to them and 
renumerative to the Company”, whilst Wilsons also overcame the difficulties with shipments 
of North Country coal.511 Indeed, most letters from coal trading companies came emblazoned 
with wording similar to that across the top of all Cory Brothers Stationery: “All offers subject 
to our usual strike, war and accident clause and to acceptance by return of post unless 
otherwise stated.”512 The development and growth of alternative coal supplies was, of course, 
an important aspect of the coaling station business. 
However, the supply of North Country Coal or other coals was not unknown to 
coaling stations. Indeed, testimony to the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies in 1903 
demonstrates that it was in fact frequent as not all merchant steamers believed it to be 
necessary to only run on the finest Welsh steam coal, especially not with such a price 
premium.513 The Economist reported in 1900, that as a result of the Boer War and the high prices 
of Welsh coal, shipowners were increasingly turning to Newcastle and America for their 
supplies, and a fear that “foreigners may cease to regard Welsh coal as worth the heavy 
premium they are so often called on to pay…”514 Presumably a merchant steamer running light 
between jobs could afford to fill up more space with cheaper, less efficient coal, rather than a 
full steamer trying to conserve as much capacity as possible for cargo. Coaling stations had to 
be able to offer a differentiated product depending on circumstances – be it North Country 
                                                 
511 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 15 February, 1899, Minutes of Annual General 
Meeting (1898), Directors’ Report & London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. 
& Sons,  Twenty First Annual General Meeting (1898), Directors’ Report. 
512 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of Directors. This particular 
example is from a letter in 1906 regarding disagreements with the coal trimmers in Cardiff Docks.  
513 Evidence of Sir J. Joicey & Mr. D. Stevenson, Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 
Volume III (London, 1903), p.109. 
514 The Economist, 24 February 1900, Issue 2948. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 189 
or Welsh coal (or even a blend) – and that these business decisions were being taken by ship 
captains on a daily basis. But this strikes at the key point about coaling stations. Rather than 
simply offering shipowners a large and undifferentiated pile of fuel to burn, they offered a 
finely tuned service, responding to demand. Different shipowners had preferred types and 
brands of coal, the Royal Navy for example had a very limited set of coals with which it was 
prepared to dirty Her Majesty’s furnaces, whilst the large liner firms were likewise particularly 
strict in the qualities of coal they would accept.515 Tramps, on the other hand were far more 
likely to accept a lower, and consequently cheaper, quality of coal.516 Furthermore, these 
requirements were likely to change depending on particular circumstances, as directed either  
by management decisions or local conditions. Still, the demand for a recognisable quality of 
coal (or perhaps, more accurately, a trustworthy brand of service), throughout the world, 
resulted in coaling firms linking together to form chains of affiliated stations, enabling 
steamers to remain within one group of companies no matter where they travelled, much like 
the airline groupings of today. Wilsons had several such ‘partner firms’: Burness and Sons and 
Decandia & Co. feature significantly in the early years of the company under lists of 
contracts.517 But by far the most dominant company would appear to be Cory Brothers. In one 
meeting of directors, sixteen firms were acknowledged as coaling with the company due to 
Cory Co.518 Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Corys would remain a 
regular supplier of business to Wilsons. These close links were, as mentioned in their annual 
report, an attempt to “supply steamers all along the line” and therefore “afford increased 
                                                 
515 Evidence of Mr G. W. Miller, Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, Volume II (London, 
1903), pp.137 – 147. 
516 Evidence of Sir J. Joicey & Mr. D. Stevenson, Parliamentary Papers, Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 
Volume III (London, 1903), p.109 
517 See, for example, London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of 
Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, 15 December 1881, 3 February 1882, 3 January 1883. 
518 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
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facilities to connexions... [which will]…augment the coal business to a considerable extent”.519 
These links could prove to be remarkably profitable for the firms making them. A report of 
contracts (for coaling at Rio) signed for the year ahead in November, 1881 indicates that 
Whitstroff & Co.’s steamers were offered 44s/- per ton, with 1s/- of that price being a 
commission to Cory Brothers for the business.520 
Thus each steamship firm was offered an individual contract for an individual type of 
coal at an individual coaling station, with options to extend this through a worldwide network 
of aligned firms. This reflects the diversity and complexities of the coal trade as undertaken 
before 1914. These contracts could either be won in the traditional manner, or perhaps 
through close links with the shipping firm involved. In 1897, Cory Brother’s bought £12,000 
of ordinary shares in the Clan Line Steamers Ltd. In return, that company “hereby undertake 
to purchase…all the coals required by the Clan Line Steamers at the ports where you have a 
depot, for the period of five years certain, from the 1st of January 1898.”521 However, the 
contract stipulates that “a depot” is “either in your own name or under your control or where 
you are able to supply” which would appear to cover such arrangements as that outlined above 
between Wilsons and Cory Brothers. Furthermore the coal supplied had to be classed as “Best 
Welsh Steam (South Wales)”; the Clan Line’s preferred quality of coal. Similarly, Cory Brothers 
took shares in the Lady Lewis Steam Ship company in exchange for all foreign coaling.522 
Conversely firms could also seek to tie in purchasers of coals by making arrangements 
to be the exclusive shippers of coals at certain ports. Again, Cory Brothers sought to ensure 
                                                 
519 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Seventh and Eighth 
Annual General Meetings (1884 &1885) Directors’ Reports. 
520 All figures from London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of 
Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, 17 November 1881. 
521 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Correspondence with Clan 
Line Steamers Co., Glasgow (21 December 1897) 
522 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Correspondence with Lady 
Lewis Steamship Co., (10 February 1897). 
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competitive advantage in this way too, with one example being a letter to the Gas Coal 
Collieries Ltd., referencing an interview earlier that day and asking exclusive rights to sell their 
Meiros Gas Coal at Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Janerio, Monte Video & Buenos Aires, assuring 
the company that “we will undertake to work these ports diligently and place as much of your 
coal there as possible.”523 
It was the responsibility of the coaling firm to ensure, therefore, that it could provide 
enough coal for all its contracts throughout the year. This was not always successfully achieved. 
Putting external factors such as the South Wales coal strike aside, Wilson Sons & Co, the Aden 
Coal Co. and Cory brothers all logged examples of failing to ensure an adequate supply. 
Wilsons’ attempt to supply the North German Lloyd Line on the Suez route (which only lasted 
a few years before being abandoned) ended when significant amounts of coal had to be bought 
in at last minute and freighted at great expense.524 Aden coal had to charter a special steamer 
at a very expensive 29s per ton to replenish stocks and Cory’s were forced to borrow coal off 
of Wilsons at Rio to avoid a shortfall.525 
Some agreements did not allow such ‘sharing’ of resources. Agelasto, Spezzo & Co. 
ran a coal depot in Constantinople. In order to gain access to Cory Brothers’ network of 
stations and their supply of coal, the agreement stipulated that they were required to “purchase 
from the Sellers [Cory Brothers] all the coal, coke and fuel required for their business at 
                                                 
523 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Letter to Gas Coal Collieries 
Ltd. (20 January 1897). 
524 The expensive, uncontracted and unexpected freights, when combined with the low prices tendered in order 
to undercut Cory Brothers resulted in a significant loss. See London Metropolitan Archives, 
CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons,  both 5 April 1887 and 13 
May 1887 and also the Director’s Report to the Tenth AGM (1887). 
525 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 17 February 1897, Minutes of Annual General 
Meeting (1896), Directors’ Report & London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of 
Meetings of Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, 13 December 1888. 
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Constantinople and for the supply of their depot there.”526 In return, however, they were the 
exclusive outlet for Cory Brothers’ coals in the city for the purpose of bunkering steam ships, 
“…but the Sellers shall be free to supply coal to Railway Co’s and other customers at 
Constantinople who have no depot, allowing the Buyers [Agelasto, Spezzo & Co.] a 
commission of 1.5d per ton on such sales.” Interestingly, should Cory Brothers decline some 
business for any reason, Agelasto, Spezzo and Company were only able to fulfil with 
Newcastle coal.  
Of course, in order to make sure that such an agreement was possible, Cory Brothers 
required advanced notice of the estimated requirements for the coaling station’s coming sales. 
These were to be supplied by the 15th for the month following, with Cory Brothers responsible 
for procuring and chartering suitable tonnage, and delivering the coal freight on board to the 
ship at Cardiff. A further clause allowed for the “where you are able to supply” requirements 
of the agreement with Clan Line Steamers, as Cory Brothers agreed to forward all their 
bunkering agreements at Agelasto, Spezzo and Co., who were responsible now for fulfilling 
all the terms and requirements thereof. Cory Brothers agreed to send multiple varieties of their 
coals to the firm (presumably to enable different steamers their specialist coals or to enable 
mixing as suitable) and had oversight of the coaling firm’s coal accounts, in terms of the 
amounts of each coal in stock, supplied and sold each month to further guide them in ensuring 
adequate supplies were sent out.  
These amounts required to be sent out could be relatively sizeable. Wilsons Co. & 
Sons, in the course of six months in 1888, sent out an average of over 21,000 tons a month to 
the five stations they possessed at the time: 
                                                 
526 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co. Deeds & Agreements, Agreement with Agelasto, 
Spezzo & Co., (1899).  
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Table 6.1: Wilson Sons & Co. Coal Shipments in 1888 (tons)527 
 February March April May June July 
St. Vincent 4,300 3,500 4,000 3,900 4,700 2,800 
Rio de Janeiro 5,600 8,100 6,700 6,700 8,000 7,900 
Montevideo 6,400 8,500 9,000 8,900 7,700 8,000 
Colombo 1,200 2,000 1,800 1,900 2,000 - 
Singapore 1,100 1,050 1,000 1,000 1,450 950 
       
 
When the date is taken into account, it is interesting to consider how this amount 
would have grown as steamers continued to take over more business, particularly on the routes 
to South America where three of these stations were located. Just four years later, in 1892, the 
firm was contracting with three different steamer companies, each shipping firm to deliver 
15,000 tons of coal to St Vincent, spread out in bi-monthly steamers.528  
In addition to Wilsons’ long term main supplier, the Ocean Coal Company (180,000 
tons were ordered in 1893, and 300,000 tons in 1895), the firm also contracted with different 
other suppliers to enable them to deliver the right coal to the right ships in the right quantities, 
be that through mixing or exclusively. Not only were these other Welsh coals (such as 16,000 
tons of Dowlais Steam Coal, 5,000 tons of Spedegar Steam Coal and 5,000 tons of Nantgyle 
Steam Coal, all to be delivered freight on board in Cardiff or Newport in 1895) but also 
Scottish coals such as Barris Hamilton Ell (17,000 tons) and 5,000 tons of Hamilton Hard 
Splint (both freight on board at Glasgow).529 Wilsons had to make sure that they had all the 
coals required, for whilst some of the customers may have been happy to accept whatever was 
                                                 
527 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, March - August 1888 
528 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, June 1892 
529 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, 5 November 1895 
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available (presumably Oceans was Wilsons’ standard supply), others had bespoke 
requirements. 
Coaling stations and chains therefore had a clear role in the market if they were to be 
successful: they were required to provide the right coal, at the right place, in the right amount, 
at the right time for the right price. Those that failed to develop large networks, close 
relationships with other parties or customer bases (such as the Aden Coal Company) were 
short-lived, instead being outpaced by the more responsive and attractive offers elsewhere in 
the competitive industry. Yet in addition to this core role of providing fuel, many of the firms 
also diversified into other areas. Cory’s offered repair facilities at many of their depots and 
bunkering stations, such as Aden and Rio de Janeiro.530 Both the Aden Coal Company and 
Cory’s were involved in cargo loading, removal and storage. Indeed, Aden’s cargo division 
significantly expanded in 1892 with the construction of new facilities purely for that purpose, 
alongside their coaling facilities.531 Wilsons (at its larger depots) expanded into stevedoring, 
lighterage, wharfing, steamship agencies, tug-boating services and engineering shops in order 
to diversify its revenue base, and by 1896 these forays into the wider port facilities business 
(sowing the seeds for the company’s present form as the largest operator of ports in South 
America) were demonstrating “satisfactory returns”.532 
Thus coaling stations were supplying individual firms with a distinct and bespoke 
package of services, offering individual firms different “brands” of coal, extending that 
throughout the world with a partner network and also providing a whole range of shipping-
                                                 
530 M.H. Green, A World-wide Organisation: the origin and activities of Cory Brothers & Company Ltd. (London, 1946), 
pp.10–11. 
531 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 15 February 1893, Minutes of Annual General 
Meeting (1892), Directors’ Report. 
532 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Nineteenth Annual 
General Meeting (1896), Directors’ Report. 
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related services. This industry offered a lot more than merely a pile of coal upon some tropical 
quayside. Instead it was a complex, integrated distribution network that provided world trade 
with the fuel for its function. 
It was also an immensely profitable industry. As Figure 4 demonstrates, Wilsons made 
money every year between 1878 and 1911, with the sole exception of a loss in 1883 of £2,143.  
In some years the profits were truly colossal. From 1900 onwards, aside from 1903 and 1904 
(when a particularly vicious price war was being waged), every year saw six figure profits, a 
remarkably sum for its day.533 The wealth was not merely limited to Wilsons either. The Aden 
Coal Company paid out remarkable dividends between 1881 and 1907. A total return of 403% 
on the initial investment during that period, and the firm was able to offer 50% in one year 
alone (1883).534  
 
                                                 
533 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/003 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Twenty-seventh and 
twenty-eighth Annual General Meetings (1904 & 1905), Chairman’s Remarks. 
534 Figures taken from Appendix Three. 
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With such large amounts of money at stake, it is hardly surprising that several of the 
firms attempted some form of collusion. Indeed, shipping as an industry was famous for its 
cartels and conferences, and coaling stations were not immune from this impulse.535 In 
response to the earlier mentioned counter-thrust of Wilsons into the East (to fuel the North 
German Lloyd Line on the Suez route, deep within Cory Brothers’ sphere of influence), Cory’s 
offered an olive branch in the form of a working arrangement at St. Vincent. The Directors 
were informed that an ‘arrangement’ had been made with Cory Brothers and a certain Messrs. 
Geo. Miller & Co. to carve up the coaling business on the Cape Verde Islands. After one of 
                                                 
535 See, for example, B. M. Deakin, Shipping conferences: a study of their origins, development and economic practices 
(London, 1973) and A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, pp.174 – 202. 
Figure 6.4: Profits of Wilson, Sons & Co. (1878 – 1911) 
 
 
 
Source: See Appendix Two 
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their mutual competitors, the German firm of Breuer & Co., had stated their intention to sell 
up, the remaining three firms agreed to carve up the plant and stocks of that company equally, 
and then of the future coaling business, Wilsons were guaranteed one quarter of all business 
at St. Vincent (excluding the Royal Mail contract) for three years of the 1st of January, 1888.536 
This was the beginning of a period of co-operation between the former antagonists, which 
would see similar arrangements reached in Rio the following year.537 But St. Vincent was to be 
the main area of collaboration. Despite the initial agreement not holding, (it being cancelled 
by February of 1887 as neither Miller’s nor Cory’s had maintained their end of the agreement) 
the two firms lent each other coal stocks and when Burness & Sons removed themselves from 
the fray, Wilsons took over their existing customers, but agreed to pay Cory’s (actually Cory 
and Miller after those two firms had merged their St. Vincent interests) 2.5% on all of them, 
in addition to providing the customers thus gained with coal from Cory Brothers’ mines in 
Wales.538  This arrangement echoed that made at other ports. The Atlantic Islands Depot 
Arrangement which survived until the 1930s, was based at the Canary Islands to the north of 
Cape Verde, between many of the same firms.539 Cory Brothers’ records have a copy of another 
agreement laid down in 1903 for the coaling stations located at Port Said and Suez. This is 
interesting not only for shedding light on the cartel arrangements which would have occurred 
elsewhere (such as on the Cape Verde and Canary Islands) but also given its location at one 
                                                 
536 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, 5 September 1887.  
537 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson 
Co. & Sons, 18 June 1889 
538 The cancellation of the arrangement was noted in London Metropolitan Archives, 
CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, 7 February 1888; the 
sharing of coal delineated in the same on the 13 December 1888 and the terms of the Burness takeover were 
noted on the 4 July 1889. 
539 The Arrangement is laid out in principle in M.S. Bora, ‘Canary Islands’ p.115. However, unlike the example 
in Port Said & Suez which is discussed here, no documentation regarding it has survived, hence the switch of 
focus. From Bora’s work, however, it is clear that the cartel operated a similar structure to that outlined here. 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 198 
of the key nodes in the steam-shipping network of the nineteenth century. The agreement was 
between five different coaling firms, with the proportions of coal which were allocated to each 
firm stipulated thus: 
Table 6.2: Parties to the Port Said & Suez Agreement (1903) 
Coaling Firm Percentage Allocated 
Messrs Worms & Co. 33% 
Messrs Lambert Bros, Ltd. on behalf of themselves and the Port 
Said & Suez Coal Co.  
19% 
Messrs Cory Brothers & Co. Ltd. on behalf of themselves and the 
Eagle Coal Co. Ltd. 
17.5% 
Messrs Wills & Co. Ltd. 17% 
Messrs L. Savon & Co. on behalf of themselves & Messrs Moxey 
Savon & Co. Ltd. 
13.5% 
  
 
Each firm paid into pool account (in this instance two shilling and nine pence per ton) 
for the coal they sold and then this money was re-distributed so as to match the percentages 
stated above. Those who had over sold had some of their contribution moved to those who 
had not successfully met their percentage of trade. There were fifteen clauses in all, and the 
agreement further laid out that in addition to agreeing market share, the firms involved were 
to agree prices:  
The subscribers to this understanding shall fix prices for contracts and current 
prices from time to time as may be necessary and no rebates or advantages shall be given 
to obtain fresh customers and no coal shall be sold to fresh customers below the prices 
fixed from time to time and such prices shall be altered if required at a meeting held for 
the purpose and the majority at such meetings shall fix the prices and each subscribing 
party hereto undertakes to abide by the decision of the majority. Three firms represented 
to form a quorum.540 
 
The meetings where this was to be done were to be held in London, rather than locally 
(or, indeed, in Cardiff). However, it demonstrates that, again, even at these important 
                                                 
540 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Port Said & Suez Agreement 
(1903) 
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locations, the coaling infrastructure was resolutely in British hands. Meetings to discuss the 
arrangement could be called with 3 days notices in London, demonstrating that no foreign 
interests could realistically have been involved had they been headquartered in their home 
country. Indeed, the Deutsches Kohlen-Depot joined the combination in 190 and the 
meetings remained in London, attended by an agent of the latter firm.541  
The costs of upholding these agreements, in terms of capital being tied up in the pool 
account were not trivial, indicating the size of the coaling operations. Returning to the Atlantic 
Islands Depot Arrangement, the logs of payments into the pool account in the period 1904 – 
1907 were noted by Bora from internal correspondence: 
Table 6.3: Contributions to Atlantic Islands Depot Arrangement Pool Fund542 
Year Hamilton & Co. Cory Brothers 
1904 £2,101 £1,260 
1905 £4,573 £2,743 
1906 £7,403 £4,521 
1907 £5,571 £3,343 
   
 
It is interesting to note that Wilsons also withdrew from the Eastern coaling market in 
1889, shortly after these cartel arrangements with Cory Brothers at Cape Verde were made as, 
aside from the aforementioned loss due to expensive freights, “their object in starting this 
business…has been gained, and the extensive augmentation of the Company’s business in St. 
Vincent and South America sufficiently demonstrates”.543  Another example dates from 1885, 
when Cory Brothers were offering stiff competition in Rio, and thus Wilsons convinced the 
Glamorgan Coal Co. (a Welsh coal-mining firm that was moving into the coaling station trade) 
                                                 
541 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Port Said & Suez Agreement 
(1907) 
542 M.S. Bora, ‘Canary Islands’ p.115. 
543 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Twelfth Annual General 
Meeting (1889), Directors’ Report. 
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to cease competing in Rio. By 1887 Wilsons were in negotiations to takeover all of their 
business and plant there whilst also working with them in Montevideo.544 All of this co-
operation between firms had quite clear benefits for Wilsons; from £17,115 in 1886, profits 
rose to over £22,000 annually for the rest of the decade.545 
The arrangement is mirrored elsewhere. When a new coaling station was created at 
Perim Island (near to Aden), Aden Coal arranged to send them some business minus a slight 
commission of 1/- per ton, and all coal for orders arranged through Aden and Cory’s were to 
use Cory’s Merthyr coal.546 In 1899, after years of expensive and destructive competition, there 
are hints at a more co-operative approach: 
The keen competition at the coaling stations surrounding the Company’s depot 
has to a great extent been removed by a general desire of all the Depot owners to 
obtain a price which leaves them a better margin for profit.547 
 
Whilst it would be inferring too much to suggest a cartel similar to those outlined 
above was being formed, this certainly was not open, unfettered competition. Indeed, Cory 
Brothers were particularly apt at co-opting others into their cartels. In addition to their work 
with Wilsons at Cape Verde, they undertook to fix prices in Port Said and also in Suez.548 A 
similar approach could be that each company agreed to reserve certain contracts with key 
customers (such as the Royal Navy) to one party or to alternate them between the parties to 
                                                 
544 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Eighth Annual Genetral 
Meeting (1885), Chairman’s Remarks and London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - 
Minutes of Meetings of Directors, 04 February 1887 and 11 March 1887. 
545 Actual figures are £22,177 in 1887, £22,541 in 1888 and £22,090 in 1889. Figures taken from the Minutes of 
the Company’s Annual General Meetings (1882 – 1912), see Appendix Two for the full table. London 
Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 for 1882 - 1891, CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 for 1892 - 
1900, CLC/B/225/MS20186/003 for 1901 – 1906 and CLC/B/225/MS20186/004 for 1907- 1912. 
546 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/1 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of Directors, 31 July 1893. 
547 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 15 February 1899 Annual General Meeting, (1898), 
Directors’ Report. 
548 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of Directors, 18 April 1895, 9 
September 1897, 26 October 1897 and 8 February 1898. 
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the agreement, as between Whittall & Co and Bowen Rees & Co, with the chosen party being 
able to choose the price at which their colleagues in the Combination should bid.549 
However, these arrangements don’t appear to have been quite as successful as many 
of the shipping conferences were at setting rates, at least certainly not across the board.550 
Whilst Port Said and the Canary Islands may have been ‘carved up’ between the various 
companies present, elsewhere competition remained high within the coaling station trade. 
Wilsons felt compelled to mention the competition several times in their annual report and in 
Figure 4, the vicious cost of the aforementioned 1902 “coal war” (as termed by Sargent) on 
the River Plate is quite clear.551 The Chairman commented on its severity, nothing that Wilsons 
were “engaged in a fight for the maintenance of the commanding position we had for years 
occupied…and [having won the battle] we have, I hope, done with the Dogs of War for at any 
rate some years.”552 Whilst, no doubt, a triumphant chairman is expected to adopt a somewhat 
hyperbolic manner, these are still fighting words discussing a vicious competition. On the busy 
route of the Suez Canal the Aden Coal Company talked of little else.553 Even the mighty Cory 
Brothers were forced to lower their prices anent the fierce competition in 1892.554  
As a particular example, the competition between Aden and Perim Island for the 
coaling business of the Suez Canal was not just with regard to prices. Petitions and counter-
petitions were lodged with the government, the India Office was accused of creating a 
                                                 
549 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of Directors, 26 October 
1897. 
550 A.W. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, pp.174–202. 
551 Sargent is actually referring to a similar event in 1913, but the term is certainly worth wider recognition. 
552 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/003 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Twenty-fifth Annual 
General Meeting (1902), Chairman’s Remarks. 
553 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, Minutes of Annual General Meetings. The Directors 
refer to little else in most of their annual reports. 
554 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/1 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of Directors, 1 November 
1894. 
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monopoly and bribes were used at all levels.555 However in the middle of the 1890s, Aden’s 
companies combined to lower prices and drove the Perim company into the arms of one of 
the London coaling brokers. Thereafter the competition gave way to a “more gentlemanly 
solicitation of custom.”556 This trend towards exploring cartels does to some extent align with 
Olson’s criticisms of British businessmen in the period 1870 – 1914, in that competition (and 
thence investment and/or growth) was stifled by these cartels, yet given the benefits of the 
arrangements in securing supplies for customers should one firm or the other be unable to 
provide, it seems difficult to fully support his thesis.557 
The alternative to collusion in these cases was often aggressive expansion. Wilsons 
expanded dramatically in the period from their inception (1878) through to the First World 
War. Aside from their ventures into the Suez route to combat Cory’s expansion in South 
America (as earlier mentioned), Wilsons also expanded rapidly in its home market.  
The company was founded in 1878 to provide coal in South America and owned a 
depot in Rio de Janeiro. By 1882 a further depot at Pernambuco had been added and contracts 
were being made for coaling at Bahia through third party firms.558 With further expansion in 
1891 (La Plata), 1893 (Buenos Aires), 1898 (Las Palmas and Rosario de Santa Fe), 1902 
(Madeira, Bahia Blanca and Tunis) and 1903 (Dakar and Tenerife), when combined with 
expansions in Santos and Sao Paulo, it is clear that Wilsons was attempting to rapidly outgrow 
the competition.559 In 1907 they merged with their long-term supplier, the Ocean Coal 
Company, and acquired its own collieries, meaning that in addition to broad, geographic 
                                                 
555 R.J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, (London, 1975), pp.180–184. 
556 Ibid., p.181. 
557 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, 1982). 
558 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Fifth Annual General 
Meeting (1882), Directors’ Report. 
559 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 and CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 - Wilson Co. 
& Sons, Annual General Meetings for the year in question. 
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growth, they were attempting to control all levels of coal distribution.560 Indeed, failing to 
expand often meant becoming part of a larger firm. The Aden Coal Company was merged 
into the sprawling Cory’s empire in 1910, joining a catalogue of other firms.561 Wilsons’ 
expansion was often through the takeover of smaller, single station firms.562 Often contracts 
in these instances offered a set of ‘golden handcuffs’ to the directors of the old firm; in that 
they would be kept on as part of the new company, working as before, but if they left the firm 
they must wait one full calendar year before working for any other firm in any other part of 
the coal supply business.563 
Therefore, not only were coaling stations offering a wide scope of services, a diverse 
range of coals and worldwide links, they were also doing so in a highly competitive 
environment. This meant that they were forced to keep a close eye on developments. The 
Aden Coal Co. & Cory’s both paid particular attention to developments with regard to changes 
in fuel preferences. Cory’s was appointed the sole general bunker sales agent to the B.P. 
Trading Company from the very beginning of the oil era.564 The Aden Coal Company was 
constantly watching Indian coal as a rival to Welsh from its first arrival (in 1897), and as soon 
as demand merited it a stock was constantly kept on hand.565 Furthermore, they also paid close 
attention to “Messrs. Samuel and Co.” (a company later known simply as “Shell”)’s scheme 
                                                 
560 London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/004 - Wilson Co. & Sons, Thirtieth AGM (1907), 
Chairman’s Remarks. 
561 The takeover is covered in Glamorgan Archives, DCB/1/1 – Cory Brothers & Co., Minutes of Meetings of 
Directors 27 September 1899 – 23 July 1912 
562 For example, the takeover of the Compana Bahiana, noted in London Metropolitan Archives, 
CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 - Minutes of Meetings of Directors, Wilson Co. & Sons, 24 October 1890.  
563 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/2 – Cory Brothers & Co., Deeds & Agreements, Contract between L. Gueret & 
Co and Augusto Amaral – a coaling firm in South America. L Gueret itself would be later absorbed by Cory 
Brothers. 
564 One Hundred Years: The Cory Fleet, (London, 1960), p.1. 
565 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, 21 February 1900, Minutes of Annual General 
Meeting (1899), Directors’ Report. 
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for the supply of oil to steamers on the Suez route from 1898 onwards.566 Thus coaling stations 
were involved in a highly competitive market, in which aggressive expansion and 
diversification into shipping related services and alternative fuel sources was part of the 
landscape. This does not seem like the work of the Victorian British businessman of past 
historical opinion, watching innovation and entrepreneurship elsewhere whilst ignoring it at 
home, a rentier content to live off Britain’s natural resources and pre-dominance in shipping 
and foreign investment. Instead, it seems to reflect the more recent historiography on the 
period, that the direction of entrepreneurship shifted, and that rather than focusing on textiles 
it moved instead into imperial development including transport infrastructure and utilities as 
suggested by Crafts.567 it does seem to be a genuinely dynamic and competitive sector, with 
companies diversifying in an attempt to gain further growth and profits, lending this 
interpretation further weight. 
Therefore coaling stations were much more than merely a station for steamers ‘caught 
short’ on the way to their destination. Indeed, they were important nodes within the 
international trade network. Aden’s role as a coaling station brought many steamers to the 
port, which in turn made it into a convenient hub for the local commerce. In 1872, only 
twenty-one steam vessels entered Aden from the nearby ports of Hudayda and Jedda, but by 
1893, a hundred vessels (60,897 tons) cleared for those ports from Aden, and a further eighty-
nine for Zayla and Berbera.568 Aden had developed into a local entrepot for the Red Sea and 
Egyptian region, thanks to its location as a major port of call for on the international steamer 
                                                 
566 Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, Minutes of Annual General Meetings, (1898 – 1902), 
Directors’ Reports. For the link to Shell, see R.D.Q. Henriques, Marcus Samuel: First Viscount Bearsted and founder 
of the "Shell" Transport and Trading Company, 1853 - 1927 (London, 1960) 
567 M. Casson & A. Godley, ‘Entrepreneurship in Britain’p.220 
568 R.J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, p.186. 
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network. Not only was the coal trade affected by the wider economy, but the relationship went 
both ways, with extra business being drawn to ports with reliable coaling supplies. 
Coaling stations are a vital and under-appreciated asset in the field of British Victorian 
business, much like the coal trade in general. Offering a wide range of services, diverse qualities 
of coal in a competitive and dynamic market, they were profitable and forward looking 
successes. They operation of these networks was complicated and governed not just by 
competition but also by cartels such as the Atlantic Island Depot Arrangement. The contracts 
between agents, coal suppliers, shipowners and other interested parties were often designed 
to provide exclusive relationships, binding coaling stations in different regions together into 
networks, supplying bespoke qualities of coal to ships across the world. Despite this 
arrangement in some cases, coaling firms were also required to purchase multiple qualities of 
coal to cater for their customers’ requirements. These could change based on business 
decisions by the shipowners, mining difficulties (such as the Taff Vale strike) and local 
circumstance; as well as the requirements changing over the period under study due to 
technological change. Coaling stations acted as hubs for local commerce, and the world-wide 
coal distribution network that Britain created through these stations is a perfect example of 
adding value to a base resource. They stand out further as a model of British business success 
in a period generally associated with British economic decline. Much like the coal trade more 
generally and coal mining, easy assumptions about the nature of the business and an 
unentrepreneurial spirit do not necessarily fit the actual surviving documents of coaling 
stations. 
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 “I have now, I fear, respassalmost too long on your attention, but must plead, as an excuse, the 
interest attached to the subject. It was one I took up to wile away the tedium of confinement to the house 
with influenza, thinking that a few paragraphs would embrace all I had to say on it, but the further I 
proceeded the more extensive became the field of inquire opened up; a field through which I have had 
almost to pulot my own way unassisted, as I know no subject which has among authors attracted so 
little attention..” 569 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the nature and complexity of the British coal trade 
in the period of 1850 – 1914. In doing so it has brought together related but separate areas of 
history which, recently, have generally been considered in isolation. The coal mining industry, 
railways, steam-shipping, coal exports from both the North East and South Wales and also 
the development and operation of coaling stations across the globe. Bringing these together 
and looking at them through the lens of coaling stations, both their role and the business of 
them, helps to demonstrate how they worked together to create a competitive and dynamic 
industry on the shores of countries around the world, rather than just the traditionally studied 
movements of coal around the UK.  
A Victorian would immediately have recognised these different areas as facets of the 
same thing; a single and important aspect of Britain’s commercial past: the coal trade. Yet it is 
perhaps the coal trade’s ubiquity during the period that has partly resulted in its lack of study. 
It was accepted as a given, a key and crucial foundation of Britain’s economic might – enabling 
the import of goods from across the world and in return fuelling Britain and the world’s 
steamers and factories as they carried out the day-to-day business of the global economy. 
Although only significant after 1850, it soon achieved this enviable status. Yet, at the other 
                                                 
569 W. Laird, The Export Coal Trade of Liverpool.  
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end of the scale, it was even faster to fade away: the rise of oil, the sinking of steam tonnage 
and the problems of the coal industry between the wars all led to coal’s rapid obsolescence 
and the replacement of Britain’s black diamonds with the Middle East’s black gold by the 
1950s. The more resonant histories of mining communities, upheaval, and the politics, culture 
and society of the coal community has, understandably, taken centre stage since in 
understanding the coal industry in the period under study. Economic historians have focused 
on coal simply as an output, an increasing number of tons being produced across Britain by 
ever more soot-stained miners.  
Yet whilst the technology of coal mining in the period may have remained broadly 
static, with improvements in winding technology being the main relevant improvement, the 
coal industry’s growing output had instead to be utilised, either at home or abroad, and it is to 
further enlighten this understanding that the thesis aims. The transport of coal, from pithead 
to (more often than not) dock, was revolutionised by the transport networks enabled by coal 
as a fuel. The rapid spread of railways across Britain and the wider world was possible thanks 
to coal, especially the Welsh steam coal which also powered the slow but steady spread of 
steam shipping as an alternative to wind power; a development which, along with the Suez 
Canal, would change the face of world trade.  
These new transport modes were not only dependent upon coal as a fuel but also 
reliant on coal to provide a large amount of the freight that they would move. Railways, from 
the start with the Stockton and Darlington, had been built around the simple task of moving 
coal from pithead to dock for onward shipment, and mineral traffic remained the lifeblood of 
Britain’s railways until after the Second World War.  
Coal-mining and the development of the railways are, however, well-studied and well-
understood aspects of the coal trade. They have traditionally, as part of that understanding, 
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come in for criticism that they were lacking dynamism and entrepreneurial nous; the lack of 
coal-cutting machinery and declining productivity of the former or the “silly little bob-tailed 
wagons” of the latter providing suitable ammunition with which later historians could write 
scathing critiques. However, further consideration has started to chip away at these old 
certainties; coal-cutting equipment was used where it was suitable and the rail wagons were 
suited to the requirements of the coal trade being conducted in the UK.  
For the coal trade of the UK was a complicated and diversified one. Even taking the 
example of coals from Newcastle that were bound for London, the easy historical narrative of 
sail ships giving way to the railways as technologies changed is a simplification too far. The 
collapsing of the Limitation of the Vend may have brought about a significant change in how 
coal got to London, hastened by the railways, but sea remained an important aspect of this 
trade, and indeed regained a share of tonnage as the steam revolution took hold. This is best 
understood when the different strengths of each mode are considered. Large, bulky 
consignments of coal for burning in gas works or electricity stations were suited to the 
traditional shipment by sea. The tonnages involved best served by the loading technology of 
staithes in the north east, large ships of growing capacity on the coastal run and then steam-
powered cranes such as the Cory’s Atlas platforms for unloading on the Thames. By contrast 
the railways, with their marshalling yards all over London and their ability to marshal coal from 
different collieries together into bespoke services, provided the perfect solution for merchants 
of household coal. Every colliery was accessible by rail, every shunting yard and every depot 
being linked in a chain of complexity which enabled merchants to ensure adequate supplies of 
multiple coals at once, without over-burdening their storage arrangements – storage 
arrangements which often involved the wagons themselves, much to the chagrin of collieries 
who required constant movement of coal from the pit-head. Treating coal as a homogenous 
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output is an easy but crucial error. Certain coals were best suited for certain tasks. In this way, 
shipping and rail were never really in ‘competition’ for the London coal market; they each 
operated in their own niche and dominated it, complementary services which helped fuel the 
metropolis.  
Similarly, when the export of coal from Great Britain is assessed, it is easy to forget 
the difference between coals. The Stockton and Darlington was the first of many railways 
which brought coal to the ports of the North East for export to the rest of Europe. A 
burgeoning trade grew up around the shipment of coal to continent, coal from Durham and 
Northumberland fuelling factories across France, Germany, Russia and Scandinavia. This 
trade was a competitive and dynamic one, composed of both specialised colliers running out 
with coal and back empty, or (as in the case of the S. S. Leonis) running out with coal and 
back with grain or pit props. This business sat at the heart of shipowning, shipbroking and 
coal-exporting, as shown through the example of Witherington and Everett, a firm which was 
keen to keep its fleet up to date and as efficient as possible, whilst also undertaking similar 
concerns for other ship owners and coal merchants. The juggling of different factors resulted 
in a complicated business but one that was successful. Indeed, the competition in the trade 
meant that in Northern Germany, British coal from the North East was cheaper than that 
from the nearer Westphalian fields. The coal trade shaped the geography of the north east, 
through the growth of Seaham for example, or the dense railway network as well shaping the 
trade flows of the North, Germanic and Baltic Seas.  
Whilst the coal trade of South Wales was slower to develop, taking off only after 1850 
and the coming of the railways, its rise was dramatic, accounting for by far the most significant 
part of British coal exported from any single field on the eve of the First World War. The 
reasons for this dominance lay in its different to the north eastern coal; its suitability for 
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burning in steam boilers and navigation, leading to its adoption by railway companies and, 
crucially, the Admiralty and the steam-shipping lines as the highest quality fuel.  If Newcastle 
fuelled the manufactories and mills of the Industrial Revolution across Europe, Welsh coal 
provided the coal to fuel the distribution of the resulting goods. That is not to deny that the 
coal trade in South Wales bore many similarities with that of the North East. Indeed, some of 
the companies were the same. Witherington and Everett provide an example of a firm who, 
whilst based in the North East, also sent their ships to Cardiff and Newport if the conditions 
for such a run were propitious. Likewise, the firms operating out of Cardiff were also at the 
heart of a network of similarly diversified firms, with shipbroking being a very common second 
occupation for coal shipping firms, alongside ship-owning and timber-importing. However, 
such similarities disguise the differences. Welsh coal was shipped across the globe in quantities 
far greater than that of North Country coal. Welsh coal was to be found in locations as far 
away as Hong Kong, Durban, Rio de Janerio, Calcutta and across the Mediterranean. It earned 
this widespread dispersion not just as a fuel for the world’s steamships, but as a freight too. 
Exports of Welsh coal could be found on the key routes which were used by British imports; 
providing a return freight for ships laden with grain and other raw materials from across the 
world. This return freight lowered the transport costs of the goods and food required to keep 
the British economy growing in the period up to the First World War. Contemporaries such 
as Jevons and Thomas discussed the importance of this trade at length, whilst others such as 
Sargent and Smith described the impact that the British coal trade had on the shape of world 
trade flows. British coal often out-competed domestic coal in ports such as India, or closer 
exporters of coal (such as Australia in Hong Kong) due to this important role. Much like in 
North Germany, it was cheaper to get British coal shipped across oceans than it was to get 
more local coal shipped specially or across expensive land routes.  Whilst this differentiation 
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was slowly being eroded as the years under study continued to pass, it was still an important 
and fundamental part of British trade. The coal trade was “the alpha and omega” as Jevons 
put it.  
This trade, and the importance of coal to the British merchant and Royal Navies meant 
that he government regularly were asked to consider intervening, however the Admiralty 
found it easier to buy from the private sector rather than own it directly, whilst aside from a 
brief foray into taxation, Central Government left the export trade generally well alone, outside 
of the related area of work safety regulation that affected the mining industry more broadly.  
Much of this coal from South Wales was being shipped to coaling stations, strung out 
along the world’s trade routes. These coaling stations enabled global trade to progress, 
spreading the steam revolution across the globe. Coaling stations meant that ships no longer 
needed to call at destinations such as Britain, Australia or America every second stop to stock 
up on fuel for the next voyage. In combination with the telegraph, coaling stations enabled 
the age of the tramp steamer. Ships could be re-directed according to the latest market 
intelligence, safe in the knowledge that coal could be found at the destination, or, safe in the 
knowledge that coal could be carried rather than ballast and a willing buyer found.  
The buyers, that is, the coaling stations themselves, were, however, much more than 
piles of imported coals on the quayside. Analysis of the surviving records of a number of firms 
indicate an industry which was complicated and dynamic. These coal merchants played a 
crucial part in the coal trade, buffering the collieries’ demands for steady, predictable and 
regular shipments to the docks against the vicissitudes of the world markets in coal and 
freights. Instead they had to collect these regular shipments, mix them as required and then 
ensure they were available across the globe to customers. This was done through alliances and 
networks, as well as through sheer heft and numbers (as exemplified by Cory Brothers). 
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Smaller firms such as Wilsons dominated regional markets and linked with other firms for a 
global network, whilst others, smaller still (such as the Aden Coal Co. or Agelasto, Spezzo and 
Co.) ended up either as small, independent merchants or becoming agents for larger chains, 
locked in through a number of contracts.  
The competitive nature of the industry meant that, similar to other industries in the 
period (including the two related most closely, that is shipping and coal mining) there were 
attempts to set up agreements to minimise competition. However, whilst these worked in 
some instances such as the Atlantic Islands Depot Arrangement, or even at locations as 
important as Port Said at Suez, generally the picture from the surviving reports seems to be 
one of competition and innovation. Firms diversified into related industries to try and promote 
their services to customers. Much as coal-factoring was seen as a ‘need-to-have’ business line 
on the Cardiff docks, many coaling stations diversified in to broader trades such as victualling, 
stevedoring and even repairs.  
These firms were run from Great Britain, stocked with British coal and supplied the 
world’s steam ships, most of which were British. They did this as part of a chain of dynamic 
and forward-looking merchants and traders, who were closely interlinked and often involved 
themselves with the allied trades of shipbroking and ship-owning. Furthermore, despite 
worries about the nature of the goods they were selling and its quality, being whether it should 
be kept solely for the Admiralty to ensure Britannia could truly rule the waves, the sector 
remained resolutely in private hands. The Admiralty were more than content with the 
arrangements in place, and bar a short four year period when the export trade was taxed (as a 
result, mostly of its success) the Government remained relatively uninterested in interfering, 
instead focusing on the allied trades and related areas of shipping, railways and mining. The 
British coal export trade is a hitherto under-appreciated area which provides new evidence to 
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refute easy condemnations of the Victorian businessman. This is of particular note given its 
role as a service, adding value to a primary input of varied coals. This confirms the general 
trend in history away from blanket condemnation of the Victorian and Edwardian 
entrepreneur, instead supporting a more nuanced hypothesis, as has increasingly become the 
standard argument throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Dynamism 
and innovation moved away from core manufacturing (such as textiles in the North of 
England) and moved to the provision of an international trading infrastructure that 
demonstrated a range of different company forms. In addition to this, the British coal trade 
provides an as yet overlooked approach to understanding the nature of both the British and 
the world economy before 1914, tying together rail development, steam shipping, coal mining, 
distribution, services, global reach and local specialisms and entrepreneurial drive; a crucial 
part of Britain’s structure in the pre-war period was, as contemporaries knew, the coal trade. 
 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: A Study of the British Coal Trade: 1850 - 1913 
 
 214 
Coal as a Freight, Coal as a Fuel: 
A STUDY OF BRITAIN’S COALING STATIONS: 1865 - 1913 
 
Appendix One: Freight Rates 
 
 The following table lays out the freight indexes used within the text: 
 
Year 
Isserlis’ Index 
(General Tramp) 
(1880 = 100) 
Isserlis’ Index 
(Coal from Wales to Rio) 
(1892 = 100) 
Wilsons’ Freights 
(1880 = 100) 
1880 100  100 
1881 100  94 
1882 93  103 
1883 86  108 
1884 74  124 
1885 72  80 
1886 68  66 
1887 75  88 
1888 87  88 
1889 86  125 
1890 74  98 
1891 72 100 76 
1892 63 103 62 
1893 69 84 61 
1894 67 74 62 
1895 64 93 50 
1896 64 96 60 
1897 64 105 73 
1898 78 83 74 
1899 75 108 65 
1900 87 82 66 
1901 66 71 67 
1902 56 59 55 
1903 56 56 
 
1904 56 68 
1905 59 100 
 
Source:  Isserlis’ General Tramp Index was taken from the figures created by Mitchell, B. R., & 
Deane, P., Abstract of British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, 1962), p.224. 
Isserlis’ Coal from Wales to Rio Index was taken directly from Isserlis, L., ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, 
and Freights, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 101, No. 1 (1938), pp.53-146. 
Wilsons’ Freights are somewhat less accurate. The amount of coal sold was divided by the amount paid 
in freight (figures taken from Appendix Two). The resultant figures were indexed. Whilst far more 
rough and ready then Isserlis’ work, the general trends are still apparent and as such are useful in a 
preliminary study such as this. 
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Appendix Two: Statistics of Wilsons, Sons & Co. 
 
 The following table lays out the key figures from Wilson, Sons & Co. used: 
 
Year Sales (tons) Profit Coal Revenue Freights 
1878 63,708 £18,252 £104,773 £65,308 
1879 N/A £23,761 £76,406 £49,987 
1880 57,116 £32,355 £93,007 £54,272 
1881 78,598 £35,044 £107,313 £69,961 
1882 91,166 £20,232 £138,470 £89,223 
1883 108,924 -£2,143 £165,294 £111,503 
1884 108,224 £17,602 £171,870 £127,407 
1885 110,922 £3,672 £130,098 £84,246 
1886 149,193 £17,115 £157,614 £93,733 
1887 229,097 £22,177 £287,743 £191,563 
1888 332,983 £22,541 £379,799 £276,868 
1889 437,251 £22,090 £624,384 £518,836 
1890 341,861 £25,075 £447,226 £319,961 
1891 257,526 £31,707 £299,497 £184,954 
1892 242,632 £86,769 £269,076 £142,878 
1893 271,516 £30,129 £292,733 £156,632 
1894 323,261 £11,285 £322,563 £189,502 
1895 441,208 £9,440 £351,017 £210,907 
1896 514,168 £42,808 £403,722 £291,491 
1897 423,584 £35,523 £396,848 £293,380 
1898 507,865 £71,187 £528,907 £358,749 
1899 576,605 £52,973 £511,638 £354,012 
1900 733,823 £122,142 £703,235 £463,008 
1901 625,481 £114,957 £648,176 £398,592 
1902 756,685 £12,500 £554,767 £398,873 
1903 849,000 £77,500  
(figures cease after 1902) 1904 918,000 £107,286 
1905 1,014,000 £110,849 
1906 1,272,245 £158,238 
1907 1,412,378 £257,535 
1908 1,333,180 £211,516 
1909 1,593,221 £155,839 
1910 1,904,221 £109,152 
1911 1,769,000 £204,648 
 
Source: London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/225/MS20186/001 for 1882 - 1891, 
CLC/B/225/MS20186/002 for 1892 – 1900 and CLC/B/225/MS20186/003 for 1901 – 1902, Wilson Sons & 
Co., Minutes of Annual General Meetings, 1878 – 1911.  
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Appendix Three: Statistics of the Aden Coal Company 
 
 The following table lays out the key figures from the Aden Coal Company used: 
 
Year Sales (tons) Profit Dividend 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
32,083 
52,892 
68,464 
46,78116 
39,47912 
43,62215 
42,76210 
51,514 
53,86712 
37,796 
40,44910 
36,64916 
28,10915 
29,65010 
39,54610 
43,153 
29,299 
46,61910 
45,28010 
40,42615 
45,122 
37,960 
37,35610 
34,651 
33,11010 
32,5059 
35,7012 
18,0607 
17,48515 
£12,844.11.11 
£20,505.6.5 
£21,816.8.9 
£8,835.14.11 
£6,546.19.9 
£6,840.11.4 
£5,541.16.10 
£1,816.15.11 
£8,440.4.5 
£2,301.19.0 
£3,031.19.6 
£3,635.7.9 
£1,268.8.5 
£4,000.10.3 
£5,831.15.6 
-£2991.17.1 
£1,066.7.4 
£10,029.3.5 
£7,145.0.1 
£6,134.19.5 
£5,242,18.9 
£3,619.18.3 
£3,835.14.4 
£4,000.9.7 
£1,921.2.10 
£8,949.0.9 
£8,682,13.6 
£900.14.6 
-£3,948.4.9 
20% 
33% 
50% 
30% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
10% 
20% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
10% 
10% 
N/A 
5% 
15% 
15% 
15% 
15% 
15% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
10% 
10% 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Source: Glamorgan Archives, DCB/3 - Aden Coal Company, Minutes of Annual General Meetings 1881 – 1909.  
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